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ABSTRACT
The dissertation consists of three essays. The first essay examines the role of earn-
ings per share (EPS)–tied performance metrics on firm value and share repurchase activity
using compensation data from proxy statements. We find that firms are more likely to re-
purchase stock when CEO contracts are tied to EPS metrics. Because stock buybacks can
potentially be beneficial for firms with low investment opportunities and high free cash
flow, firms are grouped on these dimensions. Investors react positively when firms with
low investment opportunities and high free cash flow add EPS-tied performance goals; in
contrast, investors react negatively when firms with high investment opportunities and low
free cash flows add such goals. The results are consistent with agency costs of free cash
flow. Overall, this essay highlights the importance of EPS-tied performance metrics to
firm value.
In the second essay, the effects of managers’ pay duration on mergers and acqui-
sitions (M&As) activities are studied. We find that when short-horizon managers make
announcement of an M&A deal, both the short-term and long-term abnormal returns are
greater than the group of firms with long-horizon managers. Consistent with the positive
reactions, M&As conducted by short-horizon managers have stronger post-M&A account-
ing performance in the short term and do not exhibit poor performance in the long term. The
results are surprising when viewed against the conventional wisdom that giving managers
short-term incentives is suboptimal and imply that long-term incentives are not necessarily
optimal for all firms in all situations.
ii
In the third essay, we revisit the controversial question of whether long-run abnormal
returns are associated with major corporate events. Our analyses investigate M&As, ini-
tial public offerings (IPOs), seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), and dividend initiations. In
an attempt to resolve ambiguous empirical evidence with respect to these events, we con-
duct a variety of tests for abnormal long-run performance, including buy-and-hold returns
(BHARs), different calendar time approaches, and a recent standardized test. Empirical
tests for these different methods consistently detect significant long-run abnormal returns
for all four corporate events.
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NOMENCLATURE
ASR Abnormal standardized return
BE Book equity
BHAR Buy-and-hold abnormal return
CAR Cumulative abnormal return
CEO Chief executive officer
CTAR Calendar time abnormal return
EPS Earnings per share
FCF Free cash flow
IPO Initial public offerings
MB Market-to-book
ME, MVE Market value of equity
M&A Mergers and acquisitions
NR Net repurchases
ROA Return on assets
R&D Research and development
OLS Ordinary least squares
SEO Seasoned equity offerings
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In this dissertation, recent topics related to corporate governance andmajor corporate
events are examined using short-run and long-run performance tests. Firms are required
to disclose compensation details in their proxy statements. Using available information
from proxy statements, earnings per share (EPS) metrics in compensations plans are ex-
tensively studied in the first part of the dissertation. Next, following Gopalan et al. (2014),
pay duration measure is constructed using vesting schedules of pay components. Mergers
and acquisitions (M&A) activities are examined for studying effects of incentive horizon
using pay duration measure. Finally, we study long-run abnormal returns associated with
major corporate events, including M&As, initial public offerings (IPOs), seasoned equity
offerings (SEOs) and dividend initiations.
In the first essay, “Do EPS metrics in CEO pay contract affect repurchases and firm
value?”, the role of earnings per share (EPS)–tied performance metrics on firm value and
share repurchase activity are investigated. There is a significant increase in the use of share
repurchases (Skinner, 2008) and there has been widespread criticism of stock buybacks al-
leging that they are used only as attempts to inflate stock prices in the near term and that
firms conducting them sacrifice longer-term investments that benefits both firms and their
employees. Performance-vesting conditions written EPS could create incentives to repur-
chase stock because repurchases decrease shares outstanding, the denominator of EPS, and
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thus ceteris paribus, increase EPS. The increased EPS can then trigger vesting of certain
performance-vesting stock or options, which an executive likely finds valuable even if it
does not maximize shareholder wealth. Consistent with this prediction, we find that firms
are more likely to repurchase stock when CEO contracts are tied to EPS metrics.
Stock buybacks can potentially be beneficial (harmful) for firms with low (high)
investment opportunities and high (low) free cash flow. Thus, firms are sorted on these
dimensions and the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the proxy filing date are
used to determine the effect of “adding EPS metrics” or “removing EPS metrics” on share-
holder value. Investors react positively when firms with low investment opportunities and
high free cash flow add EPS-tied performance goals. On the other hand, investors react
negatively when firms with high investment opportunities and low free cash flows add such
goals. Findings are consistent with agency costs of free cash flow. (Jensen, 1986)
In the second essay, “The Bright Side of Giving Managers Short-Horizon Incen-
tives”, coauthored with Mehmet Cihan and Shane Johnson, the effects of managers’ pay
duration on mergers and acquisitions (M&As) activities are examined. Research on the
question whether incentives to managers improve firm performance provides mixed ev-
idence. M&As are often one of the largest investments a firm makes and provides a
conducive setting to explore the relation between executive compensation design and the
creation of shareholder wealth (Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman, 2001). In this essay,
we present evidence that short-termism is not necessarily bad, at least when making an
M&A deal, by showing that firms offering short-term incentives, defined by the length of
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compensation’s vesting schedule, realize better announcement abnormal returns than firms
offering relatively long-term incentives.
Consistent with the positive reactions, M&As conducted by short-horizon managers
have stronger post-M&A accounting performance outcomes in the short term, and do not
exhibit poor performance in the long term. The results are surprising when viewed against
the conventional wisdom that giving managers short-term incentives is suboptimal, and
imply that long-term incentives are not necessarily optimal for all firms in all situations.
In the third essay, “On long-run stock returns after corporate events”, coauthored
with James Kolari and Seppo Pynnonen, we contribute a broad set of evidence on the con-
troversial question of whether long-run abnormal returns are associated with major cor-
porate actions. Our analyses investigate major corporate events, namely mergers and ac-
quisitions (M&As), initial public offerings (IPOs), seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), and
dividend initiations. We contribute to the continuing controversy about the significance of
long-run abnormal returns associated with these events by implementing a battery of dif-
ferent test approaches, including Bessimbinder and Zhang regression approach (Bessem-
binder and Zhang, 2013), well-known buy-and-hold returns (BHARs), three-factor calen-
dar time regressions, and a recent standardized abnormal return (ASR) approach (Dutta
et al., 2015).
Empirical tests for these different methods detect significant long-run abnormal re-
turns for all four corporate events. BHAR and ASR findings suggests significant long-run
abnormal underperformance over a 5-year horizon after M&As, IPOs, and SEOs. For IPOs
3
and SEOs, a common reversal pattern is evident with 1-month over-performance followed
by accumulating under-performance that becomes significant after about 3 years. We de-
tect significant over-performance for dividend initiations using ASR approach.
4
CHAPTER II
DO EPS METRICS IN CEO PAY CONTRACT AFFECT
REPURCHASES AND FIRM VALUE?
”There is only one combination of facts that makes it advisable for a company to re-
purchase its shares: First, the company has available funds –cash plus sensible borrowing
capacity– beyond the near-term needs of the business and, second, finds its stock selling
in the market below its intrinsic value, conservatively calculated.”
Warren Buffett, 1999 letter to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders
II.1 Introduction
Changes in payout policies over the last three decades exhibit a significant increase
in the use of share repurchases (Skinner, 2008). There has been widespread recent criticism
of stock buybacks alleging that they are used only as attempts to inflate stock prices in the
near term and that firms conducting them sacrifice longer-term investments that benefits
both firms and their employees.1 It is important to understand why CEOs decide to engage
in stock repurchases and how these decisions affect firm value. Fenn and Liang (2001) find
that firms’ payout policies are related to the type of compensation—options versus stock—
that firms use in compensating and incentivizing their executives. Other features of execu-
1Recently, Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton proposed “reforms to help CEOs and share-
holders alike to focus on the next decade rather than just the next day”. Also some politicians, like Senators
Elizabeth Warren and Tammy Baldwin, think that stock buybacks are bad and that SEC should forbid them
as market manipulation. See: Wall Street Journal article http://on.wsj.com/1CBuLBD and Bloomberg View
article http://bv.ms/1QyixQK
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tive compensation could also affect the decision to repurchase stock. In particular, Bizjak,
Hayes, and Kalpathy (2015) and Bettis et al. (2014) report that performance-contingent
vesting conditions are common in executive compensation contracts. Performance-vesting
conditions written on earnings per share (EPS) could create incentives to repurchase stock
because repurchases decrease shares outstanding, the denominator of EPS, and thus ceteris
paribus, increase EPS.2 The increased EPS can then trigger vesting of certain performance-
vesting stock or options, which an executive likely finds valuable even if it does not max-
imize shareholder wealth.
Considering the downsides of EPS metrics, some firms removed EPS-related trig-
gers in their compensation plans. For example, in a recent case, Starbucks mentioned the
removal of EPS-tied metrics in their proxy statement:3
“In recent years, shareholder feedback has influenced certain of our compensation
design changes, including … the removal of EPS as a performance measure under our
EMBP [Executive Management Bonus Plan] … ”
Yet, many other firms have added EPS-related compensation plans.
Given the increasing use of performance-vesting features in executive compensation,
in particular those related to EPS, we examine two important questions using data on CEO
compensation plans from the Incentive Lab database. The first question is: are firms signif-
icantly more likely to initiate stock buybacks when their CEOs have EPS-related triggers
in their performance vesting conditions? We find they are.
2EPS is the most used accounting-type absolute performance metric. CEO pay contracts may include
different types of accounting metrics, e.g. sales, operating income, earnings, cash flow, EBITDA, etc.
3Starbucks Corporation , Notice of 2014 Annual Meeting of Shareholders and Proxy Statement
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Realizing that stock buybacks can potentially be beneficial (harmful) for firms with
low (high) investment opportunities and high (low) free cash flow, the second question
is: do investors react positively to additions of EPS-related triggers for firms with low
investment opportunities and high free cash flow? In this case, the EPS-related triggers
would be beneficial by reducing free cash flow problems to the type described by Jensen
(1986). Conversely, do investors react negatively to additions of EPS-related triggers at
firms with high investment opportunities and low free cash flow? In that case, investors
would be harmed when EPS-related triggers lead CEOs to pay out cash that would be
better used on high investment opportunities. Based on abnormal returns around proxy
filing dates (in which the proxies disclose the additions or deletions of EPS-triggers), We
find support for both hypotheses. We find that the additions of EPS-related goals increase
the equity value around 1.1% for firms with low investment opportunities and high free
cash flow.
This study contributes to the prior literature in several ways. First, we reveal the
positive association between share repurchases and EPS-tied pay contracts. Second, we
find that buyback activities triggered by EPS-tied compensations may also be explained by
shareholders’ interests in addition to those of managers. we argue that EPS-tied compensa-
tion grants can be designed so firm can both achieve certain goals to maximize shareholder
value and incentivize managers at the same time. In order to protect shareholders from
manipulative actions of managers, managerial incentives can be designed based on firms’
investment opportunities and free cash flow. This paper also provides insights into the
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managerial incentives and implications of the accounting-tied performance grants. Over-
all, our results extend our understanding of EPS factors in executive contracts.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II.2 discusses the related literature. In
section II.3, hypotheses are presented. Section II.4 describes the data sources and con-
struction of variables. Section II.5.1 shows the effect of EPS-tied performance metrics on
share repurchases. Section II.5.2 analyzes the effect of adding or removing EPS-related
goals on firm value. Section II.6 discusses robustness checks and Section II.7 concludes.
Definition of variables are in Appendix A.
II.2 Related literature
The connection between firm value and managerial incentives is one of the central
topics in compensation research. In an ideal world, compensation plans should motivate
CEOs to make business decisions that maximize shareholder value. A large body of the
literature examines the relationship between executive compensations and firms’ invest-
ment decisions (Larcker, 1983, Core and Larcker, 2002). Skinner (2008) (among others)
shows that “share repurchases are now the dominant form of payout”. Fenn and Liang
(2001) examine how payout policies are affected by managerial stock incentives and find
evidence that the effects are more pronounced at firms with potential agency problems.4
The compensation literature also shows that there is a link between firms’ stock
repurchases and the presence of EPS-tied performance metrics in CEO compensations
(Young and Yang, 2011). Brav et al. (2005) surveyed senior financial executives and docu-
4Jensen (1986) discusses the agency problem between shareholders and managers over payout policies.
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mented that majority of the executives expressed concerns about the effect of buybacks on
EPS, indicating increasing EPS as an important element affecting their share repurchase
decisions.
In a recent paper, Bizjak, Hayes, and Kalpathy (2015) find that firsm with earnings-
based performance metrics are more likely to manage real earnings compared to non-
earnings-based performance metrics. Also, Almeida, Fos, and Kronlund (2016) show
the real effects of share repurchases by studying firms that are close to the threshold of
zero earnings surprise.5 They find that that EPS- motivated buybacks cause firms to re-
duce investment, R&D, and employment. As Almeida, Fos, and Kronlund (2016) echoed,
EPS-driven buybacks are interesting in their own right, and additional motives and sources
should be explored to answer why some companies are willing to sacrifice investments to
finance EPS-motivated buybacks. In this study, we provide additional insights on this issue
by studying EPS-metrics in CEO contracts.
As Frydman and Jenter (2010) noted, compensation schemes are endogenous with
firm characteristics and correlated with several unobservable characteristics. Therefore,
measuring their causal effects on firm value is particularly challenging. As Almeida, Fos,
and Kronlund (2016) noted, the choice of how to finance share repurchases is also endoge-
nous. In this study, to address endogeneity concerns, we use event study methodology to
measure the effect of compensation plans on market value of equity. Moreover, Bennett
et al. (2015) study asymmetry of performance goals around target values and find that firms
5Almeida, Fos, and Kronlund (2016) study stock market reactions to earnings announcements. In this
paper, stock market reactions to changes in proxy statements are explored.
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that just exceed their EPS targets have higher abnormal accruals (compared to firms that
just miss their targets). In this paper, we use a similar approach to identify firms that are
close to their target values.
In a related paper, Young and Yang (2011) study the link between firms’ stock re-
purchase activity and the presence of EPS performance conditions in executive compen-
sation contracts in UK. In this study, we revisit this issue using US data and we further
explain firm value consequences. More recently, using CEO bonus compensation con-
tracts, Cheng, Harford, and Zhang (2015) find that firms may buy back their shares to
manipulate EPS to achieve bonus targets. They also find that the effect on share repur-
chases is greater when the EPS targets are closer to their threshold. As noted by Bens
et al. (2003) and Hribar, Jenkins, and Johnson (2006), CEOs make sub-optimal decisions
(buy back shares) to improve EPS. In this study, we argue that the board can prevent these
sub-optimal decisions by choosing the correct contract type for CEOs.
II.3 Hypotheses
In the compensation literature, the key question related to EPS-tied goals is whether
EPS-driven managerial actions such as share repurchases impose costs on shareholders.
In this paper, we address this question looking the effects of EPS-tied compensations on
repurchases and examining short term abnormal returns around the filing date of proxy
statements to identify the market reaction.
First, we extend the hypothesis of Cheng, Harford, and Zhang (2015) to all types
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of executive payments (instead of using only bonus payments). First hypothesis is about
the role of the EPS-tied absolute performance metrics on share repurchases activity. Share
repurchases mechanically decrease the number of shares outstanding and increase EPS.
Therefore, when a CEO’s pay contract is tied to an EPS-metric, she would be motivated to
buy back shares and the presence of EPS factors creates an agency problem between the
CEO and shareholders. Accordingly, we expect that firms are significantly more likely to
initiate stock buybacks when their CEOs have EPS-related triggers in their performance
vesting conditions.
Hypothesis 1: When a CEO’s executive compensation is tied to EPS, firms are likely
to buy back their shares.
Hypothesis 1a: When EPS targets are close to (ex-post) actual value, the magnitude
of the net repurchases increases.
Next, we examine stock price reactions to adoptions or deletions of EPS-related trig-
gers in performance vesting conditions. Because stock buybacks can potentially be benefi-
cial (harmful) for firms with low (high) investment opportunities and high (low) free cash
flow, we sort firms on these dimensions.6 When we place the firms into investment and
free cash flow groups, we expect different reactions for different types of groups. First, we
consider the firms with low investment opportunities and high free cash flows as these two
accounting metrics are important indicators for the agency problem between managers and
6Rajan and Wulf (2006) study agency problems and executive perks by using cash flow and market-to-
book ratio. Fenn and Liang (2001) consider few investment opportunities or high free cash flow as indicators
for the agency problem. John, Knyazeva, and Knyazeva (2011) study the effect of geography on agency costs
and firm payout policies and find that the effect is most noticeable for companies with limited investment
opportunities and high free cash flow.
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shareholders.
Hypothesis 2a: When shareholders (board) make a contract that is tied to EPS, if the
firm has low investment opportunities and high free cash flows, then it is expected that the
equity value of the firm will increase.
As an alternative, high investment opportunities and low free cash flows are two
accounting indicators that indicate a growth path for a firm. Therefore, shareholders may
expect a growth for this type of firm, and EPS-tied metrics may slow the growth of the
firm if CEOs are incentivized by EPS-tied goals in their pay contract. Thus, removing
EPS-tied metrics may help the firm in this circumstance, i.e. high growth possibilities
with a shortage of free cash flow.
Hypothesis 2b: When the firm has high investment opportunities and low free cash
flows, equity value of the firm positively changes if shareholders (board) remove EPS-tied
contracts.
II.4 Data, variables and descriptive statistics
Executive compensation plans are from Incentive Lab, and the firms’ accounting
and financial data are from Compustat. Our sample covers for fiscal years between 1998
and 2013 since coverage of Inventive Lab database starts from 1998. Only CEO com-
pensation plans are used in the sample. After excluding financials and utilities (SIC code
6000–6999 and 4900–4999), our sample consists of 1,343 firms with 13,411 firm-years.
Incentive Lab collects grant data from definitive proxy statements (DEF 14A) filed by the
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firms. The sample of the firms in Incentive Lab is based on the largest 750 public firms
measured by the market value. In this paper, we especially emphasize EPS-tied absolute
performance metrics. Proxy filings are usually reported three months after the fiscal year
end. Incentive Lab data is merged with the recent fiscal year accounting variables from
Compustat. Figure B.1 shows the timeline of the events.
Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are calculated using Eventus. Market Model
is used with the estimation period length of 255 trading days.7 Filing dates from Incen-
tive Lab are used to calculate CARs around proxy statement announcements. We calculate
three-day and seven-day abnormal returns around the filing date. Following Fama and
French (2001), Skinner (2008) and Cheng, Harford, and Zhang (2015), “net repurchase”
is defined as the increase in common treasury stock. If treasury stock is zero in the cur-
rent and the prior year, net repurchase is the difference between stock purchase and stock
issuance. If either of these two amounts is negative, net repurchases are set to zero. Net
repurchases are scaled by market value of equity (ME) or book equity (BE). According to
Fama and French (1993), book equity is the book value of the stockholders’ equity plus the
balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit (if available) minus the book value
of preferred stock. Depending on availability, the redemption, liquidation, or par value (in
that order) is used to estimate the value of preferred stock. Negative book equity values
are excluded.
Cash is the amount of cash and cash equivalents scaled by the book value of assets.
Market to Book is the market value of equity plus debt, divided by the book value of assets.
7The estimation period ends 64 trading periods before the event date (filing date).
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Market to Book ratio is used to measure investment opportunities. Dividend payout ratio
is the dividend paid scaled by net income. Bliss, Cheng, and Denis (2015) define free cash
flow (FCF) as operating income before depreciation, minus total interest-related expenses,
minus total income taxes. This study excludes cash dividends and is scaled by total assets
because paying dividends is an alternative method of payout policy.8 Profitability (ROA) is
the ratio of net income to the total assets. Leverage is the sum of short-term and long-term
debt scaled by total assets.
Pay contract is compared to the actual performance for EPS-tied grants. Following
Bennett et al. (2015), Actual EPS - Target EPS is calculated as the difference between actual
EPS (reported in Compustat) and the target EPS (from proxy statements in Incentive Lab).9
Three variables based on Actual EPS - Target EPS variable are constructed. ExceedEPS is
a dummy variable such that ExceedEPS=1 if a firm just exceeds an EPS goal in their CEO
compensation plan.10 MissedEPS is a dummy variable such that MissedEPS=1 if a firm
just missed an EPS goal in their CEO compensation plan.11 Finally, CloseEPS is a dummy
variable for firms that just missed or exceeded an EPS goal in their CEO compensation
plan.
EPS-metric is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has an EPS-tied absolute
performancemetric in their CEO’s pay contract and zero if they do not. EPS-metrics Added
8Results hold when we don’t exclude cash dividends in calculating FCF.
9Compustat reports four different EPS measures based on the fact that EPS are fully diluted (or not) &
earnings include extraordinary items (or not). Following Bennett et al. (2015), we pick the actual EPS that
is closest to the target EPS specified in Incentive Lab.
100  Actual EPS - Target EPS < +0.02
110 > Actual EPS - Target EPS > -0.02
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sample includes firms that added EPS-tied absolute performancemetrics in their CEO com-
pensation contracts for the first time. (Firms that have already had EPS-tied metrics are
excluded; this exclusion is especially necessary for first observation of a firm in the sam-
ple). Figure B.2 shows an example of adding EPS-metrics in pay contracts. Similarly,
EPS-metrics Removed sample includes firms that removed EPS-tied absolute performance
metrics (and never used them again). EPS-metrics Removed sample only includes first
filing dates after the existence of last EPS-tied metrics. Figure B.3 illustrates an example
of dropping EPS-metrics from pay contract.
Table C.1 presents summary statistics for the main firm characteristics. Panel A
covers all observations from the sample and presents distributions of the main accounting
variables. Note that, variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% in the models to reduce the
effects of outliers. Panel B includes mean values for three subsets of the sample. The
last two subsets explicitly look at the firms that add or drop EPS factors in CEO plans.
The average net repurchases scaled by market equity is higher for the EPS sample (2.4%)
compare to full sample (1.7%). The average values of FCF variable are higher for EPS
and EPS-metrics Added samples compared to the overall mean. Also, profitability and
dividend payout ratio are different for the EPS-metric Added sample and the EPS-metrics




II.5.1 The effect of EPS-tied metrics on share repurchases
In this section, the effects of EPS-tied absolute performance metrics on share repur-
chases are examined. Executives whose contracts are tied to EPSmetrics have an incentive
to buy back. Therefore, there should be a positive and significant relation between EPS-tied
metrics in pay contracts and share repurchases. To test the incentives, a left-censored Tobit
Regression is used. The dependent variable is net repurchases scaled by market value of
equity (NR/ME) or net repurchases scaled by book equity (NR/BE). Independent variables
are left bounded by zero by definition.
Figure B.4 shows the mean value of net repurchases scaled by market value of equity
(NR/ME) or net repurchases scaled by book equity (NR/BE) for the period of 1998 to 2013.
The overall mean NR/ME is 1.7%, i.e. the average amount of repurchases is about 1.7
percent of market value of equity. During the beginning of the 2000s, the mean value of
the ratio is less than one percent, and during the pick times (around 2006-2007 and 2011-
2012), the mean value of the ratio of repurchases to market value is more than two percent.
Average net repurchases over the sample period is 222.5million dollars (560million dollars
for firms having positive share repurchases –NR/BE is greater than 1%)
A Tobit regression of share repurchases (NR/ME or NR/BE) is estimated as the fol-
lowing:
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[NR=ME]it = a+bEPS Dummiesit + g1Firm sizeit 1 + g2Cashit 1+ g3FCF it 1
+g4Pro f itabilityit 1+ g5Payout Ratioit 1+ g6Market to Bookit 1
+g7Leverageit 1+ e it : (II.1)
Three different EPS dummy variables are used: EPS-metric, CloseEPS and Ex-
ceedEPS. In Table C.2, we find that the EPS-metric significantly and positively affects
share repurchases. Model 3 or 5 shows that tying the executive contract to an absolute
EPS-metric increases NR/ME by about one percent, consistent with our first hypothesis.
Note that,CloseEPS and ExceedEPS are not significant, consistent with the results of Ben-
nett et al. (2015).12 This table clearly shows that there are both mechanical and economic
relations between EPS-tied metrics and share repurchases. Having EPS-tied metrics in pay
contracts increases the amount of buy backs significantly.
The next table shows an estimate of the following left-censored Tobit regression
with EPS-metrics Added and EPS-metrics Removed dummy variables for all firms in the
sample.
[NR=ME]it = a+b aEPSmetric Addedit 1 +b rEPSmetric Removedit 1
+ g1Firm sizeit 1 + g2Cashit 1+ g3FCF it 1+ g4Pro f itabilityit 1
+g5Payout Ratioit 1+ g6Market to Bookit 1
+g7Leverageit 1+ e it (II.2)
12Bennett et al. (2015) covers the period 2006-2012. They define repurchase as the percentage change in
shares outstanding with respect to the previous fiscal year.
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The first two columns of Table C.3 include firm and year fixed effects. EPS-metrics
Added is significant at 10%, suggesting that adding EPS-tied performance metrics in CEO
pay contract increases NR/ME by 0.5%. Compared to the overall average of 1.7%, the
magnitude is not small. When year-fixed effects (or both firm and year fixed effects) are
excluded, the results are consistent and more pronounced.
Next, only firms that buy back their shares are analyzed to emphasize the magnitude
of the effect. This is because some firms may choose not to buy back their shares or buy
back only a fraction of their shares for operational purposes. In Table C.4, the left-censored
Tobit regression is repeated for only share-repurchasing firms. Positive net repurchase
firms (Positive NR) include firms with (i) net repurchases is positive and (ii) NR/BE is
greater than one percent. The second condition ensures that repurchases are sizeable. For
example, a value close to zero could be driven by the firm buying back some stocks because
employees want to exercise their employee stock options.
The coefficients of the EPS-metrics Added variable are positive. They are significant
when fixed effects are excluded. Results suggest that adding EPS-tied metrics in CEO
compensation plans increase the magnitude of the buyback for positive NR firms. The
coefficients of EPS-metrics Removed (in NR/ME models) are negative (albeit statistically
insignificant).
In Table C.5, the effect of adding (or removing) EPS-tied metrics on share repur-
chases is estimated. The Probit regression with positive NR dummy variable is estimated.
In the first model, both year and industry-fixed effects are included. The probability of
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positive buybacks increase 19.3% when firms add EPS-tied absolute performance metrics
in CEO compensation plans. Again, results are more pronounced when year-fixed effects
(or firm and year fixed effects) are excluded. Note also that, cash and FCF variables are
also positive and significant in Tables C.3-C.5.
Falsification tests
In Table C.6, the estimations in Table C.5 are repeated using firm characteristics
from different fiscal years. We estimate the effect of EPS-metrics Added and EPS-metrics
Removed variable on positive NR variables in different years. For example, the first model
is an estimate of the effect of EPS-metrics variables on lags of share repurchases. Table C.6
shows that the effect of adding EPS-tied metrics on positive NR is only significant after
adding EPS-metrics, not before. When compared to the original model in Table C.4, one-
lag and one-lead models are not significant. Therefore, adding EPS-tied metrics affect
share repurchases decisions after they are added to pay contracts.
Treatment effects
In this section, we use matching models to compare EPS-Added firm with a control
firmwith similar firm characteristics. We estimate the average treatment effect (ATE) using
nearest-neighbor matching procedure. The treatment group includes firms adding EPS
metrics in CEO compensation plans. (EPS-metrics Added variable) Matching variables
include firm size, M/B, ROA, cash and dividend payout ratio. Mahalanobis distance metric
(Abadie and Imbens, 2006, 2011) is used and Abadie-Imbens standard errors are reported
in Table C.7.
19
Table C.7 shows that EPS-metrics Added causes the probability of positive net repur-
chase to be increased by an average of 12.8%. This result is consistent with the previous
results in the Probit model. Also, EPS-metrics Added causes the ratio of net repurchase-
to-book equity to be increased by an average of 0.7% (compared to 1% in Table C.4).
Overall, the EPS has a clear effect on share repurchases, consistent with the recent
literature. It is also clear that adding EPS-tied metrics in the CEO contract increases both
the magnitude of the share repurchases and the probability of positive buybacks. Falsifica-
tion tests in Table C.6 suggest that EPS-Added firms are buying their stocks (or increasing
NR/ME) after they add EPS metrics.
II.5.2 The effect of adding or removing EPS-tied metrics on firm value
In this section, adding (or dropping) EPS-tied metrics in CEO contracts and whether
this is good or bad for shareholders is examined. Cheng, Harford, and Zhang (2015) dis-
cusses “the link between share purchases andCEO’s private financial benefit” usingmanip-
ulation channel. However, the channel between CEO incentives and firm value (through
share repurchases) may not necessarily impose a cost on shareholders.
The effect of EPS-tied metrics on firm value is not always harmful (without ruling
out manipulation channel). We predict that if a firm has good investment opportunities
and a low free cash flow, having EPS factors in CEO pay contracts may hurt sharehold-
ers. However, if a firm has low investment opportunities and high free cash flows, then
adding EPS metrics (incentivizing CEOs to buy back their shares) can be beneficial for
shareholders.
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Rajan and Wulf (2006) examine agency problems and executive perks by using cash
flow and market-to-book ratio. They also use a dummy variable (called Jensen indicator)
for firms with high free cash flow low growth (limited investment prospects). Fenn and
Liang (2001) find that managerial share ownership provides incentives to increase payouts
at firms with potentially the most severe agency problems. Fenn and Liang (2001) also
consider few investment opportunities or high free cash flow as indicators for the agency
problem. John, Knyazeva, and Knyazeva (2011) study the effect of geography on agency
costs and firm payout policies and find that the effect is most noticeable for companies
with limited investment opportunities and high free cash flow.
In this section, the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the proxy filing date
are used to determine the effect of “adding EPS metrics” or “removing EPS metrics” on
shareholder value. As seen in Table 1, the sample is divided into four subgroups based on
free cash flow (FCF) and market-to-book (MB) median values (median values in a fiscal
year). Also, subgroups based on terciles are used as an alternative. In this case, only higher
and lower groups are considered and the middle terciles are dropped.
It is expected that for high FCF/ low MB firms, EPS-tied absolute performance met-
rics could incentivize CEOs to buy back shares and this action may be an ideal choice
for a firm (rather than a manipulating channel). On the other hand, for low FCF/high MB
firms, there are possibly other investment opportunities with limited resources (limited free
cash flow). Thus, EPS-tied metrics may increase the probability of share repurchases and
increase the agency problem between the CEO and shareholders.
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Table 1: Four subgroups based on free cash flow (FCF) and market-to-book (MB)
Low MB High MB
High FCF EPS-metrics may help (highfree cash flow with limited
investment opportunities)
Low FCF
EPS-metrics may hurt (low
free cash flow with potential
investment opportunities)
Table C.8 presents descriptive statistics for cumulative abnormal returns (CARs).
Panel A showsmean values of abnormal returns for the sample and three subsamples (EPS-
metric sample, EPS-metric Added sample and EPS-metric Removed sample). The average
three-day abnormal return is about 11 basis points for full sample and 16 basis points for
firms that include EPS-metrics in CEO pay contracts. This number is significantly larger
for the EPS-metric Added sample (about 0.36%) and relatively smaller for the EPS-metric
Removed sample (about 0.13%). The average seven-day abnormal return values are more
pronounced.
Panel B and Panel C show mean CARs for four subgroups based on FCF and MB
median values for EPS-metric Added and EPS-metric Removed samples, respectively. Sta-
tistical significance levels corresponding Z statistics (Patell, 1976) are reported.13 Panel B
shows that high FCF/low MB firms have significantly positive abnormal returns, as pre-
dicted by Hypothesis 2a. Average three-day abnormal returns for this group is 1.53%, i.e.
13Standardized cross-sectional test based on Boehmer, Masumeci, and Poulsen (1991) also gives very
similar statistics.
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firmswith high cash flow and low investment opportunities have positive response from the
market when they add EPS-metrics in managers’ pay contracts. Similarly, Panel C reports
the average three-day and seven-day abnormal returns for firms dropping EPS-metrics in
CEO contracts. Results are consistent with Hypothesis 2b, albeit they are insignificant.
The next tables estimate weighted least squares regressions for cumulative abnor-
mal returns (calculated using the market model) over three trading days (or seven trading
days) around the proxy filing date – CAR(-1, +1) or CAR(-3, +3). The regressions are
weighted by the variance (calculated from the market model) to reduce heteroskedasticity
problems.14 Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
In Tables C.9 and C.10, the announcement effects of adding or dropping EPS-metrics
in pay contract results are reported based on the median and 33% cut-off points (for FCF
and MB variables). First, in Table C.9, the following regression for different investment
and free cash flow categories is estimated.
CARit = a+b aEPSmetric Addedit + g1Firm sizeit 1+ g2Cashit 1
+g3Pro f itabilityit 1+ g4Leverageit 1+ e it (II.3)
CARit is either CAR(-1, +1) or CAR(-3, +3). EPS-metrics Added is an indicator for
EPS-metrics Added firms. Industry and year fixed effects are included. Fama-French 48
industry classification is used.15 For the brevity, only b a coefficients are reported.
Table C.9 gives more evidence on the announcement effects of adding EPS-metrics.
14Reported WLS weights from Eventus (Market Model) are used. Precisely, weight = 1=(n variance),
i.e. more volatile returns get less weight.
15Results are robust for different industry classifications, including NAICS 3-digit, NAICS 2-digit and
SIC 2-digit.
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Panel A and Panel B illustrate that signs of the coefficients are consistent with the predic-
tions outlined in the hypotheses development section. For example, high FCF/ low MB
groups (based on median cut-offs) have positive and significant abnormal returns (1.11%
for the three-day period and 1.6% for the seven-day period). The results show that investors
reward companies that add EPS-tied compensations when firms have high FCF and low
investment opportunities. In contrast, companies having low FCF and high investment
opportunities observe a decline in stock prices when they add EPS-tied compensations.
Next, in Table C.10, the effect of removing EPS-tied performance metrics on firm
value is examined. Again, the following regression for different investment and free cash
flow categories are estimated (weighted least squares regression model is estimated for
each of four categories):
CARit = a+b rEPSmetric Removedit + g1Firm sizeit 1+ g2Cashit 1
+g3Pro f itabilityit 1+ g4Leverageit 1+ e it (II.4)
CARit is either CAR(-1, +1) or CAR(-3, +3). EPS-metrics Removed is an indicator
for EPS-metrics Removed firms. Similarly, industry and year fixed effects are included.
In Table C.10, only b r coefficients are reported.
Results show that low-FCF-high-MB firms have a positive investor shock when they
remove EPS-tied goals. Panel B shows that a seven-day cumulative abnormal return around
proxy filing is about 5.65% higher for firms dropping EPS-tied metrics. This result is also
consistent with the predictions, suggesting that firms with high investment opportunities
with lower free cash flows could be better off when they drop EPS-tied measures. Most
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of the reported coefficients from Tables C.9 and C.10 have predicted signs. Note that the
magnitude of the coefficients relatively lower for clashed groups such as low-FCF-low-MB
firms. In most cases, they are also insignificant.
This section explains clear (and reverse) predictions for two categories. Thus, in the
following model, low FCF/highMB and high FCF/lowMB groups are combined to test the
predictions. Clashed groups (low FCF/lowMB and high FCF/highMB firms) are dropped,
because their predictions are ambiguous.
In Table C.11, the weighted least squares estimation is repeated for only the low
FCF/high MB and the high FCF/low MB groups using following model.
CARit = a+b 1EPSmetricAddedit +b 2EPSmetricRemovedit + g1RG
+g2[EPSmetricAddeditRG]+ g3[EPSmetricRemoveditRG]
+ g4Firm sizeit 1+ g5Cashit 1+ g6Pro f itabilityit 1
+g7Leverageit 1+ e it (II.5)
CARit is either CAR(-1, +1) or CAR(-3, +3). Industry and year fixed effects are
included. In this model, the main dummy variable RG (reasonable group) equals 1 for High
FCF/Low MB group, and 0 for low FCF/high MB. In Table C.11, only and coefficients
are reported. The coefficient (for interaction term) indicates that adding EPS-metrics may
help firms if RG =1 (reasonable group). On the other hand, the coefficient (for interaction
term) shows that dropping EPS-metrics may hurt the firms if RG =1 (reasonable group).
Consequently, according to the hypotheses, it is predicted that is positive and is negative.
Table C.11 shows consistent results with the predictions.
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Again, results are consistent with the hypotheses: it is a better decision to make a
contract that is tied to EPS when the firm has low investment opportunities and high free
cash flow. It is also beneficial for shareholders to remove EPS-tied contracts when the firm
has high investment opportunities and low free cash flow.
II.6 Robustness checks
Different industry classifications (including NAICS 3-digit, NAICS 2-digit and SIC
2-digit) are used instead of Fama-French 48 industry classification. Results are robust.
For Tables C.9, C.10 and C.11, OLS regressions were run without using weights. The
un-weighted results are quantitatively similar to the reported weighted results.
CEO contracts may include different types of accounting metrics. The popular met-
rics include EPS, Sales, Operating Income, Earnings, Cash flow and EBITDA. In addition
to EPS-metrics Added variable, we define Cash Flow Added variable (in a similar way)
and repeat the models in Table C.9 (i.e. the announcement effect of addingCash Flow met-
rics in CEO pay contracts). The coefficient of Cash Flow Added variable is insignificant
for each category. The results show that EPS is an important accounting-type metric and
adding other types of accounting metrics may not significantly affect the equity value of
the firm.
Furthermore, we use alternative definition of EPS-metric considering the vesting
schemes. We define vested-EPS-metric such that vested-EPS-metric is equal to 1 if a firm
has an EPS-tied absolute performancemetric in the CEO’s compensation plan in the current
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fiscal year, or it had EPS-tied metrics in previous years and their vesting period includes the
current fiscal year. Results are quantitatively very similar when we use vested-EPS-metric
instead of EPS-metric.16
Additionally, the Tobit regressions were run in Table C.2 for firms that have precise
EPS targets in CEO contracts. Results are robust. Instead of using market-to-book ratio
for proxy for investment opportunities, we use research and development (R&D) variable
when we classify our subgroups. We find similar results. Finally. we run our results for
the sample after 2006 and find consistent results.
II.7 Conclusions
This paper examines the effect of EPS performance metrics in a CEO’s pay contract
on the firm’s share repurchases activity and firm value. We have two main findings. First,
firms are more likely buy back their shares when their CEOs have EPS-tied performance
metrics in their pay contracts. Second, the market reacts positively when EPS-tied goals
are added in the CEO’s pay contract in case a focus on enhancing EPS seems an advanta-
geous incentive mechanism, i.e. when a firm has high free cash flows and low investment
opportunities. Similarly, the market reacts negatively when EPS-tied goals are added in the
CEO’s pay contract in case a focus on enhancing EPS seems disadvantageous, i.e. when a
firm has low free cash flows and high investment opportunities.
In sum, findings in this paper explore contracting benefits of EPS-based targets in
16There are only 155 firm-years (108 firms) where EPS-metric is zero and vested-EPS-metric is one (EPS
metric is removed from the compensation plan but there are still vesting periods for the previous plans).
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CEO compensation. We argue that different types of firms may have different goals and
EPS-tied compensation may be beneficial for some of them while it is not the case for
others. Therefore, policy makers should consider all sides when addressing the issues
related to buybacks and compensation plans.
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CHAPTER III
THE BRIGHT SIDE OF GIVING MANAGERS
SHORT-HORIZON INCENTIVES
III.1 Introduction
The conventional academic wisdom suggests that corporate managers focusing on
short-term goals may take suboptimal actions. This view of managerial compensation as-
sumes that executives focus on short-term goals whereby they can benefit from short-term
stock price changes. Investors focus more on long-term goals which avail themselves of
long-term value increases. Executive short-termism, therefore, execarbates the existing
incentive misalignment between the principal and the agent.1 There are common calls in
the press, most recently by a presidential candidate running for 2016 general elections, that
incentives and/or tax laws should be changed to encourage long-term thinking.2 In this pa-
per, we present evidence that short-termism is not necessarily bad, at least when making an
M&A investment. We show that the firms offering short-lived incentive packages realize
better announcement abnormal returns, post-announcement stock price performance, and
operating performance than the firms offering relatively long-term incentives.
1See Bebchuk and Fried (2010) for a discussion of how executive short-termism could cause myopic
managerial actions. Themodel in Bolton, Scheinkman, andXiong (2006) implies that in a speculativemarket,
CEOs may pursue inefficient projects in short-run when a bubble exists. Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong
(2006) argue that a way of avoiding such unwanted outcomes is to lengthen the vesting period of a CEO’s
compensation package. Gopalan et al. (2014) investigate how pay duration is related to short-term stock
performance.
2The Wall Street Journal, 2015, The Imaginary Problem of Corporate Short-Termism, August 17.
http://on.wsj.com/1NoU1OH.
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Equity-based compensation packages are applauded as they are thought to provide a
better incentive alignment between shareholders and managers. According to proponents
of equity-based compensation, linking a CEO’s pay to firm performance can help max-
imize intrinsic value in the long-run. Indeed, previous research suggests that providing
equity-based compensation enhances the value of an acquiring firm.3 The mypoia theories
of executive compensation, however, underlines that it is not the weight of equity-based
payment in the package but the payment horizon over which the benefits are vested. Ac-
cording to the myopia and other theories of executive compensation, one would expect that
CEOs whose incentives are granted in a long period of time are more prone to make worse
investments through acquisitions.4 However, under certain circumstances when making
important corporate decision, today’s executives may be optimizing both short- and long-
run value gains. Examining M&As, we lend support to the latter view that short-termism
should not be seen as bad implied by the theories.
M&As, often seen as major, externally observable investments, offer relatively a
more conducive setting to explore the relation between executive compensation design and
the creation of shareholder wealth (Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman, 2001). Corporate
restructuring through takeovers are quite involved, hence the investors pay more attention.
Firm managers expend a significant amount of time during a merger or an acquisition
process beginning from searching for appropriate targets to closure stage. During such a
3Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman (2001) reports that higher equity-based compensation is associated
with higher short-run (two-day) acquirer abnormal returns. The authors also find that high EBC acquirers
pay lower premiums.
4Managerial myopia has already been shown to negatively impact R&D investments. Edmans, Fang, and
Lewellen (2013) document that newly-vesting equity is negatively associated with R&D investment.
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long, involved process, managers use their discretion more carefully by taking into account
various outcomes following the decision. Moreover, announcement period returns and
their volatility change not only shareholder but also manager wealth. Hence, when making
a target choice or structuring a deal, managers should think twice by taking into account the
effects of possible outcomes on their personal wealth which is a fraction of the shareholder
wealth at the same time. M&As, thus, provide us an ideal setting to explore the impacts of
executive pay duration on the outcomes of an investment decision.
Gopalan et al. (2014) innovated a metric for executive pay duration by computing
the weighted average of vesting durations of different pay components with the weight for
each component being the portion of that component in the total compensation. However,
due to inherent endogeneity, the authors cautiously admit that it is difficult to establish a
causal link in understanding causes and consequences of pay duration. The use and length
of stock- and option-based compensation have increased significantly over the past decades
(see Figure E.1). Although we do not use exogeneity of such an increase in our tests, we
believe exogenous increases in executive pay duration enables us to avoid the endogene-
ity issue to a degree.5 Gopalan et al. (2014) propose two ways to deal with endogeneity:
(1) finding a good instrument for the pay duration (2) using an exogenous shock. In ad-
dition to the exogenous change in the pay duration, visibility of the corporate action is
also important from investor perspective. We take advantage of M&A announcements’
inherent quasi-shock nature for the market by examining the reaction of investors to M&A
5Gopalan et al. (2014) use a data set provided by Equilar covering the years between 2006 and 2009. We
build our sample from the data provided by Incentive Lab, and it covers all available years from the vendor,
between 1998 and 2015.
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announcements. Comparing market reactions to deals made by long- and short-horizon ex-
ecutives, we can investigate the consequences of providing incentives with varying vesting
schedules on firm investment policies.
We first build a similar metric developed by Gopalan et al. (2014) using the data
set provided by Incentive Lab. We borrow pay duration metric in Gopalan et al. (2014)
and further compute a firm-wide executive pay duration, which is the weighted average
pay durations of the top executives reported in proxy statements (SEC Form DEF14A).
Using standard event study techniques and controlling for the variables often thought to
impact the announcement period returns, we first use multivariate tests to see whether the
announcement period returns of acquiring firms with short- and long-horizon executives
are significantly different.6
Long-horizon executives make their firms realize worse abnormal returns around
M&A announcements than short-horizon executives. When an acquiring firm has higher
pay duration (above the median in that fiscal year) , it losses 78.6 basis points (0.79%)
over the five-day announcement period and 76.7 basis points (0.77%) over the 3-day an-
nouncement period. When we use a continuous metric instead of a dummy version of the
pay duration, we find that a 10-month increase in pay duration is associated with 0.42%
decrease in five-day announcement period returns. Given significant empirical evidence
that manyM&As are value destroying at worst and value neutral at best for acquirers when
the target is a publicly-traded firm, the lower likelihood of M&As by short-term managers
6We define “short-horizon” executives as those whose incentive packages have a life of less than the
median pay duration of the sample. Likewise, “long-horizon” executives are those whose incentives are
vested over a time period above the median pay duration.
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is potentially beneficial.7
Next, we investigate whether the short-run benefits to the firms providing short-
horizon incentives are present in the long-run performance of the same firms. First, to
test the differences in long-run stock performances, we use buy-and-hold returns (BHARs)
and long-run cumulative abnormal returns (LCARs). We find that in the long-run stocks
of the firms with executives whose incentives are vested in relatively longer periods do not
outperform those of firms offering incentives with lower duration. We also mimic oper-
ating performance models from Barber and Lyon (1996) and Hoberg and Phillips (2010)
to further test the differences in operating performances of both groups. The differences
in ROA, Op. Inc./Assets (operating income scaled by assets), and Op. Inc./Sales (operat-
ing income scaled by sales) are 1:2%, 0:7%, and 26:6% within three years of the M&A
announcements. Together with long-run stock performance results, the operating perfor-
mance regressions suggest that firms with short-horizon incentives appear to make more
wealth-creating acquisitions and perform better following the acquisitions than firms with
long-horizon incentives.
We also perform tests to see whether short-horizon executives make selective acqui-
sitions. The takeover literature has documented that cross-industry acquisitions or mergers
are generally detrimental to acquiring firm shareholders.8 Cumulative announcement ab-
normal returns are also shown to be positively correlated with relative deal value to the
7See Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) and Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) for negative
reactions by investors to the acquisitions of public firms by public firms.
8See DeLong (2001) how banks focusing on activity and geography enhances stockholder value. Morck,
Shleifer, and Visnhy (1990) find that bidding firms realize higher negative announcement returns when they
make diversifying acquisitions.
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market value of an acquiring firm.9 However, the joint effect of relative deal value and
diversifying acquisitions is not clear. Given the less value destruction by bidders with
short-horizon incentives, one would expect that the executives of these firms are also more
careful as to selection of their targets. Consistent with this expectation, we find that long-
horizon incentive group is more prone to buy big firms in different industries.
Our results imply that longer-term incentives are not necessarily optimal uniformly
for all firms in all situations. We conjecture that short-term incentives (perhaps along
with short-term pressure from investors) lead managers to be more selective when un-
dertaking M&A projects, and choose only those that are more certain to produce value in
the short term. The enhanced short-run wealth creation for shareholders, better operating
performance following M&As, and less likelihood of engaging possibly wealth destroy-
ing acquisitions altogether suggest that managers incentivized with packages vested in the
short-run take more optimal and at least less value-destroying M&A actions compared to
long-horizon managers. Overall, the findings in this paper indicate that stock markets are
more welcoming to the acquisitions made by short-horizon managers than those made by
long-horizon managers. The results presented here provoke us to think twice as to blaming
short-horizon incentive designs.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section III.2 motivates our research
question. Section III.3 summarizes the sampling procedures, construction of key variables,
description of the data via key statistics, and presents the main econometrics models. We
summarize our findings in Section III.4.
9See Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1983) and Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002).
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III.2 Motivation
Executive compensation has been in the focus of both the society and researchers for
several decades. Recently, it has become even more questioned not only by investors but
also by politicians. The debate centers on how to design the pay of executives so that the
managerial incentives better align with those of shareholders, who are investing the social
wealth. Managers may over-invest (Jensen, 1986) and waste stockholders’ cash (Harford,
1999) by engaging in empire building acquisitions. In a more complicated situation, man-
agers may pursue short-term risky projects at the expense of long-run value to benefit from
a likely bubble (Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong, 2006). The conventional view suggests
that the problems of incentive design could be solved by granting more equity whose ulti-
mate return depends upon performance of the underlying assets.
Even if the executive pay is offered as equity, managers may game with it at the
expense of shareholders (principals) by timing certain disclosures and/or implementing
policies that make the prices more volatile. Critics (see Bebchuk and Fried, 2010) of man-
ager short-termism argue that self-interested, myopic managerial behavior can be reme-
died by certain principles.10 According to advocates of long-term incentive designs, the
incentive’s vesting schedule should be long enough to prevent managers from risking long-
horizon, value-adding investments. There is evidence that CEO pay-performance sensitiv-
ity is linked to policy choices and investment riskiness (Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006).
We examine the issue in a setting which, we believe, provides us with sufficient tools
10Bebchuk and Fried (2010) propose eight principles that might help tying equity compensation to long
term-performance.
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to test whether there could be an investment process through which the causal impact of
an incentive plan characterized by the length of pay components. As emphasized by Boul-
ton, Braga-Alves, and Schlingemann (2014), M&A activities provide an important setting
for examining the incentive effects of compensation plans because they are generally the
biggest, and the riskiest, investments conducted by a firm. Similarly, Datta, Iskandar-
Datta, and Raman (2001) underscores that visibility and discretionary nature of M&As,
often long-term investments, make them ideal setting to investigate the relation between
the investment decision processes and managerial incentives.
The M&A literature documents that acquirers of public firms realize either non-
positive announcement abnormal returns.11 It has also been shown that relative deal value
to acquiring firm’s value is negatively correlated with acquisition performance measured
by cumulative announcement returns to the acquiring firm.12 There is also evidence that
cross-industry acquisitions have wealth-decreasing effect.13
On the incentive side of the M&A literature, the findings suggest that equity-based
compensation structure is positively related to short-run shareholder wealth creation around
the announcements.14 While bad acquisitions may threat the throne of a CEO (Lehn and
Zhao, 2006), acquisitions not wealth-destroying may reward the CEO (Harford and Li,
11Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) and Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) for negative reactions
by investors to the acquisitions of public firms by other public firms.
12Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) reports that acquiring firms lose about 2.56% upon announcement
of acquisition of a publicly-traded company. See Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1983) for the first use of
relative size defined as deal value scaled by acquirer’s value. Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004)
shows that the M&A performance of big acquirers is worse than small acquirers.
13See Berger and Ofek (1995) and Lang and Stulz (1994) for negative wealth-effect of diversifying into a
different line of business.
14Morck, Shleifer, and Visnhy (1988) report greater incentives do not imply better firm performance uni-
formly.
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2007). CEOs’ power on the board is shown to affect the acquisition outcomes (Grinstein
and Hribar, 2004). The literature on the relationship between CEO characteristics and
acquisition outcomes suggests that CEOs close to retirement tend to sell firms (Jenter and
Lewellen, 2015). There is also evidence that CEOs with more stock and option holdings
tend to engage in acquisitions (Cai and Vijh, 2007). The use and length of stock- and
option-based compensation have increased significantly over the past decades (Figure E.1
and E.2).15 None of the studies mentioned examined the pay duration and M&As in the
same setting.
The closest paper to our study is Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman (2001). The
authors find that high equity-based compensation is positively associated with long-run
stock performance of the acquirer. There are a number of differences between that study
and ours. First, Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman (2001) do not examine the relation
between incentive length and acquiring firm performance. As Bebchuk and Fried (2010)
indicate focusing on the magnitude of equity-based incentive may not solve the agency-
principal problem in incentive setting. It is not only the magnitude but also the vesting
schedule of equity-based payment that may impact the corporate policies. Second, Datta,
Iskandar-Datta, and Raman (2001) focus more on long-run returns, use a more limited
sample, and do not investigate the propensity of firms with different incentive horizions to
acquire. Another paper that more directly investigates the relation between equity vesting
and managerial incentive horizon is Edmans, Fang, and Lewellen (2013). The authors find
15Following the revision of FASB Statement No. 123, Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation, a sig-
nificant number of public companies adopted Statement 123’s fair-value-based method of accounting for
share-based payment transactions with employees. FASB 123R has been in effect beginning July 15, 2005.
37
that R&D is negatively related to the stock price sensitivity of options and stocks that vest
over the same year. The results lend support to managerial myopia theories. Our paper
differs from Edmans, Fang, and Lewellen (2013) in selection of corporate action. R&D
expenditures are easily unobservable to investors. They also do not offer a suitable quasi-
natural event following which the outcomes of corporate policy change can be studied. We
believe that M&As offer a better setting for studying effects of incentive horizon.
We acknowledge that there is little or no theoretical basis for why short-termism
could be beneficial to shareholders. There are a couple of reasonswe conjecture for why ex-
ecutives with short-term incentives could pursue more wealth-creating acquisitions. First,
short-term incentives are more prone to be impacted by stock price changes. Hence, man-
agers may avoid excessive risk. Second, in an M&A deal making process, the quality of
target, method of payment, and deal structuring are vital for the success of a deal. Thus,
short-horizon managers may be optimizing their and shareholder wealth both in the long-
and short-run.
Our approach in this paper is more of exploration rather than taking a side in the de-
bate of incentive horizon. Conditioned on the benefits of ex-ante long-horizon incentives,
one would expect that long-horizon managers would make better acquisitions whereby cre-
ate less friction between them and shareholders. We leave the mechanism through which
short-horizon managers engage in more wealth-creating acquisitions to future research.
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III.3 Data and methods
III.3.1 Sampling procedures
We collected data as follows: (1) stock prices from Center for Security Prices Re-
search (CRSP), (2) accounting and financial data from S&P Capital IQ’s Compustat North
America (Compustat), (3) mergers and acquisitions data fromThomson Reuter’s SDCPlat-
inum (SDC), (4) executive compensation data fromS&PCapital IQ’s ExecuComp, (5) gov-
ernance characteristics from BoardEx, and (6) executive compensation plans and vesting
schedules for executive officers (executives) including the CEOs from Incentive Lab. Sim-
ilar to Equilar and ExecuComp, Incentive Lab collects the details of compensation plans
from proxy statements for the largest 750 firms from 1998 onward.16 Thus, our sample is
limited to panel of firm-fiscal years between the 1998 and 2013.17
We start sampling with all domestic acquisitions for the study period in which a pub-
licly company announces to make anM&A deal with another company. The targeted firms
are either a public, private, or subsidiary of a parent firm. To be included in the sample,
a deal must be in one of the following forms: acquisition, acquisition of assets, acquisi-
tion of majority interest, or merger. We exclude mergers and acquisitions with undisclosed
values and specific transaction types such as leveraged buyouts, spin-offs, recapitaliza-
tions, minority stake purchases, repurchases, self-tenders, exchange offers, acquisitions
16Incentive Lab updates its database by back-filling and forward-filling. There may be more than one
grant on a specific date for an executive. Incentive Lab provides the value of compensation component at
grant-level and a table consolidating the values for the same compensation components. We use grant-level
data to identify vesting length and fair value of stock and option grants, and use summary table to get salary,
bonus, and other compensation data.
17Our data spans more years compare to Gopalan et al. (2014) where they cover compensation plans
between 2006 and 2009.
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of remaining interest, and privatizations as none of these restructuring activities represent
traditional mergers or acquisitions.
Mulherin and Simsir (2015) find that some target firms are involved inmerger-related
activities before the primary announcement dates that are recorded in SDC. Using news
articles in the Lexis-Nexis database, they identify M&A-related events that appear within
one calendar year of the deal announcements. We correct the announcement dates in our
sample with the dates corrected by Mulherin and Simsir (2015).18
We begin data compilation by merging the fiscal year-end accounting and financial
data, in Compustat, before the announcements with themerging firms obtained from SDC’s
M&A files.19 If a firm in Compustat does not have information on key financial data such
as assets or sales, we drop them out. We exclude acquiring firms with SIC codes between
4900 and 4941 (utility firms). We also exclude small deals where the ratio of deal value to
acquirer’s market value of equity is less than 1%. Once the merger of CRSP, Compustat,
and SDC data is completed, we compute cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) using Even-
tus. In the final stage of sampling, we merge the deals supplemented with CARs, financial
data of merging firms, and CEO characteristics with pay duration measures constructed
using the data from Incentive Lab. The final sample leaves us with of 3,412 deals after
dropping unmatched observations from any of the data sources above and deleting the ob-
servations with missing key data items used in the tests or tables. In Probit Regressions,
18The corrected announcement dates in Mulherin and Simsir (2015) are available at:
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/fima.12053/suppinfo. The results do not change materially when
we do not correct the dates.
19SDC contains historical CUSIP numbers of merging firms. Since Compustat does not include historical
CUSIP numbers, we use CRSP as a bridge to match the firms in Compustat and SDC.
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we supplement the data with non-merging Compustat firms. We have total 1,600 firms
with 10,363 firm-year observations in Probit Regressions. We lose additional observations
when no data is recorded for a specific test or table item.
III.3.2 Construction of key variables
Following Gopalan et al. (2014), we construct a measure of pay duration using vest-
ing schedules of stock options and non-equity incentive grants. For each executive, we
calculate a pay duration using the vesting length (in months) of each pay component, i.e.
stock options. As the pay duration is a weighted-average measure by construction, we use
ratio of a component’s grant date fair value to the sum of grant date fair value of all compo-
nents as the weight of that component. The durations of salaries, bonuses, and unclassified
pay components (other payment) are zero. We aggregate the same components if there are
more than one compensation item granted in a given fiscal year. The following equation





StockiVesting Lengthi+åMj=1Option jVesting Length j
Salary + Bonus + Other+åNi=1Stocki+åMj=1Option j
(III.1)
where Stocki andOption j represent the dollar values of stocks and options granted to exec-
utives with the vesting lengths next to them (Vesting Lengthi= j). Salary, Bonus, and Other
represent the annual dollar values of remaining compensation components.20
Next, we calculate firm-wide pay duration, the paper’s variable of interest, as the
weighted-average of executive pay durations. Weights are the ratios of an executive’s total
20Cadman and Sunder (2014) also developed a measure that is similar to Pay Duration. They study the
relation between CEO pay duration and investor horizon using the initial public offerings (IPO).
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compensation (in dollars) to the total executive compensation paid by a firm. In statistical
tests, we use three different versions of pay duration: Duration (cont.) is a continuous
pay duration variable, Duration (median) and Duration (> 36 months) are dummies where
the former takes the value of “1” if the firm-wide pay duration is greater than the median
calculated for each fiscal year, and the latter takes the value of “1” if the firm-wide pay
duration is greater than 36 months.
Other key variables include Delta, the dollar change in CEO wealth for one percent
change in stock price, using the methodology described in Core and Guay (2002), and CEO
tenure (Tenure) taken from ExecuComp and BoardEx. Descriptions of other control and
definitive variables in the Appendix D (on page 118).
III.3.3 Descriptive analyses of the data
In Table F.1, we double-sort the deals first according to acquirers/targets and second
according to pay duration. Numbers of the acquisitions are 1,714 and 1,698 for long-
duration and short-duration acquirers respectively. The distribution of deals across Fama-
French 12 Industries differ significantly for both groups in almost all industries. Between
the acquirers sorted with respect to pay durations, there are significant differences among
industries of the firms. Although drawing a pattern is difficult, it seems that there are sig-
nificant differences between the number of acquisitions made by long-duration and short-
duration acquirers except for Telecommunication, Shops, and Finance. When sorted with
respect to target industries, number of the deals made by long-duration firms is smaller than
number of the deals made by short-duration firms in all industries except Business Equip-
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ment and Healthcare. Overall, as Gopalan et al. (2014) documented, certain industries
have different pay duration.
In Figure E.3, average value of the deals are presented over the sample period for
short and long-duration acquirers. Average price paid to the targets by long-duration and
short-duration are close to each other in the recent years (2009-2013). There are some
differences between average deal values before 2009. For example, in 1998 (around the
start of Internet Bubble), short-duration managers made more high-value acquisitions than
long-duration ones. The differences in 2001 and 2002 are also striking. An opposite pattern
exists in years 2000, 2005, and 2008, in which long-duration managers spend more money
than short-duration managers.
Table F.2 presents the summary statistics (mean, median, and number of observa-
tions) of key variables. The short-duration group represents the acquirers with pay duration
below the median pay duration, whereas the long-duration group represents the acquirers
with pay duration above the median pay duration. The medians are calculated using the
firms within the same fiscal year. The average number of months in which executive grants
are vested are 32.64 and 13.00 for long-duration and short-duration groups, respectively.
Although Tenure variables are similar for both groups, there are significant differences be-
tween long- and short-duration firms in Total Executive Pay and Delta. Importantly, Total
Executive Pay paid by short-duration firms is almost one half (16.24 versus 27.93) of that
of long-duration firms. The possible explanation for this difference is that long-duration
managers have more contract items.
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Panel B of Table F.2 (on page 126) displays acquirer characteristics.21 On average,
acquirers with long-duration plans are growth firms (M/B=1.01) whereas the short-duration
firms are income firms (M/B=0.88), and the difference between two groups is significant.
Long-duration firms are, on average, larger than short-duration firms. The M&A liquidity,
measured by total value of deals in the same industry divided by total assets, are similar for
both groups. More importantly, the number of deals announced by short-duration group
(1.70 per year on average) is smaller than the number of deals announced by long-duration
group (1.77 per year on average). The difference is significant, and it provides a stylized
fact that the acquiring firms with short-duration compensation plans are less acquisitive.
We discuss this issue in the last section.
The characteristics of deals made by two groups also differ in some dimensions.
Relative deal value to acquiring firm’s market value of equity (Value/Acq. MVE) is larger
(9.71%) for short-duration firms than long-duration firms (8.47%). Long-duration firms
use cash more frequently (42%) than do short-duration firms (39%) to finance the acquisi-
tions. The most striking item in Panel C is the number of big acquisitions made by both of
the acquirer types. We define an acquisition as “big” if the price (deal value), paid by the
acquirer, relative to its market capitalization exceeds 10% threshold. Short-duration firms
make “big” acquisitions more frequently than long-duration acquisitions. Although there
seems differences between number of bids received by the firms targeted by both types
of the acquiring firms, the difference is not significant. There is no economical or statis-
21For private and subsidiary targets, we are unable to collect financial data. SDC does not provide reli-
able financial data on private and subsidiary targets. Market value of private and subsidiary firms are also
unavailable.
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tical significance in the percentage of acquirers that made deal payments with stock fully
(Paid by Stock), percentage of not-public targets (Non-public), percentage of diversifying
acquisitions (Different 3-SIC), and percentage of tender offers made to target shareholders
(Tender) for both acquirer types.
Table F.2 also provides the three- and five-day cumulative abnormal announcement
returns (3-day and 5-day CAR) of both acquirer types. Across all types of targets, short-
duration acquirers enjoyed better announcement returns (0.19%), on average. However,
the distribution of CARs to short-duration acquirers is negatively skewed, making its me-
dian smaller (-0.03%) than that (0.05%) of the long-duration group of acquirers. Addi-
tionally, we compare CARs for only big acquisitions and big-and-cross-industry acqui-
sitions.22 The difference is significant for big deals. 3-day CAR for big acquirers with
short-horizon incentives is 0.78% and significantly higher than those with long-horizon
incentives (-0.46%).
Panel E of Table F.2 reports monthly idiosyncratic volatility aroundM&A announce-
ments.23 The differences are significant in the month a deal announced and in the follow-
ing month (t and t + 1). The differences are not significant from t + 2 to t + 12. Addi-
tionally, Figure E.4 shows average monthly idiosyncratic volatility for short-duration and
long-duration acquirers. It is worth noting that idiosyncratic volatility increases during the
22Big acquisitions are the deals where deal value paid by the acquirer relative to its market capitalization
exceeds 10% threshold. Big-and-cross-industry acquisitions are the subset of big acquisitions where the
targets are from different industries. We use 3-digit SIC code.
23Following Bali and Cakici (2008), we run the three-factor Fama and French (1993) regression and calcu-
late monthly idiosyncratic volatility as the standard deviation of residuals from the regressions. We calculate
Ivol for each stock using at least 17 daily observations for eachmonth. Fama-French factors are fromKenneth
French’s web site at Dartmouth.
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months deals announced for all acquirers.
III.3.4 Econometric methods
To investigate the question whether the vesting schedules of executive compensation
plans have an impact on the short-run price changes surrounding merger or acquisition an-
nouncements, we run OLS regression where the variable examined on the left-hand side is
the 3-day or 5-day cumulative announcement abnormal returns of acquiring firms obtained
from a widely-used, standard event-study methodology – Market Model.
The cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are measured as the difference between
actual and expected returns. The expected returns are calculated from the Market Model
using the value-weighted market index. CARs are winsorized at 1% and 99% percentiles
of the distribution. We use the following regression model:
Acquirer CARi; j = ai+b1Pay Durationi; j+ g X+ ei; j (III.2)
where the vector of control variables (X) includes firm size (log sales), market-to-book
ratio, relative deal value scaled to acquirer market value of equity, M&A liquidity and in-
dicators for paid-by-cash, paid-by-stock, tender offers, different industry deals, non-public
targets, and multiple bids for the target. We add industry and year fixed effects to control
for industry-wide and temporal unobserved factors. The results based on equation (III.2)
are reported in Table F.3.
Following Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999) and Bhojraj et al. (2009), we calculate
portfolio-matched buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) for 6, 12, 24 and 36 months
after the deal announcement date to test the differences in post-announcement stock per-
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where Rbenchmark is the benchmark portfolio return. Following Fama and French (1993),
value-weighted size/book-to-market portfolio returns are constructed and each firm is as-
signed to one of the 25 size/book-to-market portfolios at the beginning of the deal an-
nouncement year.
Second, we calculate abnormal returns by summing them (instead of compounding).






To calculate Rbenchmark, the same portfolio matching procedure is used for BHARs. LCAR
is the sum of differences between benchmark portfolio return and acquirer returns over 6,
12, 24 and 36 months following the announcements.
To test whether there are changes in various performances metrics of acquiring firms
from pre- to post-announcement period, we employ two sets of operating performance
tests based on Hoberg and Phillips (2010) and Barber and Lyon (1996). Namely, we test
whether the set of firms receiving positive reaction from the market also experience favor-
able changes in long-run accounting-based performances. We use ROA, operating income
scaled by book value of assets (Op. Inc./Assets), operating income scaled by sales (Op.
Inc./Sales), percentage change in sales (Sales Growth), asset turnover (Sales/Assets), and
operating expenses scaled by sales (Op. Exp./Sales) as operating performance indicators
(PIi;t).
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As indicated in Barber and Lyon (1996), specification of performance tests are dif-
ficult. A benefit of Barber and Lyon (1996) is that models rely on firm and benchmark
industry performances. In their tests, models beased on peformance- and size-basedmatch-
ing are well specified and more powerful. We use a slight variation of Barber and Lyon
(1996) models. First, when finding the benchmarks we do not impute missing values if a
firm does not have industry peers with defined search criteria. Second, we use three-digit
SIC to begin searching for the industry benchmarks instead of two-digit SIC code. Hence,
we select the benchmarks from group of firms that fall into the same three-digits SIC code
within [70% – 130%] book value of assets window. Third, we add the pay duration dummy
variable. Pay Duration captures the difference in performances of firms providing long-
and short-horizon incentives.
Formally, we specify the following model for the operating performance indicators
(PIi;t) given above:
PIi;t = a+b1Pay Durationi; 1+b2PIi; 1+b3DPIINDi; 1 to t + ei (III.5)
where t = 2, 3, 4, or 5, PI represents the firm performance indicator for firm i, and PIIND
indicates median industry performance indicator.24 We are interested in Pay Duration vari-
able (b1) to see whether there is significant differences in abnormal operating performances
between the firms with long- and short-horizon incentives.
24We do not use t=1 as it takes about at least six months to fully integrate for the merging firms. Especially,
when the twomerging firms are public, the integration and reporting process may takemuch longer compared
to small, private firms.
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Acknowledging the caveat of not accounting for the carried pre-event performance
over the post-event period, Hoberg and Phillips (2010) underscores that if the firms are
not fully merged, i.e. partial interests are acquired by the bidder, comparing pre- and
post-event changes may not be appropriate. While this may be alleviated by using only
post-announcement operating performance indicators, themodel specification assumptions
draw hardlines. We omit partial interest acquisitions in our sample. However, using Barber
and Lyon (1996) models may omit some of the factors explaining variations in performance
metrics. Hence, we make few adjustments in Hoberg and Phillips (2010) to further test the
differences in performance metrics. First, to account for the impact previous performance,
we calculate the change in industry-adjusted performance metrics from t 1 to t+2, 3, 4, or
5. Second, we add Pay Duration as the variable of interest in the equation.
The following model is slightly modified version of the ones used in Hoberg and
Phillips (2010):
D IA PIi; 1 to t = a+b1Pay Durationi; 1+ g X+ ei (III.6)
where t = 2, 3, 4, or 5, IA PI represents industry-adjusted performance indicator, and X
represents the vector of factors supposed to affect the performance change.25 Similar to
its counterpart in Equation III.5, b1 captures any difference in industry-adjusted acquiring
firm performance metric due to incentive horizon changes, i.e. the difference between
long- and short-run incentive groups.
25We use a similar set of control variables used in equation III.2. X represents control variables taken from
the M&A literature, namely firm size (log sales), market-to-book ratio, relative size of the deal (deal value
scaled by acquirer market value of equity), M&A liquidity and indicators for paid-by-cash, paid-by-stock,
tender offers, different industry deals (using 3-digit SIC code), and multiple deals.
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III.4 Results
We summarize our main findings in the following subsections. First, we present the
results from CAR regressions whereby we show that higher executive pay duration is neg-
atively associated with higher acquirer announcement CARs. Next, we provide evidence
that shorter pay duration has no negative impact on long-run stock performance of the
merged firms. Long-run operating performance results also provide similar findings.
III.4.1 Pay duration and acquisition announcement returns
In this section, we examine whether there is an association between acquiring firms’
announcement returns, measures by cumulative abnormal announcement returns described
in Section III.3.4, and average vesting length of their compensation plans. In Table F.3
(page 128), we present the results of OLS regressions of acquiring firms’ announcement
abnormal returns (Acquirer CAR) on Pay Duration and other control variables.
Table F.3 shows the results based on Model (III.2). The variables of interest are
Duration (cont.), Duration (> 36 months), and Duration (dummy).26 We report the regres-
sion results where the dependent variables are three-day (3-day CAR) and five-day (5-day
CAR) announcement returns. The results show that all of the three pay duration measures
are negatively associated with Acquirer CAR. Namely, the coefficient estimate of Dura-
tion (cont.) ( 0:032) suggests that a 10-month increase in pay duration of an acquiring
26Duration (cont.) is the number of months over which the executive’s pay is vested. Derived from
executive pay duration, Duration (dummy) is an indicator variable taking the value of “1” if the executive
pay duration is above the median pay duration within the same fiscal year, and “0” otherwise. Duration (>36
months) is an indicator variable taking the value of “1” if the executive pay duration is above 36 months, and
“0” otherwise.
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firm is associated with 0.32% decrease in 3-day announcement returns.27 The magnitude
of the effect is amplified when we use 5-day CAR. Column (3) and (4) repeat the tests
by replacing Duration (cont.) with Duration (> 36 months). The coefficient estimate
of Duration (> 36 months) is  0:992 and significant at 10% level. It indicates that if a
firm has company-wide vesting length greater than 36 months, upon an acquisition an-
nouncement it loses around 1% of its value. A similar pattern exists in Column (5) and
(6) confirming the results found in Column (1)–(4); i.e., the acquiring firms with above-
median compensation-vesting schedules experience 77 and 79 basis points decreases (both
statistically significant at 5%-level) in Column (5) and (6) respectively.
As a robustness check, we report the relationship between CEO pay duration and
acquisition announcement returns in Table F.7. Again, we find that all of the three pay
duration measures are negatively associated with Acquirer CAR. However, the results are
statistically significant for only CEO Duration (cont.) variable in Column (1) and (2).
In this section, we showed that there is an association between stock price changes
of acquiring firms and their compensation-vesting schedules. We find that firms with long
vesting schedules are the ones suffering from announcement period wealth losses as much
as 1%. The evidence here suggests that firms with managers that have short-horizon com-
pensation packages do not lose as much value as the ones with managers having long-
horizon packages. Managers with short-horizon compensations may be more careful when
27For illustration purposes and to save space, we use percentage returns in left-hand sides of the regres-
sions. Thus, a unit change in any right-hand side variable directly shows percent change in the left-hand side
variable. For example,  0:042 in Column (2) of Table F.3 (page 128) implies that a 1-month increase in ex-
ecutive pay duration is positively associated with 0.042% change whereby a 24-month increase is associated
with 1.01% change in 5-day acquirer announcement abnormal return.
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selecting targets as their compensationmay bemore affected by prices changes in the short-
run. Focusing on announcement returns, they may avoid wealth losses due to stock price
sensitivity feature of their compensation portfolio.
As a last sort in this section, we present the joint effect of Tenure and Duration cap-
tured by Tenure  Duration in Table F.3 (page 128). The coefficient estimate of Tenure 
Duration in Table F.3 (page 128) is positive and statistically significant when we use Pay
Duration (cont.) and Pay Duration (dummy) in Table F.3.
III.4.2 Pay duration and post-announcement stock performance
Table F.4 shows long-run stock performance of short-duration and long-duration ac-
quirers. Panel A shows buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) for short-duration and
long-duration firms. We report equal-weighted and value-weighted average BHARs for
each group within 6, 12, 24 and 36 months after the deal announcements. The results
based on equal-weighted (EW) averages show that short-duration firms perform better
than long-duration firms. The difference between two groups widens from 6-month to
36-month interval. The results based on equal-weighted (VW) averages show significant
negative performances for both groups while the difference is insignificant.
Panel B Table F.4 displays long-run cumulative abnormal returns (LCARs). The dif-
ference is significant in all intervals on EW basis results and in 24-month interval on VW
basis results. At the 24-month interval, on EW basis results, short-duration firms outper-
form long-duration firms by 5.08% (p-value = 0.00). On VW basis results, the difference
is 3.71% (p-value = 0.00). Overall, long-run stock performance results suggest that long-
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duration firms do not outperform short-duration firms in the long-run. These results are
consistent with our previous findings.
III.4.3 Pay duration and post-announcement operating performances
In this section, we further pursue the question whether there are long-run changes in
the combined firm’s operating performances once an acquisition or a merger is completed
and whether these changes are linked to the length (horizon - duration) of compensation
packages’ vesting schedules.
The real effects of an attribute on a firm following an acquisition it pursued is prob-
ably best measured by examining post-announcement changes in operating performances.
We examine Return on Assets (ROA), Operating Income scaled by Assets or Sales (Op.
Inc./Assets or Op. Inc./Sales), Sales Growth, Asset Turnover (Sales/Assets), and Operat-
ing Expenses scaled by Sales (Op. Exp./Sales) as operating performance proxies. We rely
on two sets of tests that, we believe, capture operating changes in the merged firms’ post-
announcement life cycle. Namely, we mimic the tests used in Barber and Lyon (1996) and
Hoberg and Phillips (2010). The former one is particularly designed to capture changes
around and event while the latter is aimed at avoiding complications associated when com-
paring two entities before and after an event as two entities may have different unobserv-
able characteristics affecting the tests. Our main results presented here are similar using
both methods.
Table F.5 (page 132) displays the results based on Hoberg and Phillips (2010) per-
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formance regressions in 2, 3, 4, and 5 years following the acquisition announcements.28
We keep only completed acquisitions, thus all surviving firms following the acquisitions
in our sample completed the transactions and survived as single entity. We only report the
coefficient of Pay Duration variable.29 When we compare short-horizon and long-horizon
firms, there is a clear path that operating performance of short-horizon firms are better.
The coefficient of ROA in the following two years (year = 2 and 3) are 1.4% and 1.2%.
Operating income divided by assets also smaller for long-horizon firms in years 3 and 4
after the completion of acquisitions (70 and 60 basis points, respectively). Similarly, op-
erating income divided by sales numbers are smaller by 6.9%, 26.6%, and 10.6% percent
respectively in years 2, 3, and 4 after the merger.
Table F.6 displays the results based on Barber and Lyon (1996) performance regres-
sions in 2, 3, 4, and 5 years following the acquisition announcements. The results are
confirming our previous findings: short-horizon firms often performs better than long-
horizon firms. When we look at Sales/AT metric in operation performance regressions,
short-horizon firms perform better in years 3, 4 and 5 after the completion of acquisitions.
(2.4%, 3.3.% and 4.1%, respectively)30
28To avoid complications within one year of the announcements, we start to examine post-announcement
returns beginning in year two. We believe it takes some time to integrate the new firm into the acquirer.
29Pay Duration is an indicator variable taking the value of “1” if the executive pay duration is above the
median pay duration within the same fiscal year, and “0” otherwise.
30We expect reverse signs for the last metric (operating expense divided by sales), i.e. the longer the pay
duration, the bigger the expenses.
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III.4.4 Pay duration and large wealth destruction
Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005) documents the apparent losses of acquir-
ing firms during the merger announcements and report that they are due to a small set of
deals with negative synergy gains by companies with extremely high valuations. The eq-
uity value of acquiring company would have increased without these deals. In addition,
acquirers with large losses perform poorly later. In this section we test whether short- or
long-duration acquirers realize large losses.
FollowingMoeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005), we calculate wealth destruction
around the deal announcement date. Large loss deal is a dummy variable where change
in market capitalization from day -2 to day +1 is greater than 1 billion dollars. (in 2001
dollars) There are 185 Large loss deal in our sample (74 and 111 for short-duration and long
duration acquirers, respectively). Among short-duration acquirers, 5.2% of deals result in
large loss in shareholder wealth while this number is significantly larger (7.5%) for long-
duration acquirers. The findings in this section implies that long-duration acquirers do not
only experience higher percentage losses but also larger dollar losses.
III.4.5 Pay duration and acquisition propensity
Next, we study the effect of executive pay duration on the propensity of a firm to
acquire. We first explain the econometric methods and then document results.
To examine the propensity of a firm to acquire another one, we use Probit regressions
where the left-hand side variable (Acquireri; j) takes the value of ”1” if the firm acquired a
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company in a given year and ”0” otherwise. Formally, we run the following model:
Acquireri; j = ai+b1Pay Durationi; j+ g W+ ei; j (III.7)
whereW is the vector of control variables and g is the vector of coefficients corresponding
to these variables. Control variables include firm size (log of total assets), market-to-book
ratio, operating income /scaled by assets, price runup and leverage. Industry and year fixed
effects are added.31
The variable of interest in Model (III.7) is Pay Duration. The estimate of b1 allows
us to test whether firms, that have firm-wide aggregate compensation plans with longer
vesting schedules, are, all else equal, more prone to engage in takeover activities.
While firms with longer vesting schedules may make acquisitions more frequently,
size of the deals made by these firms may vary. We also hypothesize that the same set of
firms prefer to buy or merge with firms in different industries, where difference is measured
by the closeness of merging firms’ SIC codes. To further analyze what type of acquisitions
are made by the firms with longer vesting schedules, we run Model (III.7) using two dif-
ferent sub-samples: (1) the sample where the targets are defined as big (2) the sample
where the targets are both big and in an industry different from the acquirer’s. One of the
important findings in this section is that firms that design their executives’ compensation
plans to be vested in longer periods engage in M&A activities more often than do the firms
with shorter vesting compensation schedules. Table F.8 displays the results from Probit
Regressions where propensity of a firm to make an acquisition deal is regressed on pay
31We exclude hostile takeovers because there are only a few hostile takeovers in our sample period.
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duration and other control variables.
In the first row of Table F.8 (page 136), the continuous variable, Duration (cont.),
represents firm-wide average number of months that take executives vest their options.
We first run Model (III.7) using the full sample. The coefficient estimate (b1) of Dura-
tion (cont.) is 0.014, positive and statistically significant in Column (1), supporting our
hypothesis that longer compensation vesting schedules of firms are positively associated
with takeover activity. Whenwe use an indicator variable having the value of “1” if a firm’s
pay duration is greater than the median, the estimate of b1 (bˆ1) becomes 0.36, significant
at 5%-level.
Column (2) of Table F.8 (page 136) shows that the results in Column (1) and (4) are
partially driven by big acquisitions, where big sample comprises of the deals whose values
are greater than 10% of their acquirers. When we further narrow down the sample by
limiting the deals where acquirers and targets are in different industries defined by 3-digit
SIC code, bˆ1 is equal to 0.015 in Column (3) (significant at 5% significance level). This
finding is particularly important as it suggests that the firms with longer compensation
vesting schedules on average pursue big targets in different industries. Long-run firms
appear to acquire difficult-to-integrate targets. Overall, the evidence in Column(1) to (4) of
Table F.8 points out that the average executive compensation duration of firms is positively
associated with propensity to make more and ”difficult” acquisitions.
On the other hand, Column (5) and (6) of Table F.8 show that the results disap-
pear after 2006. There are two main changes around 2006. First, disclosure requirements
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concerning executive compensation have changed. Second, after the revision of FASB
Statement No. 123, Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation, a significant number of
public companies started to adopt fair-value-based method of accounting for share-based
payment transactions with employees.
In addition to control variables used in the literature (see Zhao, 2009), we add Tenure
and its interaction withDuration to see if CEOs with more experience in the acquiring firm
tend to make more acquisitions when they have a longer compensation vesting schedules
compared to average CEO. CEO tenure has a negative impact on the firm’s acquisitiveness
(significant in Column 4). Following Core and Guay (2002), we calculate Delta of each
CEO’s portfolio consisting of options. Delta, “sensitivity to stock price”, is the change in
CEO’s option portfolio value for a 1% annual change in the stock price. Thus, Delta in
Model (III.7) captures the effect of CEO’s option portfolio’s sensitivity to the firm’s stock
price on the firm’s acquisitiveness. Interacted with Duration, it allows us to test whether
the effect of Duration on the firm’s propensity to acquire is amplified with Delta.
Interestingly, Delta is positively associated with propensity to acquire. The esti-
mates of Delta ranges from 0.069 to 0.105, all significant at least 5% significance level in
Columns (1)-(4). Similar to pay duration variables, the significance disappear after 2006
(in Column (5) and (6).
Our variable of interest is Delta  Duration, and its coefficient estimate is negative
and significant in all specifications except for Column (5) and (6). The negative coefficient
estimate of Delta  Duration suggests that price sensitivity of the CEO’s option portfolio
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decreases the impact of Duration on the probability of a firm’s M&A engagement. This
finding is intuitive given volatility in a CEO’s option portfolio following an acquisition
may cause the CEO carefully examine an acquisition opportunity.
Overall, the results in Table F.8 form mixed findings. Duration has positive impact
on a public firm’s takeover activity, but results disappear after 2006. Moreover, the price
sensitivity of a CEO’s option portfolio negates the impact of her compensation vesting
schedule. Again results disappear when we only investigate firms after 2006.
III.5 Conclusions
There has been almost a common consensus among policymakers and researchers
on that long-term incentives –especially in the form of equity– better align shareholder
(principal) and manager (agent) interests. More recently, researchers have come to the
conclusion that it is not only the form of payment but also the vesting schedules of pay-
ment that play significant role as to how managers decide on crucial corporate actions. In
general, short-termism has a bad reputation as it is thought to motive managers to focus on
short-term personal gains rather than long-term shareholder wealth creation. The metrics
to gauge the length of incentives have just been introduced or revised by academicians.
This paper aims at filling a gap in the literature by investigating the relation between pay
duration and crucial, visible corporate actions, i.e. M&As.
We document new evidence on the relation between duration of performance con-
tracts and M&A activities. In this paper, “short-horizon” managers are defined as those
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who have compensation package vested shortly. Using alternative proxies for short-
horizon incentives (managers), we find that M&As conducted by short-horizon managers
have stronger announcements returns. Our empirical findings also indicate that post-M&A
accounting and/or operating performances of short-horizon managers are better when com-
pared to those of firms with long-horizon executives. These findings are surprising given
almost given a number of common calls that managers with short-term incentives may not
pursue strategies that could benefit the shareholders both in the long- and short-run.
We also examine whether short-horizon managers are more acquisitive and, if the
answer “yes”, whether they buy firms relatively large in different industries. The reason
we check this is to see if the managers of firms providing long-term incentives engage in
wealth-destroying M&As more frequently. The results of Probit Models suggest that man-
agers incentivized with long-term packages are indeed more acquisitive, which in turn may
exacerbate the value destruction during announcement periods even following acquisitions
or mergers.
The results in this paper imply that long-term incentives are not necessarily optimal
for all firms in all situations. Managers with short-term incentives could also sign corporate
actions that wealth-creating in the short-run. It would be interesting to checkwhether short-
termism, as granted, is positively associated with other major corporate policies. We leave
these and other unexplored aspects of pay duration to future research agenda.
60
CHAPTER IV
ON LONG-RUN STOCK RETURNS AFTER CORPORATE EVENTS
IV.1 Introduction
Major controversy in the financial economics literature surrounds the question of
whether long-run abnormal stock returns are associated with major corporate events.
Based on buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs), Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter
(1995) document post-announcement underperformance for initial public offerings (IPOs).
Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) similarly report un-
derperformance for seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Other studies by Asquith (1983),
Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker (1992), and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) report negative
long-run abnormal returns for acquiring firms in mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Bil-
lett, Flannery, and Garfinkel (2011) find that much worse performance occurs after multi-
ple issuances of different kinds of financial claims than after single finance events. And,
Michaely, Thaler, and Womack (1995) find positive long-run abnormal stock returns for
firms initiating dividends. A common explanation for anomalous abnormal returns is over-
reaction as hypothesized by behavioral decision theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982).1
Other studies report conflicting evidence. For example, Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli
(2000) find significant underperformance for IPOs and SEOs using BHARs but insignif-
1See Fama (1998) for a comprehensive discussion of long-run return anomalies and potential explana-
tions, including market efficiency and behavioral models. In this regard, studies by Mitchell and Stafford
(2000), Brav, Geczy, and Gompers (2000), Eckbo and Norli (2005), Lyandres, Sun, and Zhang (2008), and
How, Ngo, and Verhoeven (2011) provide different explanations for anomalous long-run stock returns after
these corporate events.
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icant results using calendar time portfolio alphas. Brav and Gompers (1997) obtain in-
significant long-run results for IPOs after taking into account size and book-to-market ra-
tios (see also Gompers and Lerner, 2003). Another study by Loughran and Vijh (1997)
reports negative abnormal returns for M&As in general but positive returns for cash deals.
Also, dividend initiation tests by Brav (2000) do not detect abnormal long-run returns af-
ter adjusting for size and book-to-market ratios, and further tests by Boehme and Sorescu
(2002) yield mixed results.
A recent paper by Bessembinder and Zhang (2013) argues that long-run abnormal re-
turns associated with these corporate events are explained by imperfect matching of event
firms and control firms. They propose a regression model of abnormal returns using sys-
tematic and unsystematic factors that are normalized by taking positive (negative) values
for factors and converting them to percentile ranks. With the exception of SEOs, tests
of estimated intercepts (or alphas) indicate significant long-run abnormal returns for IPOs,
M&As, and dividend initiations. However, their results change dramatically with the addi-
tion of squared terms for market and firm-specific characteristics in the model, as all four
corporate events’ alphas become insignificant. Based on these findings, they infer that
long-run abnormal returns do not exist and conclude that calendar time regression results
that adjust for risk reconcile previously mixed evidence. Another recent paper by Fu and
Huang (2015) finds long-run abnormal returns after share repurchases and SEOs before
2002 but not after 2003. They contend that changing market environment account for the
disappearance of long-run abnormal returns in recent years.
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In this paper we contribute to the continuing controversy about the significance of
long-run abnormal returns associated with major corporate events by implementing a bat-
tery of different test approaches, including Bessimbinder and Zhang regression model ap-
proach, well-known BHAR and three-factor calendar time regressions, and a recent stan-
dardized abnormal return (ASR) approach. Our purpose is to make inferences based on the
weight of evidence from alternative tests. Upon repeating Bessembinder and Zhang’s re-
gression analyses with updated samples drawn from the period 1980 to 2007, we replicate
their findings for the most part. However, our analyses show that their results are primarily
driven by the normalization procedure, which affects the regression coefficients (and asso-
ciated t-values), destabilizes alpha estimates, and inflates alpha standard errors. When we
repeat their regression analyses using non-normalized factors that have been standardized
for comparison purposes, abnormal returns are significant even including squared terms
for all four corporate events under study.
Regarding other test method results, BHAR suggests significant long-run abnormal
underperformance over a 5-year horizon after M&As, IPOs, and SEOs but not dividend
initiations. Using an adjusted Fama-French three-factor model, calendar time abnormal
returns are negative and significant for M&As even after 3-to-5 years. For these tests IPOs
and SEOs did not exhibit significant long-run abnormal returns but did indicate significant
overperformance over shorter horizons of 1-to-6 months. Dividend initiations are asso-
ciated with significant post-event underperformance after 3 years. Finally, ASR results
strongly indicate significant post-event underperformance for M&As, IPOs, and SEOs,
63
and significant overperformance for dividend initiations.
In sum, all of the different test methods consistently detect long-run abnormal per-
formance surrounding corporate events. Despite advantages and disadvantages of different
tests, the weight of the evidence corroborates significant abnormal returns over 3- and 5-
year horizons for the corporate events under study. Also, for IPOs and SEOs, a common
reversal pattern is evident with 1-month overperformance followed by accumulating un-
derperformance that becomes significant after about 3 years. Graphs using monthly ASRs
clearly illustrate this pattern (See Figure G.5). Moreover, robustness checks that subdi-
vide samples before and after 2003 do not confirm Fu and Wang, as a consistent pattern of
long-run abnormal returns disappearing in recent times is not evident. We conclude that
evidence from available long-run event study tests consistently supports the existence of
anomalous returns associated with M&A, IPO, SEO, and dividend initiations.
The next section overviews data and methodology. Section IV.3 gives the empirical
results of alternative long-run abnormal return test approaches. Section IV.4 concludes.
IV.2 Data and methodology
In this section we describe sample selection, define abnormal return metrics, and
specify alternative test statistics.
IV.2.1 Sample selection
The M&A sample consists of completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions in the Thom-
son ONE (SDC) database between 1986 and 2007 with transactions value $5 million or
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more. Our samples end in 2007 to allow for 5-year, post-event return analyses. Also, un-
like the other corporate events sampled from 1980, sample data begins in 1986 due to few
SDC observations from 1980 to 1985. Following Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008),
we apply two filters: (1) the acquisition takes the form of a merger (M), majority interest
(AM), remaining interest (AR), or partial interest (AP); and (2) the acquisition is a control
bid wherein the acquirer owns at least 50% of the target after the deal. Also, we require
that the relative size of the deal (deal size divided by the market value of the acquirer) is
greater than 5% to eliminate small deals. Altogether we have 4,294 acquisitions.
We select a control firm for each firm by matching size and book-to-market ratio
(BM) characteristics using CRSP and Compustat databases. Following Eckbo, Masulis,
and Norli (2007) and Bessembinder and Zhang (2013) , for each M&A deal completion,
matched firms have closest BM among firms with firm size between 70% and 130% of the
bidder firm. We eliminate matching firms that are in our sample of bidders within ten years
around the event date. In this case, we choose the next candidate, i.e., the next closest BM.
Firm size (market capitalization) is calculated at the end of December prior to the
M&A deal completion date. BM is the ratio of the book equity to the market equity at
the end of year t  1. Following Fama and French (1993), book equity is defined as the
Compustat book value of stockholders equity, plus balance sheet deferred taxes and in-
vestment tax credits (if available), minus the book value of preferred stock. Depending on
availability, the redemption, liquidation, or par value (in that order) is used to estimate the
value of preferred stock.
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Table H.1 shows the distribution of the acquisitions in our sample period. Before
1994 the number of transactions ranged from only 19 in 1986 to 82 in 1993. Transactions
peaked in the period 1996–2000 ranging from 365 to 431. Subsequently, the number of
deals dropped to a low of 193 in 2002 and then climbed to 263 in 2007.
The IPO sample includes all completed US initial public offerings (IPOs) in the
Thomson ONE (SDC) database between 1980 and 2007, excluding Real Estate Invest-
ment Trusts, closed-end funds, and American Depository Receipts. We select matching
firms among the firms having CRSP data using market capitalization. Following Loughran
and Ritter (2000), for each IPO event, the matched firm has the closest but greater market
capitalization at the end of December following the IPO. Matching firms must have been
publicly traded for more than 5 years. If this is not the case, we choose the next candi-
date, i.e., the next closest (but greater) market capitalization. There are 7,454 IPO events.
Table H.1 shows that the number of IPOs increases in the 1990s and thereafter generally
declines.
The SEO sample consists of completed U.S. SEOs in the Thomson ONE (SDC)
database between 1980 and 2007, excluding American Depository Receipts, Global De-
pository Receipts, and unit offerings. Financial and utility firms are also excluded. The
procedure for selecting matching firms is similar to the M&A sample. There are 6,737
SEO events. Table H.1 shows the distribution of the SEOs over time.
The dividend initiations (DIV) sample includes cash dividend initiations in the CRSP
database between 1980 and 2007. Following Boehme and Sorescu (2002) and Bessem-
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binder and Zhang (2013) , we apply the criteria that common stocks are listed on the NYSE,
NYSE MKT (AMEX), or NASDAQ (viz., share code is 10 or 11, and exchange code is 1,
2 or 3), stocks have been included in the CRSP for more than two years, dividends are or-
dinary cash (USD), and they are paid regularly2. We apply the same matching procedures
as for M&A and SEO samples. There are 2,151 dividend initiations. Table H.1 shows that
the mid-1990s were peak years with around 150 initiations per year.
Note that the numbers of event firms in our paper are greater (especially in the divi-
dend initiations sample) compared to Bessembinder and Zhang (2013) due to our process
of searching for next available candidates in our matching procedures.3 Also, the numbers
of firms used in the regressions vary because of monthly data availability for the 5-year
post-event period.
IV.2.2 Abnormal return metrics
Wemeasure long-run abnormal returns using a variety of available approaches. Buy-
and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) (Lyon, Barber, and Tsai, 1999) over the holding period










where Rit and Rcit are returns on the test asset and its matching control firm, respectively.
Following Boehme and Sorescu (2002) (see also Mitchell and Stafford, 2000, Sec-
2The frequency of dividends is monthly, quarterly, semiannual, annual, or unspecified. As noted by
Boehme and Sorescu (2002), unspecified frequencies are mostly quarterly.
3For example, in the DIV sample, if the first matching firm (the closest BM) is in our sample within ten
years around the dividend initiation, we match with the second closest BM. We repeat this procedure for up
to 10 candidates to match our event firm. In most cases we match with the best or second-best candidate.
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tion V), calendar time abnormal returns (CTARs) are estimated from an adjusted Fama-
French model in which the return difference between a test asset and its size/book-to-
market matched control stock is regressed on the Fama-French factors. Given that the
control stock has similar characteristics as the test asset, this approach potentially elim-
inates all unknown common factors from abnormal returns. We follow this practice in
forming calendar time portfolios by estimating
(Rtest Rcontrol)pt = ap+bp(Rmt R f t)+ spSMBt +hpHMLt + ept ; (IV.2)
where ap defines the abnormal return, (Rtest Rcontrol)pt is the monthly portfolio return
difference (equal- or value-weighted) between the simple returns of each test asset and its
matched control firm, Rmt is the monthly return on the value-weighted market index, R f t is
the monthly return on one-month Treasury bills, SMB is the monthly Fama-French small-
minus-big size factor return, and HML is the monthly Fama-French high-minus-low book
equity to market equity factor return. Fama-French factors are downloaded from Kenneth
French’s online data library. In month t the portfolio return (Rtest Rcontrol)pt includes
all stocks whose event period includes the month. Thus, the number of stocks, nt , can vary
monthly from zero to the total number of sampled stocks. The month index t runs from
the earliest to the latest month among the event periods of the stocks in the sample, and
months with nt = 0 are discarded from the analysis.
Bessembinder and Zhang (2013) contend that BHAR’s matched control procedure
does not fully control for risk in estimating long-run abnormal returns. As a modification
of the above calendar time approach, they point out that the continuously compounded
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abnormal return between an event and matched control firm, or CCARit = log(1+Rit) 
log(1+Rcit), in which Rit and Rcit are the simple returns of the event and matched control
firm, respectively, corresponds to a log wealth relative as defined by Loughran and Ritter
(1995). To test for long-run abnormal returns, Bessembinder and Zhang (2013) specify the
following regression model:
CCARit = a+b1Dbetait +b2Dsizeit +b3DBMit
+b4Dmomit +b5Dilliqit +b6Disvit +b7Dinvit +uit (IV.3)
where D denotes the monthly difference in firm characteristics between event firm and
matching firm, beta for July of year t to June of year t+ 1 is estimated from the market
model using monthly stock returns during years t 5 to t 1, size is the market equity at
the end of the latest June, BM for July of year t to June of year t+1 is the book value of the
common equity to the market value of common equity at the end of fiscal year t 1, mom is
momentum computed using cumulative returns for months 12 to 2, illiq is illiquidity
in July of year t to June of year t+1 proxied by the average ratio of daily absolute stock
return to dollar trading volume from July of year t   1 to June of year t (see Amihud,
2002)4, isv is idiosyncratic volatility as measured by the annualized standard deviation
of the residuals obtained in a Fama and French three-factor regression using daily returns
in month  2, and inv is capital investment in July of year t to June of year t+ 1 based
on the annual change in gross property, plant, and equipment in fiscal year t divided by
4Following Amihud (2002), average market illiquidity in the denominator is calculated using illiquidity
of all stocks satisfying the following conditions: (1) the stock has return and volume data for more than 200
days (from July of year t 1 to June of year t), (2) the stock price is greater than $5, (3) the stock has data
on market capitalization available, and (4) illiquidity outliers are eliminated at the highest or lowest 1%.
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assets at the beginning of fiscal year t. In an effort to make estimated slope coefficients in
regression (IV.3) comparable, they normalize the explanatory variables via transforming in
each calendar month separately negative and positive values cross-sectionally to positive
and negative rank numbers and then sorting them into negative and positive percentile
ranks such that the values in each month range from  1 to +1.
Unfortunately, serious econometric problems arise in Bessembinder and Zhang’s
normalization process of factors that renders estimated alphas statistically and even eco-
nomically indistinguishable from zero. One problem is that cross-sectional normalization
of factors in a pooled panel regression randomizes potential regression relationships, such
that in each calendar month a stock’s factor (explanatory variable) values become depen-
dent on those of other stocks. Indeed, it is possible that (for example) two original val-
ues ascending by magnitude (for a firm in different years) could become descending after
cross-sectional normalization, which would weaken the regression results.
Another problem is that normalization induces unnecessary nonlinearity into the re-
gressions. Even if the original relationship of a factor is linear with dependent variable
returns, nonlinearity arises from transforming the original distribution of the explanatory
variables to uniform or, more precisely, a mixture of two uniform distributions.5 This non-
linearity suggests a kind of mirrored S-shaped curve in which third or higher order terms
in their regressions could be more significant than second order terms.
5For example, suppose that y and x have a bivariate normal distribution, which implies that the marginal
distributions of the variables are normal and the regression of y on x is linear. A simplified (theoretical)
version of Bessembinder and Zhang’s transformation maps x to a uniform distribution via z = F(x), where
F is the cumulative normal distribution function of x. Because z = F(x) is a nonlinear function of x, the
original linear regression of y on x becomes nonlinear on z.
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Additionally, it is well known that regression t-values and other test statistics used
for inferences are invariant with respect to scaling. Also, the regression intercept itself is
invariant with respect to the scaling of explanatory variables by a constant. These invari-
ance properties are lost in their procedure, as scaling and shifting origins of the regressors
are performed within subsets of observations (i.e., cross-sectionally over contemporane-
ous calendar months). Because the original values of the regressors are detached from their
context by subset-wise transformation to scaled rank numbers, this procedure is likely to
have unpredictable outcomes.
Deformation of observations according to subsets not only affects the coefficients,
including the intercept, and their t-values, but affects the whole risk adjustment process.
As observed by Kothari andWarner (2007), even a small error in risk adjustment can cause
sizable errors over long horizons. To avoid these issues, we run regressions based on equa-
tion (IV.3) without normalization. To allow comparability of estimated coefficients, rather
than normalize characteristics, we standardize the firm characteristics by their respective
standard deviations. Unlike cross-sectional normalization, standardization does not affect
the regression fit, estimated intercept (abnormal return), and related statistics.
Finally, based on extensive simulation analyses, recent work by Dutta et al. (2015)
demonstrates that standardized returns (ASRs) improve materially size, power, and ro-
bustness in long-run event study tests. Because they are standardized returns (i.e., returns
divided by their standard deviation), they are weighted by their statistical precision. In
turn, superior size and power of the tests statistics are gained, which is well documented in
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short-run event studies (e.g., Patell, 1976; Boehmer, Masumeci, and Poulsen, 1991; Kolari
and Pynnönen, 2010; and others) as well as in long-run event study tests by Dutta et al.
(2015). The authors further document that standardized return tests of long-run abnormal
returns are much less sensitive to outliers than existing test methods, such as BHAR and
CTAR. And, because returns are divided by their standard deviation, there is some degree
of total risk adjustment of abnormal returns. They define abnormal standardized returns
(ASRs) as follows:






is the month t standardized return of the ith stock in terms of log-returns, rit = log(1+Rit)
with Rit the simple return, and sit is the month t return standard deviation. We compute
monthly standard deviations, sit , from daily returns to capture time-varying volatilities. In
the same manner, srcit is the month t standardized return of the matched control firm.
Altogether, we utilize four different return metrics to test abnormal behavior of the
events. BHAR focuses on the buy-and-hold return difference of equal-weighted portfolios,
CTAR represents the monthly average (simple) return difference unexplained by Fama and
French factors, CCAR measures the monthly continuously compounded return difference




























is the standard deviation of BHARi(h)s.
The calendar time abnormal return (CTAR) ap in equation (IV.2) is tested via the
estimated regression t-ratio of the intercept coefficient, or CALENDAR-T. In the same man-
ner, the alpha in regression (IV.3) is tested by its respective t-statistic, in which we utilize
recent clustering techniques (e.g., Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller, 2012) to account for
cross-sectional correlation due to overlapping event months.
Lastly, abnormal standardized returns (ASRs) for the holding period from h1 to h2
















is the holding period average ASRit per month over the n event firms. In computing standard
errors, or s:e(h1;h2), application of clustering robust standard errors (e.g., see Cameron,
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Gelbach, and Miller, 2012) is a straightforward approach to account for cross-sectional
correlation and other issues (see Dutta et al., 2015).6
IV.3 Empirical results
This section provides empirical results using different test methods for long-run ab-
normal returns associated with M&As, IPOs, SEOs, and dividend initiations. We begin
with the regression model approach recently proposed by Bessembinder and Zhang (2013).
Our results confirm econometric issues discussed in the previous section that make infer-
ences based on normalized factors unreliable. Extending their regression approach, we
standardize (rather than normalize) factors to make them comparable, which substantially
alters the regression model results. To comprehensively evaluate abnormal returns, further
tests using BHAR, CTAR, and ASR methods are reported.
IV.3.1 Regression-based approaches
Tables H.2 and H.3 report the estimated regression coefficients based on equation
(IV.3) with normalized factors. In the bottom portion of these tables, F-tests of the joint
significance of the squared terms are shown, in addition to mean CCARs and their cross-
sectional correlation adjusted t-values. The analyses include all stocks for which regres-
sors and returns are available for the 60-month holding period or the month of delisting,
6Clustering robust standard errors are available in modern statistical packages such as SAS and Stata. One
can easily utilize these by arranging ASRit observations in the holding periods from h1 to h2 into a pooled
panel data set. Clustering robust standard errors and associated t-statistics are computed by estimating the
regression ASRit = a + uit , i.e., a regression on the constant term using the clustering standard error option
of the package. The OLS-estimate aˆ equals ASR(h1;h2), and the cluster robust standard error of aˆ gives
s:e(h1;h2) in equation (IV.9).
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whichever occurred first. Thus, these results reflect average monthly abnormal returns for
firms surviving up to 60 months rather than the 5-year average monthly abnormal return
performance. Tables H.4 and H.5 replicate regressions in Tables H.2 and H.3 with non-
normalized, standardized factors. As mentioned earlier, to make magnitudes of the slope
coefficients directly comparable, the factors are standardized by their standard deviations
computed over the pooled panel observations, such that all the factors have unit variances.
Figures G.1 to G.4 plot firm characteristics used in the regressions. The figures
show pre- and post-event median values of the characteristics for the event and matching
control firms.7 In addition to the characteristics used in the regressions, median monthly
volatilities are shown to demonstrate the dynamics of aggregate total risk during the event
months.
Regarding M&As in Figure G.1, the most obvious differences between event and
matching control firms among regressor factors are investment activity around the event
month and disparities in size and book-to-market values after the event month. Given the
nature of the the event, these differences are expected. Focusing initially on the linear and
second order models in Table H.2 forM&As comparable to those reported in Bessembinder
and Zhang (2013, Panel C of Table 4), it is notable that second order (i.e., squared) terms are
jointly highly insignificant. Among estimated coefficients associated with squared terms,
only momentum is significant at the 5% level. In Bessembinder and Zhang (2013, Panel C
of Table 4), the squared term of beta is significant at the 5% level, and the squared term of
the idiosyncratic volatility is borderline significant at the 10% level. In our case, inclusion
7Since pre-event values are not available in the IPO sample, Figure G.2 shows only post-event values.
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of these terms inflates the standard error of alpha from 0.105 to 0.253 in Table H.2 or 141%.
In their regression the standard error is inflated by 90%. Like their results, our regressions
indicate highly significant alphas without the squared terms but insignificant alphas after
including squared terms.
It is true that the alpha-estimates decrease with the addition of squared terms to the
linear model. However, as discussed in Section IV.2.2, nonlinearity caused by the nor-
malization is very likely to call for higher order terms in order to adequately capture the
implied extra nonlinearity. Indeed, enhancing the M&A regression model with third and
fourth powers of the explanatory variables reveals that third order terms become the domi-
nate (and only significant) factors in the regression. Also, as shown by the F-test reported
in the middle panel of Table H.2, third power terms are the only jointly significant terms in
the model. Even though alpha remains insignificant, its magnitude jumps from  0:067 to
 0:316, which indicates even higher abnormal returns compared to the highly significant
alpha of -0.290 for the linear model. Thus, inflated standard errors and widely varying al-
phas from one regression to another suggest that the estimates become highly unstable due
to the weak explanatory power of these factors, such that the noise component becomes
sizeable. Also, higher order terms induce other symptoms such as multicollinearity and
outlier effects, both of which can substantially affect the OLS intercept term.
The IPO columns of Table H.2 report regression equation (IV.3) results for CCAR.
The results differ considerably from those for M&As. All linear as well as higher or-
der terms are jointly statistically significant. Also, unlike Bessembinder and Zhang (2013,
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Panel B of Table 4), alpha remains statistically significant even with the squared and higher
order terms. In their study alpha is statistically significant only in the regression without the
squared terms. Inclusion of squared terms inflate the standard errors by 53% in Table H.2
compared to 66% in their regression results. In spite of the high significance of estimated
alphas in all models, again the inflated standard errors suggest growing instability in the es-
timates even though the higher order terms are jointly significant. In sum, our IPO findings
support those of many earlier studies that have documented material underperformance of
IPOs (for example, see Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn, 2008, among others).
The SEO columns of Table H.3 provide CCAR regression results. Unlike other cor-
porate events, estimated alphas are insignificant in both samples with or without squared
terms. Again the squared terms of the normalized factors are jointly insignificant. These
results for the linear and squared term regressions are consistent with those in Bessim-
binder and Zhang. However, the results become less clear cut with the inclusion of third
and fourth order terms. Consistent with our earlier discussion in Section IV.2.2, third order
terms are highly significant. With these terms, the magnitude of alpha increases dramat-
ically and becomes economically significant with an abnormal return of approximately
5.5% per year. However, due to inflated standard errors, this large alpha is only borderline
significant at the 5% level. In sum, the results for SEOs are mixed.
Results for dividend initiations (DIVs) in the last three columns of Table H.3 are
similar to those for M&As. Estimated alpha is highly significant in the normalized factors
regression without the squared or higher terms but insignificant with the inclusion of these
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terms. The addition of higher order terms at worst almost quadruples the standard errors of
alphas rendering them insignificant even in the case of an estimate equal to 0.455, or about
5.5% per year. Like M&As, IPOs, and SEOs, third order terms are jointly significant.
Due to problems of cross-sectional normalization of explanatory variables in panel
data analyses, we repeat the regression analyses using non-normalized factors that have
been standardized as discussed earlier. Tables H.4 and H.5 show that, particularly with
respect to the inclusion of squared terms, the results are quite different from those with
normalized factors. Regardless of whether or not higher order terms are included, all esti-
mated alphas are highly significant with values deviating from zero by 2:34 standard errors
or more. Notably, the standard errors of alphas remain virtually unchanged across different
model choices. The only exception is the fourth order regression of DIVs in which alpha
becomes insignificant and all higher order terms are jointly significant. This exception is
not surprising in view of implied multicollinearity caused by the inclusion of higher order
terms as well their high sensitivity to potential outliers. These empirical results confirm
potential normalization problems. More importantly, they suggest long-run underperfor-
mance after M&As, IPOs, and SEOs and overperformance after dividend initiations.
IV.3.2 BHAR, CTAR, and ASR approaches
We next report the results based on BHARs, CTARs, and ASRs for post-event return
differences between event firm and matched control firms associated with M&A, IPO,
SEO, and dividend initiation (DIV) events.
Merger and acquisition results for the sample period 1986 to 2007 as well as results
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for certain subperiods are shown in Table H.6. Although not necessary for ASRs and
CTARs, the analyses include only those M&As that have the full 60-month event-period
return history to facilitate BHAR computations. Panels A and B, respectively, give results
for the full sample of 1,838 M&As and trimmed sample of 1,828 M&As wherein 0.5% of
the most extreme M&As from both ends of the 5-year return distribution were removed.
Trimming drops 10 of the 1,838 M&As from the sample. In spite of the large sample size
of over 1,800 observations, these 10 extreme returns influence BHAR and its test statistics
over longer horizons.
Typically, exclusion of the extreme cases strengthens evidence of abnormality in
terms of the BHAR-T statistic. For example, for the full event period of 5 years, BHAR-T
indicates no evidence of abnormality in the full sample but is highly significant (p< 0:01)
after dropping 10 returns. In this case, if a few extreme cases are excluded, M&A firms
highly underperform their reference firms with average 5-year BHARs of 22:92% (third
row of Panel B), which is about the same as reported earlier byBetton, Eckbo, and Thorburn
(2008). On the other hand, including the outliers gives a BHAR of 6:70%, which is close
to  7:09% reported in Bessembinder and Zhang (2013, Table 3) and  6:5% reported by
Loughran and Vijh (1997). We infer that trimmed BHAR results suggest long-run, post-
event underperformance among M&As.
CTARs and related t-tests confirm significant negative long-run stock performance
over 3- and 5-year horizons in untrimmed and trimmed samples. Unlike BHAR, CTAR
appears to be insensitive to outliers. For the untrimmed sample in Panel A of Table H.6,
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ASRs and related test statistics ASR-T corroborate significant negative long-run perfor-
mance over 3- and 5-year periods as well as 6-month and 1-year periods. For the trimmed
sample results in panel B, 3- and 5-year abnormal returns are not significant but 6-month
and 1-year returns are significant, which subperiod analyses further support. An advantage
of the ASR approach is that monthly standardized abnormal returns over time can be com-
puted. The M&A graph in Figure G.5 illustrates post-event ASRs, which reveal a pattern
of substantive underperformance during the first year, after which the behavior appears
random.
Initial public offering results are reported in Table H.7. As before, though not as
striking asM&As, removal of only a few outliers (Panel B) affects BHAR results. ASR and
BHAR indicate highly statistically (and economically) significant abnormal 3- and 5-year
underperformance. Calendar time ap is negative but not significant over this long horizon.
However, calendar time results can be difficult to interpret due to the fact that, in each post-
event month, the portfolio contains stocks with different durations in the sample. Some
stocks may be newly-issued IPOs and others 5 years old. Thus, heterogeneous portfolio
values in different months can be expected to affect the estimation of the intercept term
and particularly its standard error. The results in Panel B of Table H.7 confirm the latter
issue, as the 5-year alpha estimate is  0:26% per month, which translates to about  16%
5-year underperformance, but alpha is still insignificant.
In the first month after the IPO month, Panels A and B show that, in terms of all
abnormal return metrics, large positive and highly significant abnormal returns occur. Af-
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ter this first month, the IPO graph in Figure G.5 shows that subsequent abnormal returns
measured in terms of ASRs are almost all negative over the remainder of the 5-year hold-
ing period. Regarding BHARs, notice that the 1-month positive abnormal return affects
the 2-month BHAR due to compounding. Also, because calendar time alphas measure
average monthly abnormal returns, the 1-month positive abnormal returns appear to af-
fect the average for up to 6 months after IPO events. Nonetheless, a clear reversal pattern
emerges from different test approaches of short-run overperformance followed by long-run
underperformance.
The seasoned equity offering results are shown in Table H.8. Again, comparing re-
sults in Panels A and B, BHAR proves to be sensitive to a few outliers, especially at the
longest 5-year horizon. The 5-year BHAR test statistic is weakly significant in Panel A but
highly significant in Panel B. Both CTAR and ASR tests in Panels A and B indicate signif-
icant long-run underperformance of SEOs at a 3-year horizon and 3- and 5-year horizons,
respectively. Significant negative 3-year calendar time aps for untrimmed and trimmed
samples further support long-run underperformance. It should be noted that 3- and 5-year
ASRs are significant despite the higher volatility profile of SEO firms relative to matching
firms (see the last panel of Figure G.3). We infer that event-induced volatility associated
with SEOs compared to their matches did not alter the inference of long-run underperfor-
mance.
Like IPOs, SEOs exhibit short-run outperformance in the 1-to-6 month event win-
dow. Calendar time and ASR tests in Panels A and B are highly significant for 1- and
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3-months after IPOs. As shown by the SEO graph of ASRs in Figure G.5, these findings
can be attributed largely to the sizeable 1-month overperformance. The ASR graph clearly
shows an unmistakable reversal from highly positive abnormal return in the first month to
steadily accumulating negative long-run abnormal returns that become significant by the
third year.
Table H.9 reports test results for dividend initiations. Unlike the above samples, in
unreported results BHARs do not change when the sample is trimmed and therefore are
not affected by outliers.8 In terms of ASRs, there is highly positive and significant 5-year
overperformance among dividend initiators, which agrees with the standardized CCARs in
Table H.5 discussed earlier. The unscaled return metric, or BHAR, is generally positive but
insignificant, except for being negative and significant at the 5% level in the 13–36 month
subperiod. The calendar time approach suggests negative but normally insignificant post-
event performance, except for the 3-year horizon and the 13–36 month subperiod. We
further investigated the latter findings by using an unmodified (value-weighted) CTAR
regression (i.e., regressing (Rtest R f )pt rather than (Rtest Rcontrol)pt on the Fama-
French factors in equation (IV.2)), which generated positive but insignificant estimated
alphas for these two horizons equal to 0.200 with t-value = 1.20 (p-value = 0.230) and
0.057 with t-value = .284 (p-value = .776), respectively.
Monthly ASRs in Figure G.5 show that the 5-year overperformance is due to per-
sistent positive ASRs over the 60-months holding period. Referring back to the last graph
in Figure G.4 (showing median monthly volatility), event firms’ volatility dropped well
8We do not report trimmed results.
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below that of matching firms’ volatility a few months before the event month. Hence,
much of the overperformance in terms of ASRs can be attributed to the lowered total risk
of dividend paying firms, which the BHAR and calendar time approaches do not take into
account.
IV.3.3 Robustness checks
Recent work by Fu and Huang (2015) finds that long-run abnormal returns for stock
repurchases and SEOs are significantly positive and negative, respectively, using samples
in 1984–2002 but disappear for samples in 2003–2012. The authors utilize conventional
BHAR and CTAR tests, in addition to the IRATS test by Ibbotson (1975). In the earlier
1984–2002 period, all three tests confirm significant three-year abnormal returns. How-
ever, in the later 2003–2012 period, BHAR and CTAR tests are insignificant, whereas
IRATS is significantly negative for both corporate events. They attribute the disappear-
ance of abnormal returns in the later period to changing external market and internal firm
factors.
We repeat their comparative analyses for our corporate event samples in 1980-2002
versus 2003-2014.9 Tables H.10 to H.13 provide the results for M&As, IPOs, SEOs, and
dividend initiations, respectively. Sample sizes after trimming (based on BHAR distribu-
tions) are reported. In the earlier 1980–2002 period, most of the results are similar to those
in the previous subsection in sample period 1980–2007. One exception is that long-run
9We should note that Fu and Huang (2015) select control stocks using conventional size and book-to-
market matches to event stocks in addition to a six-month, pre-event momentum return match. Consistent
with the previous section, we follow the common practice of matching on size and book-to-market firm
characteristics.
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abnormal returns for M&As are less negative than before. CTAR tests are significantly
negative in months 1 to 3, and BHAR is significant in month 60. However, ASR tests
are insignificant in general but positive and marginally significant (at the 10% level) in
month 48. Turning to the later 2003-2014 period, in contrast to Fu and Huang (2015),
most results remain unchanged. M&A and SEOs have post-event abnormal returns that
are negative and highly significant for all three tests, and dividend initiations are positive
and significant in ASR tests but insignificant for BHAR and CTAR tests. Interestingly, IPO
abnormal returns are generally insignificant, except for a marginally significant negative
ASR test in month 6.
Figures G.6 and G.7 graphically depict the monthly ASRs for trimmed samples of the
corporate events in the earlier and later sample periods, respectively. Visual comparisons
of these graphs for each event show that the results can differ between the earlier and
later period to some degree. For example, the pattern of long-run abnormal returns for
M&As looks weakly positive in Figure G.6 for the early period but clearly negative in
Figure G.7 for the later period. The abnormal return pattern for IPOs is strongly negative
in the earlier period but less consistently so in the later period. SEO patterns appear to stay
predominantly negative in both periods. Lastly, dividend initiations are positive in both
periods but less consistently so in the later period.
As a further robustness check, we formed samples in 1980–2007 versus 2008–2014.
In unreported results, the findings for 2008-2014 and 2003–2014 are very similar (e.g.,
ASR graphs are very similar).
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In sum, we find that long-run abnormal returns associated with major corporate
events can vary to some degree across subperiods. However, unlike Fu and Huang (2015),
we do not find a consistent pattern of long-run abnormal returns disappearing in more re-
cent times.
IV.4 Conclusions
This paper sought to contribute a broad set of evidence on the controversial question
of whether long-run abnormal returns are associated with major corporate actions. A bat-
tery of tests is implemented, including the regression approach of Bessembinder and Zhang
(2013) , well-known BHAR and calendar time approaches, as well as a recent standardized
abnormal return (ASR) approach. All four methods detect long-run abnormal performance
for IPOs, SEOs,M&As, and dividend initiations. Upon repeating Bessembinder and Zhang
seven-factor regressions, we were able to replicate their findings using factors normalized
by their procedure, with the exception of significant underperformance for IPOs. How-
ever, we found that their regression model results are primarily driven by the normalization
procedure, which affects the regression coefficients (and associated t-values), destabilizes
alpha estimates, and inflates alpha standard errors. When the regression analyses were re-
peated using non-normalized factors that were standardized, abnormal returns of the factor
models were significant for all four corporate events.
Further BHAR, calendar time, and ASR tests were generally consistent with the stan-
dardized seven-factor regression model results. BHAR tests yielded negative and signif-
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icant long-run abnormal underperformance over a 5-year horizon after M&As, IPOs, and
SEOs but not dividend initiations. Tests based on an adjusted Fama-French three-factor
model suggested calendar time abnormal returns were negative and significant for M&As
even after 3-to-5 years but for IPOs and SEOs. However, contrary to the other methods,
these calendar time tests for dividend initiations were negative (rather than positive) and
significant at a 3-year horizon, which was most likely due to inherent bad model problems.
Lastly, ASR results strongly indicated negative and significant long-run abnormal
returns for M&As, IPOs, and SEOs, in addition to positive and significant performance for
dividend initiations. Also, for IPOs and SEOs, a common reversal pattern was 1-month
overperformance followed by accumulating underperformance that becomes significant
after about 3 years. Graphs using monthly ASRs clearly illustrated this pattern. Moreover,
in robustness checks updating our samples and dividing them before and after 2003 as in
Fu and Huang (2015), unlike their study, long-run abnormal returns did not consistently
disappear in more recent times. Based on corroborating findings from different test meth-
ods and sample periods, we conclude that anomalous long-run abnormal returns occur over
different post-event horizons. Further research is recommended to better understand what




In this dissertation, three topics related to corporate governance and major corporate
events are studied using short-run and long-run performance metrics. In particular, earn-
ings per share (EPS) metrics in CEO compensations schemes are examined in the first part
of the dissertation. Then, the relation between duration of pay contracts and mergers and
acquisitions (M&A) activities are examined. Finally, long-run abnormal returns associated
with major corporate events are investigated.
In the first essay, we examine the role of EPS–tied performance metrics on the firm’s
share repurchases activity and firm value. We have twomain findings. First, firms aremore
likely buy back their shares when their CEOs have EPS-related triggers in their compen-
sation plans. Second, the market reacts positively when EPS-tied goals are added in the
CEO’s pay contract when a firm has high free cash flows and low investment opportunities.
A focus on enhancing EPS seems an advantageous incentive mechanism for this group of
firms. Similarly, the market reacts negatively when EPS-tied goals are added in the CEO’s
pay contract when a firm has low free cash flows and high investment opportunities. In
this case, a focus on enhancing EPS seems disadvantageous.
In the second essay, we study the effects of managers’ pay duration on M&As activ-
ities. We find evidence that short-termism is not necessarily bad, at least when making an
M&A deal. We find that firms offering short-term incentives realize better announcement
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abnormal returns than firms offering relatively long-term incentives. Our empirical find-
ings also indicate that post-M&A accounting and operating performances of short-horizon
managers are better when compared to those of firms with long-horizon executives. The
results are surprising when viewed against the conventional wisdom that giving managers
short-term incentives is suboptimal. The results in this essay imply that long-term incen-
tives are not necessarily optimal for all firms in all situations.
In the third essay, we investigate long-run abnormal returns associated with ma-
jor corporate events. Our long-run analyses investigate M&As, initial public offerings
(IPOs), seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), and dividend initiations. We implement a bat-
tery of different test approaches, including Bessimbinder and Zhang regression approach
(Bessembinder and Zhang, 2013), buy-and-hold returns (BHARs), three-factor calendar
time regressions, and a recent standardized abnormal return (ASR) approach (Dutta et al.,
2015). Evidence from available long-run event study tests generally supports the existence
of anomalous returns associated with M&A, IPO, SEO, and dividend initiations. Based on
corroborating findings from different test methods and sample periods, we conclude that
anomalous abnormal returns occur over different post-event horizons. Further research is
recommended to better understand what explains long-run abnormal return patterns.
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VARIABLE DEFINITIONS FOR CHAPTER II
This appendix defines the variables used in the empirical analyses in Chapter II. In
parentheses, we indicate which Compustat variables, if any, have been used.
Book Equity (BE): The book value of stockholders’ equity plus balance sheet deferred
taxes and investment tax credit (if available) minus the book value of preferred stock. To
estimate the book value of preferred stock, we use the redemption or liquidation or par
value of preferred stock (in that order). Negative BE values are excluded.
Cash: The amount of cash and cash equivalents (che) scaled by the book value of assets
(at)
CloseEPS: Dummy =1 if firm just missed or exceeded EPS goal in CEO compensation
plan. That is,  0:02 < ActualEPS - TargetEPS < 0:02. Actual EPS is from Compustat
and Target EPS is from Incentive Lab.
EPS-metric: Dummy=1 if a firm has an EPS-tied absolute performance metric in the
CEO’s compensation plan.
EPS-metric Added: Dummy =1 if a firm adds an EPS-tied absolute performance metric
in the CEO’s compensation contract for the first time.
EPS-metric Removed: Dummy =1 if a firm removes an EPS-tied absolute performance
metrics (and never uses it again) in the CEO’s compensation contract.
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ExceedEPS: Dummy=1 if a firm just exceeds the EPS goal in the CEO compensation plan.
That is: 0 ActualEPS - TargetEPS <+0:02. Actual EPS is from Compustat and Target
EPS is from Incentive Lab.
Firm size: Log of total assets (at)
Free Cash Flow (FCF): The sum of operating income before depreciation (oibdp) minus
total interest related expenses (xint) minus total income taxes (txt) minus cash dividend
(dv), divided by total assets (at)
Leverage: Ratio of sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities to book value of
assets. (dlc+dltt)/at
Market to Book (MB): The market value of equity plus the book value of interest-bearing
debt divided by the book value of assets. (((prcc_f*csho) + dlc + dltt) / at)
Market value of equity (ME): The share price times the number of common shares out-
standing (prcc_f*csho), both measured at the end of the fiscal year.
MissedEPS: Dummy =1 if a firm just missed EPS goal in CEO compensation plan. That
is:  0:02 < ActualEPS - TargetEPS < 0 Actual EPS is from Compustat and Target EPS
is from Incentive Lab.
Net Repurchase (NR): The increase in common treasury stock (tstkc). If treasury stock is
zero in the current and prior year, net repurchase is the difference between stock purchase
(prstkc) and stock issuance (sstk). If either of these two amounts is negative, net repurchase
is set to zero.
Payout Ratio: The ratio of dividend paid to net income (dvc/ni)
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Profitability (ROA): The ratio of net income to total assets (ni/at)
Vested-EPS-metric: Dummy =1 if a firm has an EPS-tied absolute performance metric
in the CEO’s compensation plan in that fiscal year or it has EPS-tied metrics in previous
years and their vesting period includes the current fiscal year.
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APPENDIX B
FIGURES FOR CHAPTER II
Figure B.1: Timeline
Figure B.1 shows the timeline of events. Proxy filings are usually reported three months after the fiscal
year end. Compensation-plan variables are merged with the recent fiscal year accounting variables from
Compustat.
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Figure B.2: Adding EPS-metrics
Figure B.2 graphically shows when the EPS metric and EPS-metrics Added dummies are 0 or 1 in the re-
gression data.
Example: Time Warner Inc. added EPS metrics in the CEO pay contract in the proxy statement after 2012
fiscal year end.
Figure B.3: Removing EPS-metrics
Figure B.3 graphically shows when the EPS metric and EPS-metrics Removed dummies are 0 or 1 in the
regression data.
Example: Dr Pepper Snapple Group Inc. removed EPS metrics from the CEO pay contract in the proxy
statement after 2012 fiscal year end.
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Figure B.4: Net Repurchases
Figure B.4 shows the mean value of net repurchases (NR) scaled by market equity and book equity from 1998
to 2013 (fiscal year). Repurchases are defined in Appendix A. The overall mean of NR scaled by market
equity is 1.7%, i.e., the average amount of repurchases is about 1.7 percent of the market value of equity.
Average NR over the sample period is 222.5 million dollars (560 million dollars for firms having positive
share repurchases –i.e. firms with positive NR with NR/BE is greater than 1%)
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APPENDIX C
TABLES FOR CHAPTER II
Table C.1 : Descriptive Statistics
Table C.1 Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the sample. Panel B presents mean
values of firm characteristics for different sub-samples. All variables are defined in Ap-
pendix A. The sample consists of 1,343 firms with 13,411 firm-years for the fiscal years
1998-2013. Accounting variables are winsorized at 1%.
Panel A
N Mean SD Median 1% 99%
Firm size 13,411 7.935 1.481 7.88 4.17 11.671
Cash 13,409 0.166 0.185 0.096 0.001 0.815
FCF 12,425 0.078 0.094 0.086 -0.397 0.292
Profitability 13,408 0.034 0.13 0.053 -0.661 0.288
Leverage 13,369 0.247 0.203 0.224 0 0.999
Payout Ratio 13,392 0.165 0.431 0 -1.241 2.81
MB 13,343 1.961 1.698 1.416 0.415 10.676
NR/ME 13,089 0.017 0.031 0 0 0.162
NR/BE 12,748 0.06 0.125 0 0 0.751
ExceedEPS 13,411 0.002 0.045 0 0 0
MissedEPS 13,411 0.003 0.054 0 0 0




EPS-metric Sample EPS-metric Added EPS-metric Removed
Mean Mean Mean
Firm size 8:39 8:03 8:124
Cash 0:117 0:128 0:141
FCF 0:098 0:1 0:076
Profitability 0:068 0:061 0:025
Leverage 0:242 0:246 0:279
Payout Ratio 0:221 0:172 0:156
MB 1:781 1:92 1:578
NR/ME 0:024 0:024 0:025
NR/BE 0:086 0:086 0:085
ExceedEPS 0:009 0:007 0
MissedEPS 0:013 0:012 0
CloseEPS 0:022 0:019 0
N 2957 411 181
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Table C.2: The effect of EPS-metrics on Net Repurchases
Table C.2 presents left-censored Tobit regressions. The dependent variable is net repur-
chases scaled by the market value of equity or net repurchases scaled by book equity All
variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for
heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. , , and  denote significance at less
than 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-sided), respectively.
NR/BE NR/ME NR/BE NR/ME NR/BE NR/ME
EPS-metrics 0:059 0:015 0:040 0:010 0:040 0:010
(0:008) (0:002) (0:008) (0:002) (0:008) (0:002)
CloseEPS  0:010 0:003  0:002 0:006
(0:028) (0:008) (0:028) (0:009)
ExceedEPS  0:059  0:015  0:049  0:014
(0:043) (0:013) (0:039) (0:013)
Firm size 0:026 0:006 0:026 0:006
(0:003) (0:001) (0:003) (0:001)
Cash 0:149 0:032 0:149 0:032
(0:030) (0:007) (0:030) (0:007)
FCF 0:770 0:134 0:769 0:134
(0:084) (0:021) (0:084) (0:021)
Profitability 0:100 0:022 0:100 0:022
(0:057) (0:013) (0:057) (0:013)
Payout Ratio  0:000  0:000  0:000  0:000
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
Market to Book 0:001  0:004 0:001  0:004
(0:002) (0:001) (0:002) (0:001)
Leverage  0:003  0:020  0:003  0:020
(0:027) (0:007) (0:027) (0:007)
Constant  0:108  0:022  0:384  0:072  0:383  0:072
(0:046) (0:009) (0:046) (0:008) (0:045) (0:008)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 12688 13028 11501 11993 11501 11993
Pseudo R2 0:191  0:149 0:387  0:256 0:387  0:256
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Table C.3: The effect of Adding and Dropping EPS-metrics on Net Repurchases
Table C.3 presents left-censored Tobit regressions. The dependent variable is net repur-
chases scaled by the market value of equity or net repurchases scaled by book equity All
variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for
heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. , , and  denote significance at less
than 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-sided), respectively.
NR/BE NR/ME NR/BE NR/ME NR/BE NR/ME
EPS-metrics Added 0:019 0:005 0:036 0:009 0:045 0:011
(0:011) (0:003) (0:011) (0:003) (0:011) (0:003)
EPS-metrics Removed 0:006 0:001  0:001  0:001 0:000  0:000
(0:019) (0:005) (0:019) (0:005) (0:019) (0:005)
Firm size 0:026 0:007 0:031 0:008 0:028 0:007
(0:004) (0:001) (0:003) (0:001) (0:003) (0:001)
Cash 0:135 0:027 0:154 0:033 0:122 0:029
(0:033) (0:008) (0:033) (0:008) (0:031) (0:007)
FCF 0:816 0:141 0:822 0:143 0:800 0:147
(0:090) (0:022) (0:096) (0:024) (0:098) (0:024)
Profitability 0:096 0:021 0:115 0:027 0:124 0:029
(0:059) (0:013) (0:072) (0:017) (0:080) (0:019)
Payout Ratio  0:000  0:000  0:000  0:000  0:000  0:000
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
Market to Book 0:002  0:003 0:003  0:003 0:003  0:003
(0:002) (0:001) (0:002) (0:001) (0:002) (0:001)
Leverage  0:012  0:022  0:026  0:023  0:038  0:022
(0:030) (0:008) (0:030) (0:009) (0:031) (0:011)
Constant  0:400  0:078  0:453  0:097  0:349  0:071
(0:061) (0:015) (0:063) (0:016) (0:035) (0:007)
Year FE Yes Yes No No No No
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
N 9556 9938 9556 9938 9602 9985
Pseudo R2 0:410  0:259 0:333  0:192 0:229  0:133
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Table C.4:
The effect of Adding and Dropping EPS-metrics on NR for firms having positive NR
Table C.4 reports left-censored Tobit regressions for firms having positive share repur-
chases in the last fiscal year (if net repurchases is positive and NR/BE is greater than 1%).
The dependent variable is net repurchases scaled by the market value of equity or net re-
purchases scaled by book equity All variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors
(in parentheses) are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. , ,
and  denote significance at less than 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-sided), respectively.
NR/BE NR/ME NR/BE NR/ME NR/BE NR/ME
EPS-metrics Added 0:015 0:006 0:034 0:009 0:035 0:010
(0:013) (0:004) (0:014) (0:004) (0:014) (0:004)
EPS-metrics Removed 0:023 0:008 0:007 0:005 0:011 0:004
(0:022) (0:006) (0:023) (0:007) (0:023) (0:007)
Firm size 0:012 0:002 0:015 0:003 0:012 0:003
(0:004) (0:001) (0:004) (0:001) (0:004) (0:001)
Cash 0:161 0:036 0:185 0:043 0:145 0:041
(0:047) (0:009) (0:047) (0:009) (0:043) (0:008)
FCF 0:520 0:064 0:457 0:049 0:409 0:053
(0:110) (0:028) (0:110) (0:026) (0:107) (0:026)
Profitability 0:354 0:062 0:413 0:080 0:431 0:076
(0:095) (0:018) (0:095) (0:018) (0:094) (0:018)
Payout Ratio  0:001  0:000  0:001  0:000  0:001  0:000
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
Market to Book 0:020  0:005 0:021  0:004 0:022  0:004
(0:004) (0:001) (0:005) (0:001) (0:005) (0:001)
Leverage 0:185  0:003 0:158  0:006 0:163  0:003
(0:037) (0:004) (0:038) (0:005) (0:039) (0:005)
Constant  0:285  0:021  0:319  0:036  0:193  0:010
(0:053) (0:011) (0:053) (0:011) (0:038) (0:007)
Year FE Yes Yes No No No No
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
N 3833 3953 3833 3953 3848 3968
Pseudo R2 2:330  0:081 1:711  0:036 1:285  0:022
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Table C.5 :
The effect of EPS-metrics Added and EPS-metrics Removed on Net Repurchases
Table C.5 reports Probit regressions. The dependent variable is a dummy variable for
positive net repurchases (=1 if net repurchases is positive and NR/BE is greater than 1%).
All variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for
heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. , , and  denote significance at less
than 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-sided), respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Positive NR Positive NR Positive NR
EPS-metrics Added 0:180 0:237 0:308
(0:070) (0:068) (0:067)
EPS-metrics Removed  0:008  0:041  0:036
(0:117) (0:117) (0:114)
Firm size 0:200 0:221 0:192
(0:020) (0:019) (0:018)
Cash 0:412 0:523 0:459
(0:164) (0:158) (0:140)
FCF 3:234 3:163 3:166
(0:489) (0:502) (0:463)
Profitability 0:465 0:558 0:565
(0:295) (0:358) (0:371)
Payout Ratio 0:001 0:001 0:001
(0:002) (0:002) (0:002)
Market to Book  0:001 0:002 0:008
(0:012) (0:011) (0:011)
Leverage  0:535  0:538  0:567
(0:171) (0:175) (0:209)
Constant  1:893  2:210  2:019
(0:486) (0:481) (0:159)
Year Fixed Effects Yes No No
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes No
N 9920 9920 9988
Pseudo R2 0:143 0:115 0:082
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Table C.6: Falsification Tests
This table repeats Probit regression from Table C.5 using one lag and one lead of all depen-
dent and independent variables (except EPS-metrics Added and EPS-metrics Removed).
The dependent variable is a dummy variable for positive net repurchases (=1 if net repur-
chases is positive and NR/BE is greater than 1%). All variables are defined in Appendix
A. Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the
firm level. , , and  denote significance at less than 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-
sided), respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Positive NR (one lag) Positive NR Positive NR (one lead)
EPS-metrics Added 0:0425 0:1801 0:1018
(0:0710) (0:0702) (0:0729)
EPS-metrics Removed  0:0610  0:0075  0:2178
(0:1184) (0:1174) (0:1207)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
N 9689 9920 9835
Pseudo R2 0:138 0:143 0:171
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Table C.7: Treatment Effects
Table C.7 provides average treatment effect (ATE) results from nearest-neighbor matching.
The first and second column include the full sample. The third and fourth column only
include positive net repurchases (=1 if net repurchases is positive and NR/BE is greater
than 1%) The treatment group includes firms adding EPS metrics in CEO compensation
plans. The matching variables include firm size, MB, ROA, cash and dividend payout
ratio. The Mahalanobis distance metric is used. Abadie-Imbens standard errors are in
parentheses. , , and  denote significance at less than 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-
sided), respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Positive NR Positive NR NR/ME NR/ME
EPS-metrics Added 0:099 0:009
(0:027) (0:003)
Lag of EPS-metrics Added 0:128 0:007
(0:028) (0:003)
N 12296 10760 4733 4242
Sample Full Sample Full Sample NR>0 firms NR>0 firms
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Table C.8: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) Descriptive Statistics
Panel A presents mean cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the full sample and for
three subsamples. CARs are calculated using the market model with the value-weighted
market index. Panel B and Panel C show the mean CARs for four subgroups based on FCF
and MB median values for EPS-metric Added and EPS-metric Removed samples, respec-
tively. , , and  denote significance at less than 1%, 5%, and 10% levels corresponding
to Patell Z statistics (Patell, 1976)
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics
Full sample EPS-metric EPS-metric Added EPS-metric Removed
CAR(-1,+1) 0:11% 0:16% 0:36% 0:13%
CAR(-3,+3) 0:18% 0:37% 0:51%  0:26%
N 13350 2955 411 181
Panel B. EPS-metric Added results for four subgroups based on median cut-offs
CAR(-1,+1) Prediction Low MB N Prediction High MB N
High FCF (+) 1.53% 66 0.08% 155
Low FCF 0.15% 113 (-) -0.12% 45
CAR(-3,+3) Prediction Low MB N Prediction High MB N
High FCF (+) 1.39% 66 0.70% 155
Low FCF 0.20% 113 (-) -0.91% 45
Panel C. EPS-metric Removed results for four subgroups based on median cut-offs
CAR(-1,+1) Prediction Low MB N Prediction High MB N
High FCF (-) -0.93% 31 -0.32% 50
Low FCF 0.47% 68 (+) 0.64% 21
CAR(-3,+3) Prediction Low MB N Prediction High MB N
High FCF (-) -1.97% 31 -0.28% 50
Low FCF 0.18% 68 (+) -0.41% 21
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Table C.9: The announcement effect of adding EPS metrics in the CEO pay contracts
This table shows the announcement effect (CAR) of adding EPS metrics in the CEO’s
compensation contract. It provides weighted least squares regression results for the
following model.
CARit = a+b aEPSmetric Addedit + g1Firm sizeit 1 + g2Cashit 1 +
g3Pro f itabilityit 1+ g4Leverageit 1+ e it
The dependent variable is CAR(-1, +1) or CAR(-3, +3) from the Market Model. All
variables are defined in Appendix A. Panel A shows results for four subgroups based on
median cut-offs, while Panel B shows results for four subgroups based on terciles. Only
ba coefficients are reported for brevity. Industry and year fixed effects are included. The
regressions are weighted by the variance calculated from the market model. Standard
errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level. , , and  denote significance at
less than 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-sided), respectively.
Panel A. EPS-metric Added results for four subgroups based on median cut-offs
CAR(-1,+1) Prediction Low MB Prediction High MB
High FCF (+) 1.11% 0.18%
Low FCF -0.04% (-) 0.22%
CAR(-3,+3) Prediction Low MB Prediction High MB
High FCF (+) 1.60% 0.54%
Low FCF -0.01% (-) -0.69%
Panel B. EPS-metric Added results for four subgroups based on terciles
CAR(-1,+1) Prediction Low MB Prediction High MB
High FCF (+) -0.05% 0.19%
Low FCF 0.08% (-) -1.12%
CAR(-3,+3) Prediction Low MB Prediction High MB
High FCF (+) 1.10% 0.36%
Low FCF 0.15% (-) -3.88%
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Table C.10: The announcement effect of removing EPS metrics in the CEO pay contract
This table shows the announcement effect (CAR) of removing EPS metrics in the CEO’s
compensation contract. It provides weighted least squares regression results for the
following model.
CARit = a+b rEPSmetric Removedit + g1Firm sizeit 1 + g2Cashit 1 +
g3Pro f itabilityit 1+ g4Leverageit 1+ e it
The dependent variable is CAR(-1, +1) or CAR(-3, +3) from the Market Model. All
variables are defined in Appendix A. Panel A shows results for four subgroups based on
median cut-offs, while Panel B shows results for four subgroups based on terciles. Only
br coefficients are reported for brevity. Industry and year fixed effects are included. The
regressions are weighted by the variance calculated from the market model. Standard
errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level. , , and  denote significance at
less than 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-sided), respectively.
Panel A. EPS-metric Removed results for four subgroups based on median cut-offs
CAR(-1,+1) Prediction Low MB Prediction High MB
High FCF (-) -0.51% -0.82%
Low FCF 0.03% (+) 0.68%
CAR(-3,+3) Prediction Low MB Prediction High MB
High FCF (-) -0.15% -0.71%
Low FCF -0.08% (+) 0.21%
Panel B. EPS-metric Removed results for four subgroups based on terciles
CAR(-1,+1) Prediction Low MB Prediction High MB
High FCF (-) -1.81% -1.09%
Low FCF 0.86% (+) 8.59%
CAR(-3,+3) Prediction Low MB Prediction High MB
High FCF (-) -1.99% -1.23%
Low FCF 0.52% (+) 5.65%
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Table C.11:
The announcement effect of adding/removing EPS metrics in the CEO pay contract
This table provides weighted least squares regression results for the following model. The
sample includes only Low FCF/High MB and High FCF/Low MB firms.
CARit = a + b 1EPSmetricAddedit + b 2EPSmetricRemovedit + g1RG +
g2[EPSmetricAddedit  RG] + g3[EPSmetricRemovedit  RG] + g4Firm sizeit 1 +
g5Cashit 1+ g6Pro f itabilityit 1+ g7Leverageit 1+ e it
The dummy variable RG=1 (reasonable group=1) if a firm is included in High FCF/Low
MB group in previous year. The dependent variable is CAR(-1, +1) or CAR(-3, +3) from
the Market Model. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Only g1, g2 and g3 coefficients
are reported for brevity. Industry and year fixed effects are included. The regressions
are weighted by the variance calculated from the market model. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at firm level. , , and 
denote significance at less than 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-sided), respectively.
Prediction CAR(-1, +1) CAR(-3, +3)
Reasonable group
(High FCF/Low MB ) coefficient
g1 - -0.28% -0.34%
Adding EPS metrics for
reasonable group (High FCF/Low MB )
g2 + 0.71% 2.21%
Removing EPS metrics for
reasonable group (High FCF/Low MB )
g3 - -1.16% -0.38%
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes





VARIABLE DEFINITIONS FOR CHAPTER III
This appendix defines the variables used in Chapter III.
3/5-day CAR: computed for acquirer as the sum of the differences between actual returns
and predicted returns, based on the market model with two parameters (intercept and the
market return) over the three/five-day period centered on the deal announcement date.
Deal Value/Acq. MVE: Ratio of deal value (reported as Value by SDC) to acquirer’s
market value of equity at the end of the last fiscal year prior to announcement.
Delta: Delta equals the dollar change in CEO wealth for a 1% change in stock price.
Natural log transformation, log(1+Delta), is also applied to reduce right skewness.
Different 3-SIC: A dummy variable that takes the value of ‘1’ if acquirer and target do not
have the same three-digit SIC code at, and ‘0’ otherwise.
Idiosyncratic Volatility : Each month for each stock, we run the three-factor Fama and
French (1993) regression and measure monthly idiosyncratic volatility (ivol) with the stan-
dard deviation of the residual.
Incentive Duration (Pay Duration, Duration ): The value-weighted average of the vest-
ing periods of the different components of executive compensation (including restricted
stocks units (RSU), stock options, salary and bonus). The weight for each component is
the fraction of that component in the total compensation plan.
Leverage: Ratio of sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities to book value of
assets.
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Log Sales: Natural logarithm of sales.
M/B: Natural logarithm of ratio of sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities and
market value of equity to book value of assets.
M&ALiquidity: Total value of deals in similar industry (2-digit SIC code) scaled by total
assets.
N Bidders > 1: A dummy variable that takes the value of ‘1’ if more than one acquirer bid
for the target, and ‘0’ otherwise .
Non-public: A dummy variable that takes the value of ‘0’ if the target is a publicly-held
company, and ‘1’ otherwise.
Op. Inc./Assets: Operating income before depreciation, interest, and taxes scaled by as-
sets.
Op. Exp./Sales: Operating expenses scaled by sales.
Op. Inc./Sales: Operating income before depreciation, interest, and taxes scaled by sales.
Paid by Cash: A dummy variable that takes the value of ‘1’ if the acquirer paid for 100%
of the target’s assets with cash, and ’0’ otherwise.
Paid by Stock: A dummy variable that takes the value of ‘1’ if the acquirer paid for the
100% of the target’s assets with stock, and ’0’ otherwise.
Price runup: Percentage change in stock price of acquiring firm from previous fiscal year
to the current fiscal year in which the announcement is made.
ROA: Net income scaled by assets.
Sales/Assets: Sales scaled by assets.
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Sales Growth: Percentage change in sales from year -2 to year 0.
Tender: A dummy variable that takes the value of ‘1’ if acquirer’s offer to target’s share-
holders is tender, and ‘0’ otherwise.
Tenure: Number of years the CEO has served the acquiring company.
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APPENDIX E































Figure E.1: Change in Pay Duration
Figure E.1 presents median pay duration of the firms included in the sample over the study period: 1998–
2013. Vertical axis represents the median firm-wide pay duration in months and horizontal axis represents




































Figure E.2: Pay Duration for Acquirers and Non-acquirers
Figure E.2 presents median pay duration for acquirers and non-acquirers over the sample period. Vertical













































Figure E.3: Average Value of the Deals by Year for Short and Long-duration Acquirers
Figure E.3 presents average value of the deals for short-duration and long-duration acquirers over the sample
period. The short-duration group represents the acquirers with pay duration below the median pay duration,
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Figure E.4: Average Monthly Idiosyncratic Volatility for Short and Long-duration Acquir-
ers
Figure E.4 shows average of monthly idiosyncratic volatility for short-duration and long-duration acquirers
from t-4 month to t+12 month (t=0 for deal announcement month). We run the three-factor Fama and French
(1993) regression for each stock and calculate monthly idiosyncratic volatility with the standard deviation
of the residual. The short-duration group represents the acquirers with pay duration below the median pay
duration, whereas the long-duration group represents the acquirers with pay duration above the median pay
duration. Vertical axis represents monthly idiosyncratic volatility (residual, in percentage terms) and hori-
zontal axis represents the months around deal announcement month.
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APPENDIX F
TABLES FOR CHAPTER III
Table F.1: Industrial Distribution of the Deals
Table F.1 displays industrial distribution of the M&A deals announced between 1998 and
2013 based on Fama-French 12 industries. The sample contains public, private, and sub-
sidiary targets. The short-duration group represents the acquirers with pay duration below
the median pay duration, whereas the long-duration groups represents the acquirers with
pay duration above the median pay duration. The medians are calculated using the firms
within the same fiscal year.
Acquirers Targets
Industry Long-Duration Short-Duration Long-Duration Short-Duration
Non-durables 55 85 51 85
Durables 19 34 12 29
Manufacturing 146 180 120 142
Energy 90 133 86 131
Chemicals 27 46 24 40
Bus. Eqp. 464 331 506 362
Telecom 111 100 87 90
Shops 84 88 97 101
Healthcare 204 129 222 149
Finance 385 410 319 336
Other 129 162 190 233
Total 1;714 1;698 1;714 1;698
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Table F.2: Summary Statistics
Table F.2 presents the means and medians of the variables along with the number of avail-
able observations for each item. The short-duration group represents the acquirers with
pay duration below the median pay duration, whereas the long-duration group represents
the acquirers with pay duration above the median pay duration. The medians are calculated
using the firms within the same fiscal year. The variable descriptions are in Appendix D.
***, **, and * stand for statistical significances obtained from t-tests for the differences in
means of the variables for for groups and represent 1%, 5%, and 10%-level, respectively.
Long-Duration Short-Duration
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median
Panel A. Executive characteristics
Pay Duration 1,714 32:64 31.71 1,698 13:00 12.62
Total Executive Pay 1,714 27:93 15.36 1,698 16:24 8.63
Tenure 1,510 7:14 6.00 1,483 7:23 5.20
Delta 1,437 6:49 6.54 1,329 6:02 5.98
Panel B. Acquirer characteristics
M/B 1,712 1:01 0.93 1,698 0:87 0.80
Log Sales 1,713 8:01 7.92 1,697 7:87 7.70
M&A Liquidity 1,708 0:07 0.03 1,687 0:07 0.03
Number of deals 1,714 1:77 1 1,698 1:70 1
Panel C. Deal characteristics
Value/Acq. MVE 1,712 8:47% 2.16% 1,698 9:71% 2.84%
Big Acquisitions 1,714 18:96% 0 1,698 22:50% 0
Paid in Cash 1,714 41:89% 0 1,698 38:69% 0
Paid by Stock 1,714 7:29% 0 1,698 7:83% 0
N Bidders > 1 1,714 1:34% 0 1,698 0:94% 0
Non-public 1,714 75:32% 1 1,698 75:91% 1
Different 3-SIC 1,714 86:06% 1 1,698 86:28% 1




Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median
Panel D. CARs and around M&A announcements
3-day CAR (All) 1,714 0:11% 0.05% 1,698 0:19% -0.03%
5-day CAR (All) 1,714 0:15% 0.08% 1,698 0:17% 0.07%
3-day CAR (Big) 325  0:46% -0.46% 382 0:78% 0.47%
5-day CAR (Big) 325  0:63% -0.53% 382 0:75% 0.23%
3-day CAR (Big & Diff.) 155  0:76% -0.24% 173 0:42% 0.19%
5-day CAR (Big & Diff.) 155  1:02% -0.37% 173 0:49% 0.42%
Panel E. Monthly Idiosyncratic Volatility (ivol) around M&A announcements
ivol at t-1 1,521 1:58 1.31 1,454 1:60 1.36
ivol at t 1,527 1:67 1.40 1,461 1:75 1.48
ivol at t+1 1,525 1:55 1.27 1,453 1:63 1.37
ivol at t+2 1,520 1:63 1.29 1,450 1:62 1.36
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Table F.3: Pay Duration and Acquirer Announcement Returns
Table F.3 presents the results fromOLSRegressions of three-day or five-day announcement period cumulative abnormal returns of
acquirers (3-day CAR or 5-day CAR) on executive pay duration and other control variables. Executive pay duration is the weighted
average of pay durations of the executives covered in Incentive Lab for the study period between 1998 and 2013. Duration (cont.)
is the number of months over which the executive’s pay is vested. Derived from executive pay duration, Duration (dummy) is an
indicator variable taking the value of “1” if the executive pay duration is above the median pay duration within the same fiscal
year, and “0” otherwise. Duration (>36 mon.) is an indicator variable taking the value of “1” if the executive pay duration is
above 36 months, and “0” otherwise. Pay Duration in the interaction term Tenure Pay Duration, takes the value of pay duration
measures in the first three columns in each model. Detailed descriptions of the variables are in the Appendix D. Absolute values
of t-values are below the coefficient estimates and based on heteroskedasticity-adjusted, robust standard errors. ***, **, and *
stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) 4) (5) (6)
Independent Variable 3-day CAR 5-day CAR 3-day CAR 5-day CAR 3-day CAR 5-day CAR
Pay Duration (cont.)  0:032  0:042
2:45 2:69
Pay Duration (>36 mon.)  0:660  0:992
1:35 1:72
Pay Duration (dummy)  0:767  0:786
2:22 1:97
Tenure  0:017  0:024 0:046 0:050 0:016 0:017
0:52 0:60 2:37 2:15 0:65 0:59
Tenure x Duration 0:004 0:004 0:080 0:088 0:094 0:103
2:90 2:76 1:59 1:53 2:67 2:48
Log Sales  0:158  0:145  0:159  0:149  0:150  0:140
1:77 1:46 1:78 1:48 1:69 1:41
M/B 0:501 0:496 0:479 0:477 0:495 0:473
2:31 1:94 2:20 1:85 2:28 1:84
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Table F.3 continued
(1) (2) (3) 4) (5) (6)
Independent Variable 3-day CAR 5-day CAR 3-day CAR 5-day CAR 3-day CAR 5-day CAR
Deal Value/Acq MVE  0:252  0:687  0:240  0:673  0:247  0:670
0:25 0:60 0:24 0:59 0:25 0:58
Paid in Cash 0:206 0:176 0:218 0:192 0:218 0:191
0:83 0:61 0:88 0:67 0:88 0:66
Paid in Stock  1:068  0:856  1:078  0:865  1:062  0:841
1:83 1:39 1:84 1:40 1:81 1:36
Tender 0:578 0:216 0:571 0:216 0:598 0:234
0:95 0:34 0:94 0:34 0:99 0:37
N Bidders > 1  0:226  0:317  0:194  0:274  0:184  0:277
0:18 0:25 0:16 0:22 0:15 0:22
Different 3-SIC  0:277 0:204  0:255 0:236  0:285 0:195
0:76 0:49 0:70 0:57 0:78 0:47
Liquidity 0:728 0:883 0:757 0:914 0:698 0:846
1:27 1:62 1:32 1:70 1:24 1:60
Non-public 1:934 1:754 1:919 1:738 1:943 1:766
5:43 4:41 5:38 4:36 5:45 4:44
Constant  1:877  0:982  2:435  1:709  2:095  1:326
0:70 0:33 0:94 0:61 0:78 0:46
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2;160 2;160 2;160 2;160 2;160 2;160
Adj R2 0:06 0:04 0:06 0:04 0:06 0:04
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Table F.4: Pay Duration and Post-announcement Stock Performance
Table F.4 Panel A displays average compounded buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs)
for short-duration and long-duration firms. Short-duration (long-duration) is definedwhere
the executive pay duration is below (above) the median pay duration within the same fiscal
year. Returns are compounded 6, 12, 24 and 36 months after the deal announcements.
25 Book-to-Market/Size portfolios are used as benchmark returns. Equal-weighted and
value-weighted average returns are reported. VW returns are calculated by using firm’s
size at the beginning of announcement year, scaled by CRSP VW index. Panel B presents
long-run cumulative abnormal returns (LCARs) for short-duration and long-duration firms.
For LCAR results, matching portfolio return is subtracted each month and then abnormal
returns are summed over 6, 12, 24 and 36 months after the deal announcements. Returns
are expressed as percentages.
Panel A: Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs)
Equal-Weighted Value-Weighted
Month BHAR p-value BHAR p-value
6 Short Duration 0:51 0:37  2:46 0:00
Long Duration  0:85 0:11  2:40 0:00
Difference 1:36 0:08  0:06 0:93
12 Short Duration 1:32 0:13  4:69 0:00
Long Duration  0:99 0:21  5:33 0:00
Difference 2:30 0:05 0:64 0:50
24 Short Duration 5:59 0:00  6:21 0:00
Long Duration 1:63 0:15  5:99 0:00
Difference 3:96 0:03  0:23 0:86
36 Short Duration 8:26 0:00  7:38 0:00
Long Duration 3:88 0:01  6:58 0:00
Difference 4:38 0:07  0:79 0:62
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Table F.4 continued
Panel B: Long-run Cumulative Abnormal Returns (LCARs)
Equal-Weighted Value-Weighted
Month LCAR p-value LCAR p-value
6 Short Duration 0:77 0:18  2:12 0:00
Long Duration  0:48 0:37  2:17 0:00
Difference 1:25 0:11 0:05 0:95
12 Short Duration 1:73 0:03  4:61 0:00
Long Duration  0:49 0:54  5:66 0:00
Difference 2:22 0:05 1:04 0:32
24 Short Duration 6:67 0:00  4:46 0:00
Long Duration 1:59 0:16  8:16 0:00
Difference 5:08 0:00 3:71 0:02
36 Short Duration 9:28 0:00  6:95 0:00
Long Duration 3:88 0:00  9:23 0:00
Difference 5:41 0:00 2:28 0:24
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Table F.5:
Pay Duration and Post-announcement Operating Performance (Hoberg-Phillips Regressions)
Table F.5 displays the coefficient estimates of long-duration dummy from regressions
based on the Hoberg and Phillips (2010). We specify operating performance regressions
as follows:
D IA PIi; 1 to t = a+b1Pay Durationi; 1+ g X+ ei
where t = 2, 3, 4, or 5, IA PI represents industry-adjusted performance indicator, and X
represents the vector of factors supposed to affect the performance change. PI is one of the
following financial ratio: ROA, Op. Inc./Assets, Op. Inc./Sales, Sales Growth, Sales/As-
sets, or Op. Exp./Sales. Pay Duration is an indicator variable taking the value of “1” if
the executive pay duration is above the median within the same fiscal year, and “0” oth-
erwise. Each block of three rows represents the coefficient estimates of Pay Duration
variable (b1), p-values, and number of the observations (N). Detailed descriptions of the
performance measures are in Appendix D.
Hoberg-Phillips Regressions
j+2 j+3 j+4 j+5
Performance Indicator Acq. Year+2 Acq.Year+3 Acq. Year+4 Acq. Year+5
ROA  0:014  0:012  0:006 0:001
p-value 0:085 0:049 0:488 0:851
N 1759 1518 1314 1119
Op Income/Assets  0:001  0:007  0:006 0:000
p-value 0:709 0:068 0:182 0:962
N 1759 1518 1314 1119
Op Income/Sales  0:069  0:266  0:106  0:334
p-value 0:096 0:219 0:079 0:085
N 1759 1517 1312 1118
Sales Growth  0:075  0:261  0:128  0:032
p-value 0:551 0:052 0:262 0:764
N 1743 1508 1297 1108
Sales/Assets  0:025  0:017  0:023  0:056
p-value 0:191 0:397 0:347 0:029
N 1759 1518 1314 1119
Op. Exp/Sales 0:068 0:266 0:111 0:336
p-value 0:100 0:218 0:065 0:083
N 1759 1517 1312 1118
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Table F.6:
Pay Duration and Post-announcement Operating Performance (Barber-Lyon Regressions)
Table F.6 displays the coefficient estimates of long-duration dummy from regressions
based on the Barber and Lyon (1996). We specify operating performance regressions as
follows:
PIi;t = a+b1Pay Durationi; 1+b2PIi; 1+b3DPIINDi; 1 to t + ei
where t = 2, 3, 4, or 5, PI represents the firm performance indicator for firm i, and PIIND
indicates median industry performance indicator. PI is one of the following financial ra-
tio: ROA, Op. Inc./Assets, Op. Inc./Sales, Sales Growth, Sales/Assets, or Op. Exp./Sales.
Pay Duration is an indicator variable taking the value of “1” if the executive pay dura-
tion is above the median within the same fiscal year, and “0” otherwise. Each block of
three rows represents the coefficient estimates of Pay Duration variable (b1), p-values,
and number of the observations (N). Detailed descriptions of the performance measures
are in Appendix D.
Barber-Lyon Regressions
j+2 j+3 j+4 j+5
Performance Indicator Acq. Year+2 Acq. Year+3 Acq. Year+4 Acq. Year+5
ROA  0:016  0:012  0:005 0:001
p-value 0:115 0:018 0:454 0:869
N 1736 1517 1315 1128
Op inc/AT  0:002  0:004  0:003 0:003
p-value 0:543 0:164 0:473 0:585
N 1736 1517 1315 1128
Op inc/Sales  0:001 0:000  0:014 0:023
p-value 0:94 0:984 0:568 0:131
N 1736 1516 1313 1127
Sales Growth 0:209  0:160  0:022 0:026
p-value 0:002 0:084 0:32 0:322
N 1722 1504 1302 1117
Sales/AT  0:014  0:024  0:033  0:041
p-value 0:133 0:030 0:005 0:002
N 1736 1517 1315 1128
Op Exp/Sales 0:006 0:004 0:022  0:018
p-value 0:691 0:783 0:360 0:234
N 1736 1516 1313 1127
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Table F.7: Pay Duration of CEOs and Acquirer Announcement Returns
Table F.7 presents the results from OLS Regressions of three-day or five-day announcement period cumulative abnormal returns
of acquirers (3-day CAR or 5-day CAR) on CEO pay duration and other control variables. Duration (cont.) is the number of
months over which the CEO’s pay is vested. Derived from CEO pay duration, Duration (dummy) is an indicator variable taking
the value of “1” if the pay duration is above the median pay duration within the same fiscal year, and “0” otherwise. Duration
(>36 mon.) is an indicator variable taking the value of “1” if the pay duration is above 36 months, and “0” otherwise. Pay
Duration in the interaction term Tenure  Pay Duration, takes the value of pay duration measures in the first three columns in
each model. Detailed descriptions of the variables are in the Appendix D. Absolute values of t-values are below the coefficient
estimates and based on heteroskedasticity-adjusted, robust standard errors. ***, **, and * stand for statistical significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) 4) (5) (6)
Independent Variable 3-day CAR 5-day CAR 3-day CAR 5-day CAR 3-day CAR 5-day CAR
CEO Pay Duration (cont.)  0:028  0:034
2:17 2:24
CEO Pay Duration (>36m)  0:508  0:519
1:11 0:98
CEO Pay Duration (dummy)  0:510  0:528
1:34 1:21
Tenure 0:017 0:027 0:067 0:090 0:053 0:073
0:38 0:55 2:74 3:32 1:58 1:97
Tenure x Duration 0:003 0:003 0:070 0:050 0:060 0:055
1:84 1:80 1:44 0:91 1:44 1:18
Log Sales  0:092  0:083  0:094  0:085  0:087  0:078
0:99 0:79 1:00 0:81 0:94 0:75
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Table F.7 continued
(1) (2) (3) 4) (5) (6)
Independent Variable 3-day CAR 5-day CAR 3-day CAR 5-day CAR 3-day CAR 5-day CAR
M/B 0:533 0:522 0:518 0:506 0:516 0:498
2:37 1:96 2:30 1:90 2:30 1:87
Deal Value/Acq MVE  1:046  1:462  1:047  1:467  1:023  1:443
1:26 1:53 1:26 1:54 1:24 1:51
Paid in Cash 0:374 0:372 0:379 0:379 0:376 0:377
1:42 1:22 1:44 1:24 1:43 1:23
Paid in Stock  1:051  0:794  1:040  0:792  1:069  0:817
1:78 1:29 1:75 1:28 1:81 1:32
Tender 0:577 0:189 0:549 0:173 0:574 0:182
0:89 0:28 0:85 0:25 0:89 0:27
N Bidders > 1  0:326  0:406  0:330  0:410  0:322  0:405
0:28 0:33 0:29 0:34 0:28 0:33
Different 3-SIC  0:321 0:112  0:341 0:091  0:341 0:089
0:87 0:27 0:93 0:22 0:93 0:22
Liquidity 0:767 0:870 0:778 0:882 0:754 0:859
1:24 1:52 1:27 1:57 1:25 1:54
Non-public 1:814 1:736 1:825 1:742 1:818 1:739
5:01 4:30 5:05 4:33 5:03 4:32
Constant  2:893  2:142  3:457  2:855  3:319  2:682
0:94 0:63 1:17 0:89 1:10 0:81
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1;882 1;882 1;882 1;882 1;882 1;882
Adj R2 0:07 0:05 0:07 0:05 0:07 0:05
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Table F.8: Pay Duration and Propensity to Acquire
Table F.8 presents the results from Probit Regressions where, in an unbalanced panel data, propensity to be an acquirer (Acquirer
= Yes (1)/No (0)) is regressed on executive pay duration (Pay Duration (cont.) and Pay Duration (dummy)), Tenure, Delta,
interactions of Tenure and Delta with Duration, and other control variables. Pay duration is the weighted average of executives’
pay durations from the firms within the study period (1998–2013) . Pay Duration (cont.) is the number of months over which the
executive’s pay is scheduled. Pay Duration (dummy) is an indicator variable taking the value of “1” if the executive pay duration
is above the median pay duration within the same fiscal year, and “0” otherwise. In Column (1) and (4), we use the entire sample
of merging and non-merging firms. For the results displayed in Column (2), we use “big” acquisitions only where the ratio of
deal value to market value of the acquirer is greater than 10%. In Column (3), we use both “big” and cross-industry acquisitions
(Diff. 3-SIC). In a cross-industry acquisition, both the acquirer and the target do not share the same three-digit SIC code. In
Column (5) and (6), we use all firms after 2006. Detailed descriptions of the variables are in the Appendix D. Absolute values of
the t-statistics are beneath the coefficient estimates and based on heteroskedasticity-adjusted robust standard errors. ***, **, and
* stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%-level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Independent Variable All Big Big & Diff. 3-SIC All All- after 2006 All- after 2006
Duration (cont.) 0:014 0:015 0:015 0:004
2:45 2:20 1:76 0:46
Duration (dummy) 0:360  0:009
2:36 0:04
Tenure  0:006  0:005  0:003  0:010  0:014  0:015
1:18 0:72 0:34 2:45 1:60 2:64
Tenure x (Duration)  0:000  0:000  0:000 0:001  0:000 0:001
0:74 1:44 1:47 0:11 0:12 0:08
Delta 0:089 0:076 0:105 0:069 0:046 0:031
3:64 2:58 2:81 3:63 1:09 1:14
Delta x (Duration)  0:002  0:002  0:002  0:059  0:000 0:013
2:25 1:90 1:30 2:22 0:20 0:35
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Table F.8 continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Independent Variable All Big Big & Diff. 3-SIC All All- after 2006 All- after 2006
Log Sales 0:031 0:013 0:010 0:031 0:068 0:067
1:92 0:69 0:39 1:93 3:20 3:17
M/B  0:019  0:049  0:018  0:020  0:022  0:025
0:65 1:40 0:43 0:66 0:59 0:65
Op income/Assets 0:242 0:366 0:509 0:243 0:108 0:113
1:18 1:50 1:73 1:19 0:43 0:45
Price runup 0:007 0:006 0:005 0:007  0:005  0:006
1:07 0:60 0:41 1:17 0:54 0:56
Leverage  0:376  0:417  0:383  0:376  0:358  0:356
3:92 3:56 2:63 3:92 3:01 2:99
Constant  0:847  0:954  1:524  0:689  0:453  0:346
2:15 2:06 2:92 1:81 0:86 0:69
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 5;957 5;064 4;492 5;957 3;543 3;543
Pseudo R2 0:07 0:07 0:08 0:07 0:08 0:08
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APPENDIX G
FIGURES FOR CHAPTER IV
This appendix lists figures for Chapter IV. First, median firm characteristics of event
firms and their matched control firms are plotted. Then, averagemonthly behavior of ASRs
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Figure G.1: Characteristics of M&A firms and their matched control firms
Characteristics ofM&A firms and their matched control firms for 60-month event periods before and after the
M&A month (t = 0). Following Bessembinder and Zhang (2013), the plots report median beta, size, BM,
momentum, idiosynctratic volatility, illiquidity, and investments. The event sample consists of n = 4,294
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Figure G.2: Characteristics of IPO firms and their matched control firms
Characteristics of IPO firms and their matched control firms for 60-month event periods after the IPO month
(t = 0). Following Bessembinder and Zhang (2013), the plots report median beta, size, BM, momentum,
idiosynctratic volatility, illiquidity, and investments. The event sample consists of n = 7,454 IPOs in the
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Figure G.3: Characteristics of SEO firms and their matched control firms
Characteristics of SEO firms and their matched control firms for 60-month event periods before and after
the SEO month (t = 0). Following Bessembinder and Zhang (2013), the plots report median beta, size, BM,
momentum, idiosynctratic volatility, illiquidity, and investments. The event sample consists of n = 6,737
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Figure G.4: Characteristics of dividend initiation firms and their matched control firms
Characteristics of dividend initiation (DIV) firms and their matched control firms for 60-month event periods
before and after the DIV month (t = 0). Following Bessembinder and Zhang (2013), the plots report median
beta, size, BM, momentum, idiosynctratic volatility, illiquidity, and investments. The event sample consists
























































































































































Figure G.5: Monthly abnormal standardized returns (ASRs) for M&As, IPOs, SEOs, and
DIVs.
The plots report average monthly behavior of ASRs. Monthly standardized returns are defined as srt = rt=st ,
where rt is the month t log-return of a firm and st is the month t standard deviation estimated from daily log-
returns in the month. Monthly ASRs are defined as srit  srcit , where srcit is the standardized return of the
size and book-to-market (BM) ratio matched control firm of the ith event firm. The event sample consists of
1,838 M&As, 3,077 IPOs, 3,052 SEOs, and 970 dividend initiations (DIVs) in the CRSP database between
January 1980 (1986 for M&As) and December 2007 that have 60 months post-event return data available.
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Figure G.6: Monthly abnormal standardized returns for M&As, IPOs, SEOs, and DIVs
from 1980 (1986 for M&As) to 2002.
The plots report monthly averages of abnormal standardized returns (ASRs), ASRt = srt  srct , where srts
are sample averages of event firm standardized returns srit = log(1+Rit)=sit in event month t and control
firm standardized returns srcit = log(1+Rit)=scit , respectively. The monthly standard deviations, sit and scit ,
are computed from the daily returns in month t. Months that have less than 10 trading days available are
dropped from the sample. The sample period covers events from January 1986 to December 2007 for M&As
and from January 1980 to December 2007 for the others. The standard errors in the 2se bands are cross-
sectional correlation robust standard errors estimated by clustering over overlapping calendar months. Also,
ASRs are trimmed each month such that one percent of the most extreme observations are dropped (i.e., 0:5%
from both tails of the distribution). The number of firms in terms of monthly averages (number of clusters
in standard errors) vary from 1,326 to 3,077 (185 to 198) for M&As, from 3,115 to 7,403 (265 to 273) for
IPOs, from 2,575 to 5,643 (271 to 274) for SEOs, and from 776 to 1,726 (245 to 271) for DIVs.
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Figure G.7: Monthly abnormal standardized returns for M&As, IPOs, SEOs, and DIVs
from 2003 to 2014.
The plots report monthly averages of abnormal standardized returns (ASRs), ASRt = srt srct , where srts are
sample averages of event firm standardized returns srit = log(1+Rit)=sit in event month t and control firm
standardized returns srcit = log(1+Rit)=scit , respectively. The monthly standard deviations, sit and scit , are
computed from the daily returns in month t. Months that have less than 10 trading days available are dropped
from the sample. The sample period covers events from January 2008 to December 2014. The standard
errors in the 2se bands are cross-sectional correlation robust standard errors estimated by clustering over
overlapping calendar months. Also, ASRs are trimmed each month such that one percent of the most extreme
observations are dropped (i.e., 0:5% most from both tails of the distribution). The number of firms in terms
of monthly averages (number of clusters in standard errors) vary from 732 to 2,142 (84 to 144) for M&As,




TABLES FOR CHAPTER IV
This appendix presents tables for Chapter IV. First, number of M&As, IPOs, SEOs,
and dividend initiations (DIV) are summarized in Table H.1. Next, normalized firm char-
acteristics and long-run abnormal returns are showed for each event based on the regression
approach of Bessembinder and Zhang (2013) in Table H.2 and Table H.3. Then, the firm
characteristics are standardized by their standard deviations (computed over the pooled
panel observations) such that all the factors have unit variances. Using regression ap-
proach with standardized firm characteristics, long-run abnormal returns are reported in
Table H.4 and Table H.5.
Additional tests of long abnormal returns are presented in Tables H.6 to H.9. Finally,
long abnormal returns are reported for two subsets (1980-2002 and 2003-2014) in Tables
H.10 to H.13.
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Table H.1: Number of M&As, IPOs, SEOs, and dividend initiations (DIV) in different
years.
TheM&A sample consists of completed USmergers and acquisitions with transaction values of $5 million or
more. Acquisitions must take the form of a merger, acquisition of majority interest, acquisition of remaining
interest, or acquisition of partial interest. The acquisition must be a control bid (the acquirer owns at least
50% of the target after the deal). The relative size of the deal must be greater than 5%. The SEO sample
excludes American Depository Receipts, Global Depository Receipts, unit offerings, and financial and utility
firms. The IPO sample excludes Real Estate Investment Trusts, closed-end funds, and American Depository
Receipts. Lastly, the dividend initiations (DIV) sample includes common stocks listed on the NYSE, NYSE
MKT (AMEX), or NASDAQ with CRSP data available for more than two years. Dividends are ordinary
cash in dollars that are paid regularly.
Year M&A IPO SEO DIV
1980 83 147 48
1981 227 160 31
1982 91 165 52
1983 510 396 47
1984 240 100 55
1985 240 143 80
1986 19 487 211 69
1987 37 373 148 54
1988 31 155 74 91
1989 25 142 113 117
1990 23 133 112 58
1991 42 283 241 43
1992 69 401 222 39
1993 82 506 307 53
1994 115 423 252 129
1995 267 440 309 166
1996 366 647 401 147
1997 415 423 358 96
1998 431 261 253 94
1999 394 396 240 94
2000 365 284 315 112
2001 263 61 302 77
2002 193 57 288 50
2003 205 59 288 91
2004 246 148 386 63
2005 221 129 259 52
2006 222 123 282 63
2007 263 132 265 80
Total 4,294 7,454 6,737 2,151
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Table H.2: Normalized firm characteristics and long-run abnormal returns on M&As and
IPOs.
The table presents OLS regressions of monthly continuously compounded abnormal returns (CCARs) of
M&As and IPOs based on normalized differences of firm and market characteristics specified by Bessem-
binder and Zhang (2013). The length of the event period for each stock is the number of months until 60
months or the time of delisting, whichever comes first. The t-values of the regression coefficients are in
parentheses, and standard errors of alphas are in brackets. The middle portion of the table reports F-statistics
and their p-values separately for the joint significance of the linear, squared, and cubic terms in the regres-
sions. The bottom portion reports mean CCARs and their t-values as well as number of clusters over which
the cross-sectional correlation robust standard errors by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2012) (see also Pe-
tersen, 2009) are computed. All the t-values, standard errors of alphas, and F-values in the table are based
on these cross-sectional correlation robust standard error computations. The mean CCARs should be inter-
preted as the average monthly abnormal returns for stocks with event periods up to 60 months rather than
5-year average monthly abnormal returns. It is notable that the number of clusters (N clusters) reported in
the bottom portion is the effective number of observations for inferences instead of the considerably higher
number of months (N months) or number of firms (N firms) reported in the last two rows at the bottom.




Linear 2nd order 4th order Linear 2nd order 4th order
Dbeta  0:424  0:404  0:215  0:414  0:415  0:280
( 1:16) ( 1:13) ( 0:60) ( 1:55) ( 1:60) ( 0:75)
(Dbeta)2  0:309  0:035  0:353  0:392





Dsize  0:304  0:321  0:157  0:291  0:282  0:398
( 1:35) ( 1:43) ( 0:30) ( 1:10) ( 1:07) ( 0:91)
(Dsize)2  0:227 0:285 0:786c 3:531c





DBM  0:042  0:064  0:075 0:761c 0:713c 1:442c
( 0:24) ( 0:36) ( 0:23) (3:33) (3:05) (3:45)
(DBM)2 0:377 1:340  0:231 0:809





Dmom 1:266c 1:284c 0:543 1:677c 1:658c 1:809c
(2:96) (3:00) (1:24) (5:17) (5:14) (4:90)
(Dmom)2  0:556b  1:027  0:186  0:648





Dilliq 0:255 0:258  0:538 0:728c 0:693c  0:180
(1:16) (1:18) ( 1:14) (3:14) (2:97) ( 0:48)
(Dilliq)2  0:205 0:274 0:839b 2:353b






Linear 2nd order 4th order Linear 2nd order 4th order
(Dilliq)4  0:370  1:624
( 0:33) ( 1:51)
Disv  1:647c  1:648c 0:188  2:259c  2:220c  1:236c
( 4:19) ( 4:22) (0:46) ( 5:74) ( 5:77) ( 2:61)
(Disv)2 0:218 0:067  0:401 0:959





Dinv  0:258  0:227 0:183  0:168  0:129  0:463
( 1:21) ( 1:05) (0:50) ( 0:80) ( 0:62) ( 1:40)
(Dinv)2 0:079  0:035  0:514a 1:525b





aˆ  0:290c  0:067  0:316  0:760c  0:792c  1:714c
( 2:77) ( 0:26) ( 0:97) ( 4:27) ( 2:90) ( 5:26)
Std. Error (aˆ) [0:105] [0:253] [0:327] [0:178] [0:273] [0:326]
Adjusted R2 0:004 0:005 0:004 0:005 0:004 0:006
F for linear terms 5:13 5:23 0:48 14:99 14:73 5:01
p-value 0:000 0:000 0:846 0:000 0:000 0:000
F for 2nd order terms 1:14 0:62 2:51 4:60
p-value 0:335 0:741 0:016 0:000
F for 3rd order terms 5:15 3:08
p-value 0:000 0:004




N clusters 323 377
N months 103,218 148,632
N firms 2,703 4,650
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Table H.3: Normalized firm characteristics and long-run abnormal returns on SEOs and
DIVs.
The table presents OLS regressions of monthly continuously compounded abnormal returns (CCARs) of
SEOs and dividend initiations (DIVs) based on normalized differences of firm and market characteristics
specified by Bessembinder and Zhang (2013). The length of the event period for each stock is the number
of months until 60 months or the time of delisting, whichever comes first. The t-values of the regression
coefficients are in parentheses, and standard errors of alphas are in brackets. The middle portion of the table
reports F-statistics and their p-values separately for the joint significance of the linear, squared, and cubic
terms in the regressions. The bottom portion reports mean CCARs and their t-values as well as number of
clusters over which the cross-sectional correlation robust standard errors by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller
(2012) (see also Petersen, 2009) are computed. All the t-values, standard errors of alphas, and F-values
in the table are based on these cross-sectional correlation robust standard error computations. The mean
CCARs should be interpreted as the average monthly abnormal returns for stocks with event periods up to
60 months rather than 5-year average monthly abnormal returns. It is notable that the number of clusters (N
clusters) reported in the bottom portion is the effective number of observations for inferences instead of the
considerably higher number of months (N months) or number of firms (N firms) reported in the last two rows





Linear 2nd order 4th order Linear 2nd order 4th order
Dbeta  0:296  0:288 0:060  0:137  0:106 0:044
( 1:39) ( 1:37) (0:24) ( 0:61) ( 0:47) (0:11)
(Dbeta)2  0:154 0:781 0:417  1:452





Dsize  0:447c  0:435c  0:755b  0:350a  0:329a  0:573
( 2:83) ( 2:75) ( 2:26) ( 1:95) ( 1:83) ( 1:39)
(Dsize)2  0:180  0:587  0:273  0:965





DBM  0:072  0:083 0:424a  0:087  0:092 0:045
( 0:56) ( 0:64) (1:86) ( 0:48) ( 0:51) (0:12)
(DBM)2 0:405b 0:367  0:412  0:975





Dmom 1:311c 1:324c 1:349c 1:571c 1:528c 1:394c
(4:87) (4:94) (4:68) (6:61) (6:46) (3:62)
(Dmom)2 0:177 1:292b 0:245 0:090





Dilliq 0:468c 0:478c  0:003 0:417a 0:376a  0:100
(3:01) (3:01) ( 0:01) (1:86) (1:68) ( 0:24)
(Dilliq)2  0:183 0:046 0:588 1:290






Linear 2nd order 4th order Linear 2nd order 4th order
(Dilliq)4  0:097  0:968
( 0:12) ( 0:74)
Disv  1:674c  1:672c  0:275  1:241c  1:195c 0:263
( 6:22) ( 6:25) ( 0:89) ( 5:60) ( 5:42) (0:64)
(Disv)2  0:128 0:920 0:462  0:512





Dinv 0:024 0:034 0:272  0:099  0:123  0:157
(0:17) (0:24) (1:26) ( 0:61) ( 0:76) ( 0:43)
(Dinv)2 0:052  0:261 0:097  0:082





aˆ  0:135  0:136  0:458b 0:337c 0:011 0:455
( 1:32) ( 0:79) ( 1:97) (3:43) (0:04) (1:16)
Std. Error (aˆ) [0:102] [0:172] [0:232] [0:098] [0:263] [0:391]
Adjusted R2 0:003 0:004 0:003 0:004 0:004 0:005
F for linear terms 14:10 14:50 5:25 12:06 11:36 2:11
p-value 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:042
F for 2nd order terms 0:83 1:53 2:10 0:77
p-value 0:563 0:154 0:042 0:610
F for 3rd order terms 6:83 2:41
p-value 0:000 0:020




N clusters 396 393
N months 213,855 47,222
N firms 5,556 1,170
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Table H.4: Standardized firm characteristics and long-run abnormal returns on M&As and
IPOs.
The table presents OLS regressions of monthly continuously compounded abnormal returns (CCARs) of
M&As and IPOs, SEOs, and dividend initiations (DIVs) based on normalized differences of firm and market
characteristics specified by Bessembinder and Zhang (2013). Unlike Table H.2 above as well as Table 4 in
Bessembinder and Zhang, original non-normalized values of the factors are used. However, we standardize
the factors by means of dividing by their standard deviations computed over the pooled panel observations,
such that all the factors have unit variances. Like Table H.2, the length of the event period for each stock
is the number of months until 60 months or the time of delisting, whichever comes first. The t-values of
the regression coefficients are in parentheses, and standard errors of alphas are in brackets. The middle
portion of the table reports F-statistics and their p-values for the joint significance of the squared terms in
the regressions. The bottom portion reports mean CCARs and their t-values as well as number of clusters
over which the cross-sectional correlation robust standard errors by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2012)
(see also Petersen, 2009) are computed. All the t-values, standard errors of alphas, and F-values in the table
are based on these cross-sectional correlation robust standard error computations. The mean CCARs should
be interpreted as the average monthly abnormal returns for stocks with event periods up to 60 months rather
than 5-year averagemonthly abnormal returns. It is notable that the number of clusters (N clusters) reported in
the bottom portion is the effective number of observations for inferences instead of the considerably higher
number of months (N months) or number of firms (N firms) reported in the last two rows at the bottom.




Linear 2nd order 4th order Linear 2nd order 4th order
Dbeta  0:315  0:300  0:336  0:314b  0:317b  0:436c
( 1:57) ( 1:50) ( 1:52) ( 2:26) ( 2:29) ( 2:96)
(Dbeta)2  0:023  0:073b 0:025  0:017





Dsize  0:081  0:115  0:197a 0:069 0:079 0:045
( 1:24) ( 1:37) ( 1:79) (0:57) (0:64) (0:26)
(Dsize)2 0:003 0:012b  0:003  0:008





DBM 0:166a 0:017 0:297 0:519c 0:498c 0:638c
(1:72) (0:10) (0:99) (4:09) (3:76) (4:29)
(DBM)2 0:001  0:054  0:013  0:009





Dmom 0:462a 0:477a 0:656b 0:496 0:520a 0:793c
(1:83) (1:84) (2:28) (1:63) (1:65) (2:75)
(Dmom)2  0:004  0:010  0:014  0:046c





Dilliq 0:563 0:875b 1:663b 0:254b 0:309b 0:368a
(1:37) (1:97) (2:50) (2:17) (2:18) (1:72)
(Dilliq)2  0:102a  0:242 0:004 0:001






Linear 2nd order 4th order Linear 2nd order 4th order
(Dilliq)4 0:004 0:000
(1:35) ( 0:52)
Disv  1:062c  1:068c  1:279c  1:232c  1:144c  1:714c
( 3:02) ( 3:04) ( 3:19) ( 3:50) ( 3:21) ( 4:68)
(Disv)2 0:024 0:075  0:078 0:096





Dinv  0:221a  0:302  0:288  0:015  0:002  0:037
( 1:87) ( 1:59) ( 1:48) ( 0:15) ( 0:02) ( 0:26)
(Dinv)2 0:014 0:034  0:003  0:018





aˆ  0:332c  0:312c  0:292c  0:831c  0:775c  0:651c
( 3:34) ( 3:09) ( 2:84) ( 4:82) ( 4:48) ( 3:96)
Std. Error (aˆ) [0:099] [0:101] [0:103] [0:172] [0:173] [0:164]
Adjusted R2 0:003 0:004 0:003 0:004 0:004 0:006
F for linear terms 3:05 3:31 4:03 5:24 4:70 7:71
p-value 0:004 0:002 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
F for 2nd order terms 1:37 1:80 0:83 2:51
p-value 0:219 0:087 0:564 0:016
F for 3rd order terms 3:40 5:21
p-value 0:002 0:000




N clusters 323 377
N months 103,218 148,632
N firms 2,703 4,650
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Table H.5: Standardized firm characteristics and long-run abnormal returns on SEOs and
DIVs.
The table presents OLS regressions of monthly continuously compounded abnormal returns (CCARs) of
SEOs and dividend initiations (DIVs) based on normalized differences of firm and market characteristics
specified by Bessembinder and Zhang (2013). Unlike Table H.3 above as well as Table 4 in Bessembinder
and Zhang, original non-normalized values of the factors are used. However, we standardize the factors by
means of dividing by their standard deviations computed over the pooled panel observations, such that all
the factors have unit variances. Like Table H.3, the length of the event period for each stock is the number
of months until 60 months or the time of delisting, whichever comes first. The t-values of the regression
coefficients are in parentheses, and standard errors of alphas are in brackets. The middle portion of the table
reports F-statistics and their p-values for the joint significance of the squared terms in the regressions. The
bottom portion reports mean CCARs and their t-values as well as number of clusters over which the cross-
sectional correlation robust standard errors by Cameron, Gelbach, andMiller (2012) (see also Petersen, 2009)
are computed. All the t-values, standard errors of alphas, and F-values in the table are based on these cross-
sectional correlation robust standard error computations. The mean CCARs should be interpreted as the
average monthly abnormal returns for stocks with event periods up to 60 months rather than 5-year average
monthly abnormal returns. It is notable that the number of clusters (N clusters) reported in the bottom portion
is the effective number of observations for inferences instead of the considerably higher number of months
(N months) or number of firms (N firms) reported in the last two rows at the bottom. Superscripts represent




Linear 2nd order 4th order Linear 2nd order 4th order
Dbeta  0:306b  0:294b  0:273a  0:188  0:101  0:127
( 2:37) ( 2:29) ( 1:91) ( 1:37) ( 0:75) ( 0:83)
(Dbeta)2  0:015  0:052a 0:085a 0:187c





Dsize  0:079  0:092  0:100  0:146  0:161  0:197
( 1:52) ( 1:54) ( 1:00) ( 1:28) ( 0:96) ( 1:23)
(Dsize)2 0:001 0:003 0:000 0:019





DBM 0:079 0:053  0:023  0:080  0:129 0:093
(0:88) (0:60) ( 0:24) ( 0:60) ( 0:89) (0:60)
(DBM)2 0:008 0:030b  0:014a  0:001





Dmom 0:434b 0:424b 0:499b 0:545c 0:639c 0:910c
(2:12) (2:12) (2:35) (3:46) (3:70) (5:39)
(Dmom)2 0:008 0:000 0:033a 0:042





Dilliq 0:195b 0:540b 0:834c 0:069 0:482 0:527
(2:13) (2:22) (2:65) (0:36) (1:04) (0:81)
(Dilliq)2 0:005 0:004 0:005  0:053






Linear 2nd order 4th order Linear 2nd order 4th order
(Dilliq)4 0:000a 0:000
( 1:76) ( 0:27)
Disv  1:034c  1:066c  1:299c  0:699c  0:711c  1:001c
( 4:22) ( 4:32) ( 4:82) ( 3:48) ( 3:36) ( 4:38)
(Disv)2  0:023 0:029  0:006 0:080





Dinv  0:101  0:141a  0:125  0:151  0:134  0:240
( 1:30) ( 1:79) ( 1:20) ( 1:41) ( 1:29) ( 1:56)
(Dinv)2 0:008 0:028c  0:003  0:011





aˆ  0:274c  0:247b  0:268c 0:315c 0:239b 0:061
( 2:61) ( 2:35) ( 2:65) (3:40) (2:34) (0:59)
Std. Error (aˆ) [0:105] [0:105] [0:101] [0:093] [0:102] [0:102]
Adjusted R2 0:003 0:002 0:003 0:003 0:004 0:005
F for linear terms 4:19 4:27 5:19 4:80 4:82 8:39
p-value 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
F for 2nd order terms 0:99 2:67 1:59 2:17
p-value 0:439 0:010 0:136 0:036
F for 3rd order terms 2:53 5:76
p-value 0:015 0:000




N clusters 396 393
N months 213,855 47,222
N firms 5,556 1,170
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Table H.6: Additional tests of merger and acquisition (M&A) abnormal returns.
The sample contains M&As in the period January 1986 to December 2007 that have 60 months post-event returns available. Panel A reports results for all
M&As, and Panel B excludes 1% of M&As with the most extreme post-event holding period returns (i.e., 0.5% from both tails). BHAR is the buy-and-hold
abnormal return defined in equation (IV.1), CTAR(ap), or calendar time abnormal return, is the intercept term of the modified Fama-French three-factor
model defined in equation (IV.2) estimated using weighted least squares (WLS), and ASR is the average per month abnormal standardized return defined in
equation (IV.10). The t-values below the abnormal returns for BHAR and ASR are defined by equations (IV.6) and (IV.9), respectively, and for CTAR(ap)




Month 1 Month 2 Month 6 Month 1 Year 3 Years 5 Years 2-6 7-12 2-12 13-36 37-60
Panel A: Post-event subperiod statistics (N = 1,838)
BHAR(%) 0:51  1:56c  1:22b  4:26c  6:56c  10:23c  6:70  3:63c  2:65b  5:57c  4:06  0:10
t-val 1:03  3:36  2:16  3:47  2:96  2:65  0:63  3:25  2:32  2:86  1:03  0:03
CTAR(ap)  0:19  2:39c  1:76c  0:62b  0:41a  0:30b  0:15  0:40 0:01  0:27  0:32a  0:04
t-val  0:24  3:21  3:32  2:06  1:71  2:18  1:26  1:12 0:03  1:06  1:90  0:20
ASR 0:05 0:00  0:03  0:08b  0:10c  0:09a  0:10a  0:09c  0:06a  0:11c  0:03  0:05
t-val 1:49 0:04  0:78  2:41  2:71  1:94  1:89  2:79  1:85  2:89  0:84  1:27
Panel B: Post-event subperiod statistics, 1% trimmed sample (N = 1,828)
Post-Event Periods
M&A Subperiod (Months)
Month 1 Month 2 Months 6 Months 1 Year 3 Years 5 Years 2-6 7-12 2-12 13-36 37-60
BHAR(%) 0:48  1:65c  1:29b  4:44c  6:85c  11:81c  22:92c  3:74c  2:63b  5:81c  4:45  1:83
t-val 0:98  3:54  2:28  3:61  3:09  3:13  4:31  3:36  2:31  2:98  1:13  0:54
CTAR(ap)  0:34  2:28c  1:78c  0:63b  0:42a  0:32b  0:20a  0:41 0:01  0:28  0:33b  0:10
t-val  0:43  3:06  3:32  2:10  1:74  2:28  1:68  1:17 0:02  1:07  1:98  0:55
ASR 0:04 0:00  0:03  0:09b  0:11c  0:09b  0:10b  0:10c  0:06a  0:11c  0:03  0:05
t-val 1:41  0:09  0:85  2:56  2:80  2:01  1:97  2:90  1:85  2:96  0:88  1:34
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Table H.7: Additional tests of initial public offering (IPO) abnormal returns.
The sample contains IPOs in the period January 1980 to December 2007 that have 60 months post-event returns available. Panel A reports results for all
IPOs, and Panel B excludes 1% of IPOs with the most extreme holding period returns (i.e., 0.5% from both tails). BHAR is the buy-and-hold abnormal
return defined in equation (IV.1), CTAR(ap), or calendar time abnormal return, is the intercept term of the modified Fama-French three-factor model
defined in equation (IV.2) estimated using weighted least squares (WLS), and ASR is the average per month abnormal standardized return defined in
equation (IV.10). The t-values below the abnormal returns for BHAR and ASR are defined by equations (IV.6) and (IV.9), respectively, and for CTAR(ap)




Month 1 Month 2 Months 6 Months 1 Year 3 Years 5 Years 2-6 7-12 2-12 13-36 37-60
Panel A: Post-event subperiod statistics (N = 3,077)
BHAR(%) 0:01 1:75c 3:15c 1:04  2:57  16:75c  33:56c  1:16  2:80b  4:86b  6:59a  0:01
t-val 0:03 3:58 4:23 0:71  1:16  3:51  3:68  0:95  2:55  2:38  1:91 0:00
CTAR(ap) 1:01 2:97c 2:12c 0:77b 0:36 0:12  0:05 0:30 0:45 0:11 0:25  0:20
t-val 1:42 4:18 3:91 1:99 1:21 0:58  0:31 0:77 1:10 0:36 1:06  0:86
ASR  0:03 0:06b 0:03  0:06  0:16c  0:34c  0:43c  0:09b  0:17c  0:19c  0:30c  0:26c
t-val  0:76 2:00 0:80  1:41  3:17  5:68  6:48  2:33  4:14  3:77  6:22  5:82
Panel B: Post-event subperiod statistics, 1% trimmed sample (N = 3,061)
Post-Event Periods
IPO Subperiod (Months)
Month 1 Month 2 Months 6 Months 1 Year 3 Years 5 Years 2-6 7-12 2-12 13-36 37-60
BHAR(%) 0:03 1:77c 3:17c 1:08  2:91  19:06c  47:03c  1:13  2:84c  5:11b  7:15b  1:26
t-val 0:07 3:62 4:24 0:73  1:33  4:28  7:88  0:92  2:59  2:53  2:07  0:41
CTAR(ap) 1:19a 3:00c 2:11c 0:78b 0:35 0:07  0:17 0:27 0:47 0:08 0:17  0:44a
t-val 1:71 4:21 3:90 2:03 1:18 0:33  1:02 0:70 1:18 0:26 0:71  1:89
ASR  0:03 0:06b 0:03  0:06  0:16c  0:34c  0:43c  0:09b  0:16c  0:18c  0:30c  0:26c
t-val  0:76 1:98 0:79  1:38  3:13  5:71  6:54  2:28  4:11  3:73  6:27  5:88
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Table H.8: Additional tests of seasonal equity offerings (SEO) abnormal returns.
The sample contains SEOs in the period January 1980 to December 2007 that have 60 months post-event returns available. BHAR is the buy-and-hold
abnormal return defined in equation (IV.1), CTAR(ap), or calendar time abnormal return, is the intercept term of the modified Fama-French three-factor
model defined in equation (IV.2) estimated using weighted least squares (WLS), and ASR is the average per month abnormal standardized return defined in
equation (IV.10). The t-values below the abnormal returns for BHAR and ASR are defined by equations (IV.6) and (IV.9), respectively, and for CTAR(ap)




Month 1 Month 2 Months 6 Months 1 Year 3 Years 5 Years 2-6 7-12 2-12 13-36 37-60
Panel A: Post-event subperiod statistics (N = 3,052)
BHAR(%) 0:49 0:24 1:18b 2:06b  0:61  9:54c  9:91a 0:48  2:12b  2:68b  4:37a 4:63a
t-val 1:25 0:61 2:33 2:11  0:42  3:34  1:84 0:56  2:20  1:98  1:77 1:87
CTAR(ap) 0:26 1:87c 0:83b 0:22  0:07  0:29b  0:17  0:10  0:20  0:25  0:51c  0:03
t-val 0:37 3:34 2:12 0:77  0:32  1:97  1:31  0:32  0:69  1:08  3:33  0:16
ASR  0:02 0:10c 0:08c 0:04  0:01  0:12c  0:13c 0:00  0:06b  0:05  0:14c  0:06a
t-val  0:87 4:35 3:10 1:42  0:37  2:72  2:64 0:06  2:03  1:29  3:68  1:66
Panel B: Post-event subperiod statistics (1% trimmed sample (N = 3,036)
Post-Event Periods
SEO Subperiod (Months)
Month 1 Month 2 Months 6 Months 1 Year 3 Years 5 Years 2-6 7-12 2-12 13-36 37-60
BHAR(%) 0:52 0:23 1:18b 2:00b  0:58  10:67c  17:05c 0:41  2:01b  2:63a  5:10b 3:57
t-val 1:31 0:58 2:33 2:04  0:40  3:80  4:03 0:48  2:09  1:94  2:10 1:50
CTAR(ap) 0:31 2:00c 0:89b 0:21  0:07  0:32b  0:25a  0:13  0:18  0:25  0:56c  0:10
t-val 0:44 3:60 2:27 0:73  0:30  2:19  1:95  0:41  0:63  1:06  3:70  0:56
ASR  0:02 0:10c 0:08c 0:04  0:01  0:12c  0:13c 0:00  0:06b  0:05  0:14c  0:06a
t-val  0:82 4:30 3:05 1:35  0:38  2:73  2:66 0:00  1:98  1:29  3:70  1:68
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Table H.9: Additional tests of dividend initiations (DIV) abnormal returns.
The sample contains dividend initiations (DIVs) in the period January 1980 to December 2007 that have 60 months post-event returns available (N = 970).
BHAR is the buy-and-hold abnormal return defined in equation (IV.1), CTAR(ap), or calendar time abnormal return, is the intercept term of the modified
Fama-French three-factor model defined in equation (IV.2) estimated using weighted least squares (WLS), and ASR is the average per month abnormal
standardized return defined in equation (IV.10). The t-values below the abnormal returns for BHAR and ASR are defined by equations (IV.6) and (IV.9),
respectively, and for CTAR(ap) as the intercept t-ratio of the regression in equation (IV.2). Superscripts represent significance levels for two-tailed t-tests
as follows: a= 0:10, b= 0:05, and c= 0:01.
Post-Event Periods
DIV Subperiod (Months)
Month 1 Month 2 Months 6 Months 1 Year 3 Years 5 Years 2-6 7-12 2-12 13-36 37-60
Panel A: Post-event subperiod statistics (N = 970)
BHAR(%) 1:36b  0:18 0:49 0:37 0:15  2:40 5:94 0:01 0:84  0:10  7:83b 3:16
t-val 2:53  0:31 0:61 0:25 0:06  0:46 0:65 0:01 0:62  0:05  2:04 0:74
CTAR(ap) 1:56b 0:14 0:22  0:25  0:07  0:44a  0:27  0:29 0:08  0:10  0:70c 0:03
t-val 2:22 0:18 0:35  0:63  0:23  1:90  1:40  0:71 0:20  0:32  2:63 0:12
ASR 0:20c 0:04 0:12c 0:17c 0:18c 0:16c 0:24c 0:17c 0:10b 0:18c 0:07 0:18c
t-val 4:55 0:91 2:82 3:47 3:89 3:04 3:96 3:61 2:17 3:91 1:35 3:61
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Table H.10: Abnormal returns after Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) events for sub-periods 1986–2002 and 2003–2014.
The sample contains M&As in the period January 1986 to December 2014 divided into two subsamples. The first subsample includes events from 1986 to
2002 and second subsample from 2003 to 2014. BHAR is the buy-and-hold abnormal return defined in equation (IV.1), CTAR, or calendar time abnormal
return, is the intercept of the Fama-French three-factor model defined as (Rpt  R f t) = ap + bp(Rmt  R f t)+ spSMBt + hpHMLt + ept , and ASR is the
average per month abnormal standardized return defined in equation (IV.10). The t-values below the abnormal returns for BHAR and ASR are defined
by equations (IV.6) and (IV.9), respectively, and for CTAR(ap) as the intercept t-ratio of the above Fama-French three-factor regression. Because BHAR
is sensitive to few outliers as documented in (Dutta et al., 2015), the holding period return distributions are 1 percent trimmed by dropping 0.5 percent of
firms from both tails of the period’s BHAR distribution. Superscripts represent significance levels for two-tailed t-tests as follows: a = 0:10, b = 0:05,
and c= 0:01.
M&A Post-Event Periods
Month 1 Month 2 Months 3 Months 6 Months 12 Months 24 Months 36 Months 48 Months 60 Months
Panel A: Events during 1986–2002
BHAR(%) 0:63a  0:48  0:57  0:49  0:52  1:84  2:74  0:89  2:70  6:17b
t-val 1:79  1:38  1:21  0:83  0:63  1:48  1:54  0:40  1:09  2:28
CTAR(ap) 0:31  0:81c  0:56b  0:38a  0:24  0:29  0:17  0:02 0:08 0:11
t-val 1:09  3:17  2:47  1:81  1:33  1:49  0:94  0:14 0:53 0:78
ASR 0:05b  0:01 0:00 0:01 0:01 0:01 0:01 0:01 0:01a 0:01
t-val 2:20  0:39  0:13 0:51 0:86 0:56 1:09 1:42 1:75 1:26
N of Firms 3,067 3,012 3,015 3,015 3,016 3,016 3,016 3,016 3,016 3,016
N of Months 3,067 3,012 6,002 8,975 17,679 34,194 62,740 86,270 105,897 122,816
N of Clusters 198 198 203 205 208 214 226 238 250 262
Panel B: Events during 2003–2014
BHAR(%) 0:95c  0:27  0:85a  1:22b  1:77b  3:93c  7:02c  7:85c  9:01c  9:31c
t-val 3:01  0:83  1:89  2:28  2:24  3:47  4:36  4:31  4:22  4:15
CTAR(ap) 0:80c  0:31  0:37a  0:30a  0:34c  0:32c  0:14  0:13  0:14  0:14
t-val 3:13  1:31  1:84  1:89  2:71  3:22  1:40  1:28  1:36  1:35
ASR 0:08c 0:00  0:03  0:03a  0:02a  0:03b  0:02c  0:02c  0:02c  0:03c
t-val 3:13 0:06  1:49  1:79  1:73  2:43  2:96  3:02  3:02  3:35
N of Firms 2,136 2,095 2,095 2,095 2,095 2,096 2,097 2,097 2,098 2,098
N of Months 2,136 2,095 4,161 6,203 12,186 23,295 42,133 57,315 69,368 78,935
N of Clusters 144 143 143 143 143 143 143 143 143 143
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Table H.11: Abnormal returns after Initial Public Offering (IPO) events for sub-periods 1980–2002 and 2003–2014.
The sample contains IPOs in the period January 1980 to December 2014 divided into two subsamples. The first subsample includes events from 1980 to
2002 and second subsample from 2003 to 2014. BHAR is the buy-and-hold abnormal return defined in equation (IV.1), CTAR, or calendar time abnormal
return, is the intercept term of the Fama-French three-factor model defined as (Rpt  R f t) = ap+bp(Rmt  R f t)+ spSMBt + hpHMLt + ept , and ASR is
the average per month abnormal standardized return defined in equation (IV.10). The t-values below the abnormal returns for BHAR and ASR are defined
by equations (IV.6) and (IV.9), respectively, and for CTAR(ap) as the intercept t-ratio of the above Fama-French three-factor regression. Because BHAR
is sensitive to few outliers as documented in (Dutta et al., 2015), the holding period return distributions are 1 percent trimmed by dropping 0.5 percent of
firms from both tails of the period’s BHAR distribution. Superscripts represent significance levels for two-tailed t-tests as follows: a = 0:10, b = 0:05,
and c= 0:01.
IPO Post-Event Periods
Month 1 Month 2 Months 3 Months 6 Months 12 Months 24 Months 36 Months 48 Months 60 Months
Panel A: Events during 1980–2002
BHAR(%)  0:23 0:83c 1:24c 1:45c  0:77  8:08c  16:20c  23:39c  27:96c  35:15c
t-val  0:71 3:26 3:34 3:14  1:18  8:54  11:27  13:10  13:47  15:49
CTAR(ap)  0:07 1:80c 1:36c 1:09c 0:47b 0:01  0:10  0:02 0:05 0:10
t-val  0:17 5:13 4:60 4:07 2:10 0:03  0:48  0:12 0:29 0:57
ASR  0:13c 0:01  0:01  0:01  0:04c  0:08c  0:09c  0:08c  0:08c  0:07c
t-val  3:88 0:34  0:30  0:73  2:80  5:47  7:39  7:82  7:86  8:06
N of Firms 4,131 7,430 7,495 7,512 7,523 7,529 7,529 7,530 7,530 7,530
N of Months 4,131 7,430 14,862 22,272 44,401 87,651 164,710 227,281 277,342 317,947
N of Clusters 266 273 276 278 281 287 299 311 323 335
Panel B: Events during 2003–2014
BHAR(%) 0:32 1:56c 2:91c 3:65c  0:42 1:87 0:11  1:96  2:32  3:57
t-val 0:56 3:14 3:85 3:91  0:33 0:99 0:05  0:66  0:71  1:07
CTAR(ap) 1:10b 0:90a 1:04b 0:95b 0:02  0:02  0:02 0:01 0:04 0:06
t-val 2:06 1:67 2:29 2:31 0:07  0:09  0:07 0:05 0:18 0:27
ASR  0:06 0:06 0:04 0:03  0:05a  0:02  0:02  0:02  0:02  0:02
t-val  0:77 1:17 1:04 0:81  1:76  0:91  1:19  1:26  1:21  1:30
N of Firms 687 1,229 1,229 1,229 1,229 1,229 1,229 1,229 1,229 1,229
N of Months 687 1,229 2,442 3,637 7,164 13,698 24,396 32,632 38,786 43,398
N of Clusters 115 134 139 142 142 142 142 142 142 142
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Table H.12: Abnormal returns after Seasoned Equity Offering (SEO) events for sub-periods 1980–2002 and 2003–2014.
The sample contains SEOs in the period January 1980 to December 2014 divided into two subsamples. The first subsample includes events from 1980 to
2002 and second subsample from 2003 to 2014. BHAR is the buy-and-hold abnormal return defined in equation (IV.1), CTAR, or calendar time abnormal
return, is the intercept term of the Fama-French three-factor model, (Rpt  R f t) = ap+bp(Rmt  R f t)+ spSMBt +hpHMLt + ept , and ASR is the average
per month abnormal standardized return defined in equation (IV.10). The t-values below the abnormal returns are obtained from their associated t-ratios
that for BHAR and ASR are defined by equations (IV.6) and (IV.9), respectively, and for CTAR(ap) as the intercept t-ratio of the above Fama-French three-
factor regression. Because BHAR is sensitive to few outliers as documented in (Dutta et al., 2015), the holding period return distributions are 1 percent
trimmed by dropping 0.5 percent of firms from both tails of the period’s BHAR distribution. Superscripts represent significance levels for two-tailed t-tests
as follows: a= 0:10, b= 0:05, and c= 0:01.
SEO Post-Event Periods
Month 1 Month 2 Months 3 Months 6 Months 12 Months 24 Months 36 Months 48 Months 60 Months
Panel A: Events during 1980–2002
BHAR(%) 1:28c 2:14c 2:02c 2:36c 3:19c 0:29  4:30c  7:24c  8:59c  9:76c
t-val 4:70 8:16 5:49 5:24 4:99 0:31  3:40  4:67  4:60  4:54
CTAR(ap) 0:33 1:25c 0:58c 0:44c 0:26a  0:08  0:23a  0:21  0:12  0:05
t-val 1:17 5:17 3:28 2:64 1:80  0:56  1:70  1:57  0:97  0:44
ASR 0:02 0:14c 0:07c 0:05c 0:03b 0:00  0:01  0:02a  0:02b  0:02b
t-val 0:78 6:75 4:36 3:12 2:37 0:05  1:23  1:88  2:05  2:12
N of Firms 5,652 5,607 5,620 5,621 5,623 5,623 5,623 5,623 5,624 5,624
N of Months 5,652 5,607 11,173 16,690 32,896 63,832 119,031 165,674 204,720 237,648
N of Clusters 274 274 277 278 281 287 299 311 323 335
Panel B: Events during 2003–2014
BHAR(%)  0:25 0:39  0:54  0:75  1:47a  4:50c  7:29c  13:13c  14:90c  16:18c
t-val  0:61 1:18  1:12  1:25  1:70  3:51  4:20  6:48  6:76  6:90
CTAR(ap)  0:47  0:53a  0:83c  0:76c  0:65b  0:61b  0:51b  0:45a  0:42a  0:40a
t-val  0:89  1:70  2:95  2:88  2:57  2:60  2:27  1:95  1:82  1:76
ASR  0:13c  0:01  0:05b  0:05c  0:05c  0:06c  0:06c  0:06c  0:06c  0:06c
t-val  4:84  0:29  2:58  2:89  3:71  4:69  4:94  5:61  5:64  5:41
N of Firms 3,319 3,284 3,284 3,284 3,286 3,287 3,289 3,293 3,295 3,296
N of Months 3,319 3,284 6,525 9,721 19,062 36,011 63,693 84,662 100,744 112,721
N of Clusters 144 143 143 143 143 143 143 143 143 143
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Table H.13: Abnormal returns after Dividend Initiation (DIV) events for sub-periods 1980–2002 and 2003–2014.
The sample contains dividend initiations in the period January 1980 to December 2014 divided into two subsamples. The first subsample includes events
from 1980 to 2002 and second subsample from 2003 to 2014. BHAR is the buy-and-hold abnormal return defined in equation (IV.1), CTAR, or calendar
time abnormal return, is the intercept term of the Fama-French three-factor model, (Rpt R f t) = ap+bp(Rmt R f t)+spSMBt+hpHMLt+ept , and ASR is
the average per month abnormal standardized return defined in equation (IV.10). The t-values below the abnormal returns are obtained from their associated
t-ratios that for BHAR and ASR are defined by equations (IV.6) and (IV.9), respectively, and for CTAR(ap) as the intercept t-ratio of the above Fama-
French three-factor regression. Because BHAR is sensitive to few outliers as documented in (Dutta et al., 2015), the holding period return distributions
are 1 percent trimmed by dropping 0.5 percent of firms from both tails of the period’s BHAR distribution. Superscripts represent significance levels for
two-tailed t-tests as follows: a= 0:10, b= 0:05, and c= 0:01.
DIV Post-Event Periods
Month 1 Month 2 Months 3 Months 6 Months 12 Months 24 Months 36 Months 48 Months 60 Months
Panel A: Events during 1980–2002
BHAR(%) 2:35c 0:73a 1:18b 1:90c 3:80c 4:66c 5:81b 7:85b 10:57c 11:63c
t-val 5:92 1:81 2:08 2:76 3:88 2:92 2:39 2:53 2:85 2:72
CTAR(ap) 1:93c 0:90c 0:85c 0:97c 0:95c 0:80c 0:71c 0:61c 0:56c 0:52c
t-val 6:26 3:05 3:96 5:14 6:15 6:36 5:80 5:20 5:04 4:84
ASR 0:21c 0:06b 0:07c 0:09c 0:09c 0:07c 0:06c 0:05c 0:05c 0:05c
t-val 6:85 1:98 3:16 4:25 5:93 6:57 5:53 5:10 5:27 5:54
N of Firms 1,742 1,719 1,729 1,734 1,735 1,736 1,737 1,737 1,737 1,737
N of Months 1,742 1,719 3,422 5,123 10,050 19,325 35,731 49,513 61,307 71,230
N of Clusters 271 271 277 278 281 287 299 311 323 335
Panel B: Events during 2003–2014
BHAR(%) 1:63c 0:69 0:17 1:11  0:21  0:33  1:77  1:00  2:55  2:04
t-val 2:97 1:21 0:21 1:13  0:14  0:15  0:60  0:28  0:60  0:49
CTAR(ap) 1:46c 0:12 0:00 0:20 0:21 0:19 0:11 0:06 0:01  0:07
t-val 3:79 0:33  0:01 0:89 1:26 1:32 0:86 0:44 0:07  0:53
ASR 0:13c 0:05 0:02 0:06b 0:04a 0:04b 0:03b 0:03b 0:03b 0:02b
t-val 2:75 1:07 0:62 2:04 1:90 2:32 2:13 2:49 2:47 2:11
N of Firms 630 622 622 622 622 622 622 622 622 622
N of Months 630 622 1,227 1,821 3,551 6,742 12,091 16,176 19,453 22,102
N of Clusters 134 133 142 143 143 143 143 143 143 143
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